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Abstract 
 
Amphibious operations are a topic central to the history of World 
War Two in the Pacific Theatre.  The majority of research on this 
topic has been centred on the impact of American experiences 
and successes attributed to the development and evolution of 
amphibious warfare. The contributions of the United Kingdom and 
Japan to the development of amphibious warfare have been 
either overlooked or marginalized. This thesis will investigate the 
amphibious activities of all three powers both during and before 
the Pacific War, and seek to explain the importance of each 
nation’s contribution to amphibious warfare. In addition, the thesis 
will demonstrate how in its highest forms amphibious operations 
became a fully fledged system of global force projection. The 
thesis will explain how each of these powers interpreted the 
legacy of the failure of the 1915 Gallipoli campaign both in the 
context of their own wartime experiences, and in their respective 
strategic worldviews. This interpretation is central to how each 
power prepared for amphibious operations in the next war. The 
importance of the geography of the Pacific Ocean to the evolution 
and development of amphibious warfare will be discussed, as will 
the advances in technology that allowed the creation of logistical 
systems to support these operations. 
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Glossary 
 
AWM  Australian War Memorial 
BuShips US Navy Bureau of Ships 
Chi Ha Japanese Type 97 Medium Tank 
COHQ Combined Operations Head Quarters (UK) 
Daihatsu Japanese Type ‘A’ Landing Craft 
Dukw  (pronounced ‘Duck’) US amphibian truck 
FLEX  Fleet Landing Exercise (US Navy) 
FMF  Fleet Marine Force 
FMFRP Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication  
FTP  Fleet Training Publication (US Navy) 
HAF  Historical Amphibious File (US Marines) 
ISTDC Inter Service Training Development Centre (UK) 
IWM  Imperial War Museum (UK) 
Ka-Chi Japanese Type 3 amphibious Tank 
Ku-Mi Japanese Type 2 Amphibious Tank  
LCA  Landing Craft Assault  
LCM  Landing Craft Mechanised 
LCP(L) Landing Craft Personnel Large 
LCP(R) Landing Craft Personnel Ramped 
LCT  Landing Craft Tank 
LCV  Landing Craft Vehicle 
LF  Landing Force 
LSD  Landing Ship Dock 
LSI  Landing Ship Infantry   
LSI(L)  Landing Craft Infantry, Large 
LSM  Landing Ship Medium 
LST  Landing Ship Tank 
LVT  Landing Vehicle Tracked 
MLC  Motor Landing Craft (UK) 
ONI  Office of Naval Intelligence (US Navy) 
POA  Pacific Ocean Area 
RAAF  Royal Australian Air Force 
RAF  Royal Air Force (UK) 
RAN  Royal Australian Navy 
Rikusentai Naval Landing Party (Japan)  
RN  Royal Navy (UK) 
SNLP  Special Naval Landing Party (Japan) 
Suki Japanese amphibian truck 
SWPA South Western Pacific Area 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
Yusokan Class of Japanese Landing Ship, with a superficial 
resemblance to Allied LCT 
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Chapter One Introduction  
 
This study will attempt to answer how by the end of the war in the 
Pacific amphibious warfare developed from a military impossibility, 
to a fully fledged system of fo rce projection. Mastery of the art of 
amphibious warfare was one of the major factors that allowed the 
United States and its allies to defeat the Japanese Empire during 
World War Two. By 1945 the United States had developed the 
ability to project and sustain military force into virtually any coastal 
area in the world. Before the war such capability would have been 
considered impossible in the wake of the failed Dardanelles 
campaign, due to advances in defensive firepower and the rise of 
modern airpower.1 
 
Amphibious warfare underwent a transformation during World War 
Two. In 1939 Liddell Hart, a noted British military theorist, would 
describe amphibious operations as being "almost impossible, 
because of the vulnerable target which a convoy of transports 
offers to the defenders’ air force. Even more vulnerable is the 
process of disembarkation in open boats".2 Yet, after major 
successful amphibious operations had been conducted during the 
war, Liddell Hart would write in 1960 that "[a]mphibious flexibility is 
the greatest strategic asset that a sea power possesses".3  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine not just the development of 
amphibious warfare, but to also demonstrate how, during the 
Pacific War, it evolved into a 'higher form' of operation. This change 
                                                
1S. E. Morrison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United S tates In The 
Second World War, Boston, 1963, p.15. 
2 cited in J. H. Alexander, “Across the Reef: Amphibious warfare in the Pacific” in The 
Pacific War: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima , Oxford, 2006, p.198. 
3 cited in N. Polmar, and P. B. Mersky, Amphibious Warfare: An Illustrated History, 
London, 1988, p.6. 
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resulted in the creation of amphibious taskforces capable of 
providing their own air and naval gunfire support, and operating 
vast distances from their home base of operations. These 
taskforces were used in the Pacific by the United States to perform 
what writer Joseph H. Alexander called 'Storm Landings'. 
Alexander defines these as being “risky, long-range, large-scale, 
self-sustaining assaults executed against strong opposition and 
within the protective umbrella of fast carrier forces.”4 While 
Alexander is writing about operations in the Pacific, such as 
Operation Galvanic,5 his words could just as easily be applied to 
another taskforce operating a vast distance from its home port, that 
which the British Royal Navy used in Operation Corporate during 
the Falklands War (April 2nd to June 14th 1982). Operating a vast 
distance form the United Kingdom, or other friendly ports, the 
taskforce had to supply its own airpower protection, in addition to 
supplying air and naval gunfire support to operations conducted 
ashore. It is this type of taskforce which clearly demonstrates the 
modern evolved form of amphibious warfare today, and which can 
trace its genesis back to the Pacific War. 
 
Amphibious warfare 
Amphibious warfare can be defined as the projection of military 
force from the sea, onto a hostile or potentially hostile shore.6 While 
the term 'projection' can have many uses, it is the physical 
projection of military power that is important in this definition. The 
United States Navy, one of the great practitione rs of the art of 
amphibious warfare, defines it as being “a military operation 
                                                
4J. H. Alexander, Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific , 
Annapolis, 1997, p. xiii. 
5 The 2nd US Marine Division journeyed approximately 2000 miles from its base in 
Wellington, New Zealand, to its target Betio Island in the Tarawa Atoll chain, present 
day Kiribati. See Fig. 3. 
6  I. Speller, and C. Tuck, Strategy and Tactics: Amphibious Warfare, Staplehurst, 2001, 
p.7. 
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launched from the sea by an amphibious force, embarked in ships 
or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force (LF) 
ashore to accomplish the assigned mission”. 7 British practice is to 
use the terminology of ‘combined operations’ to describe 
amphibious operations, as they require the combined efforts of 
more than one arm of the service. 
 
In fact amphibious warfare has a history stretching back into 
antiquity. Records from the Egyptian Empire, dating to around 1200 
B.C,8 show that coastal provinces were experiencing attacks from 
raiders based in the Mediterranean islands and southern Europe. 
Homer’s Iliad 9 describes a war between the kingdoms of Greece 
and the city of Troy, which is in effect the story of an amphibious 
campaign. It starts with the initial Greek landings and assault on 
Troy, and later the feigned withdrawal used by the Greeks to lull the 
Trojans into taking a certain wooden horse into their city. 
Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War 10 describes 
many amphibious operations conducted throughout the war, most 
notably the various campaigns conducted in Sicily.  
 
 
This long, ongoing, tradition of amphibious warfare is not surprising 
given that 70.8% of the planet’s surface is water. 11 Thus the ability 
to project military force across water onto a hostile shore is 
particularly useful. It is also an ability often developed out of 
geographical necessity. As Napoleon remarked “the policy of a 
                                                
7 US Navy, Joint Publication 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 
Washington, 2001, p.18. 
8Speller and Tuck,  p.8. 
9 Homer, The Iliad, London, 1997. 
10 Thucydides, History Of The Peloponnesian War, London, 1972. 
11Anon., The Times World Atlas, London, 2005, p.44. 
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state is in its geography. The forms in which policy is expressed are 
diplomacy and war”.12 
 
Amphibious operations in warfare are 'amphibious' in the broadest 
possible sense, whereas when equipment is termed 'amphibian' it 
is meant in the literal sense of being able to operate on both land 
and water. Military forces used in amphibious operations are not 
required to be amphibian in nature (although this is an advantage); 
they merely require the ability to land from the sea onto a hostile, or 
potentially hostile, shore.  It is this element of risk which 
distinguishes it from a transport operation, which merely carries 
troops from friendly shore to friendly shore, along sea lanes of 
communications, whose security may, or may not, be guaranteed 
by friendly forces. 
 
Figure 1. TRANSPORT OPERATION US Sea Lanes of Communication South and 
Southwest Pacific, July 1943. 
 
                                                
12cited in C. Falls, “Geography and War Strategy”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 112, 
No. 1/3, Jul.-Sep., 1948, p.10. 
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 Also, it is this physical projection of force onto the shore that 
distinguishes it from littoral warfare.13 To paraphrase Lord Nelson, a 
ship may be a fool to attack a fort, but unless it lands forces on the 
shore, it is not an amphibious operation.14  The bombardment of a 
coastal fort by a warship is the projection of naval power ashore 
allowing it to dominate a coastal territory by virtue of the destructive 
power of its armament, as occurred during the Japanese 
bombardment of Henderson Field (see Figure 2). This domination 
lasts only as long as the naval force remains to continue the 
bombardment. Without the physical projection of force ashore, a 
territory cannot be occupied. Naval ordnance can dominate a 
coastal territory, but only a landing party can hold, and thus control 
it. 
 
Figure 2. LITTORAL OPERATION.  Night of 13/14 November 1942, Japanese 
Bombardment of Henderson Field, Solomon Islands. 
 
                                                
13 Littoral warfare is naval operations in coastal waters, the littorals. 
14 “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort” A maxim of naval strategy traditionally attributed to 
Lord Horatio Nelson, cited in F. O. Hough, V. E. Ludwig, and H. I. Shaw, Pearl Harbor 
to Guadalcanal: History of Marine Corps Operations in World War II Vol. 1 , 
Washington, n.d., p.16. 
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These two factors, the element of risk, and the physical projection 
of military power ashore, are the defining characteristics of 
amphibious operations. While both transport and littoral operations 
are important, they both lack these defining characteristics. 
However, the complementary value of these types of operation 
should not be overlooked. During the Pacific War, it was a series of 
transport operations that moved American troops and material from 
the United States to Allied ports throughout the Pacific. The arrival 
of these troops contributed greatly to the Allied victory, and while 
their passage across the Pacific Ocean was not without risk of 
attack from Japanese submarines, the moving from friendly port to 
friendly port constituted a transport operation. While the journey 
was potentially risky, the nodal points of departure and arrival were 
safely in Allied hands.  
 
During the Pacific War many of the campaigns centred round the 
control of various strategically placed island groups to act as naval 
and air bases. Owing to the vast size of the Pacific, and the 
technical limitations of both ships and aircraft in the early twentieth 
century, control of these islands could determine the success of 
future operations. Both the Allies and the Japanese devoted 
considerable effort and resources towards developing their 
respective amphibious forces. This was due to the obvious benefits 
these forces would have in projecting power across the vast 
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expanses of the Pacific Ocean. 
 
Figure 3.  AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION.  November 1943, Operation Galvanic. 
Methodology 
This study will attempt to take a transnational15 approach to 
examining the development of amphibious warfare in order to better 
explain the development of amphibious equipment and doctrine. 
Many of the respective technical and doctrinal solutions to the 
problems posed by amphibious warfare were quite similar. This 
was the result of four main factors: separate parallel development, 
cooperation and liaison in the interwar period, imitation of captured 
equipment and material, and finally espionage. By taking this 
                                                
15 The usage of the term 'transnational' in this thesis is that of looking at more than one 
nation, rather that the wider meanings often employed by other scholars. 
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approach, rather than focusing on one nation, the importance of 
each nation’s contribution can be assessed more fully.  
 
The three powers examined in this study are Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States of America. Both Japan and the 
United Kingdom are island nations. For either of them to wage war 
on its neighbours (or other nations) they had to develop at least a 
rudimentary ability to conduct amphibious operations. The United 
States of America by contrast is a large landmass, rich in both 
natural resources and territory. However, the Americas are 
bounded on both sides by vast oceans. In order to project military 
power onto Europe, Asia, or Africa, it too must possess the ability to 
conduct amphibious operations. As a result all three powers have a 
tradition of conducting amphibious operations, and had conducted 
major amphibious operations during the fifty years prior to the 
beginning of the Pacific War. 
 
The selection of these three powers as the primary focus of this 
study is due to the fact that at the beginning of World War Two, 
these nations were the three largest naval powers. This study will 
examine the approaches each of these three major powers had 
towards the development and practice of amphibious warfare 
during World War Two.  The focus on the geographical area of the 
Pacific is due to its being the largest ocean; the sheer number of 
amphibious operations conducted in it during World War Two, and 
because it was the theatre in which all three of the powers directly 
interacted.  
 
The structure of this study will be based on five chapters. This 
introduction will serve to outline the purpose of the study as a 
whole. The second chapter of this study will briefly provide an 
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overview of the period 1759 –1914 and demonstrate the impact that 
the new technologies of the nineteenth century had on amphibious 
warfare.  In order to properly explain the development of 
amphibious warfare during the Pacific War, it is also necessary to 
briefly examine the development of amphibious warfare during the 
period 1914-1918.  
 
By examining the period, it will be demonstrated that even before 
the ill-fated 1915-1916 Dardanelles campaign, amphibious 
operations had been viewed as risky operations in both military and 
political circles, and that they had often failed just as spectacularly. 
Indeed, at the beginning of the twentieth century some theorists 
were beginning to believe that the improvements in defensive 
firepower bought about by the introduction of the magazine feed 
rifle, the machine gun, and quick firing artillery “appeared to make 
opposed landings at best hazardous, and at worst impossible”. 16  
Events in the Dardanelles would offer evidence to reinforce this 
theory, even as other operations in World War One would show 
that properly planned and resourced operations could succeed.   
 
The third chapter of this study will seek to demonstrate the 
reactions of all three powers to the lessons of World War One, and 
will examine in detail the technical and doctrinal developments 
made by each power during the interwar period. Amphibious 
operations and exercises conducted during this timeframe will also 
be closely examined as a number of technological and doctrinal 
innovations were developed during this period, both in readiness for 
future conflicts, or for use in current conflicts.  
 
                                                
16 Speller and Tuck, p.10. 
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An investigation into the development of amphibian17 vehicles, 
purpose built landing craft, and other specialised equipment will 
occur in the fourth chapter. The chapter will also explain how these 
equipments became the genesis of the modern types in use since 
1945.  The relative importance of doctrinal needs versus 
operational experience in the design process will be shown, as will 
the contributions each power made towards the development of 
modern amphibious equipment. 
 
The final chapter will examine amphibious operations conducted by 
all three powers in the Pacific and how they shaped the evolution 
and development of amphibious warfare. The impact of operations 
in other theatres and the logistical challenges posed by the Pacific 
will be explored as will the exchange of information, ideas, and 
equipment between allies, theatres, and even opposing powers.  
This chapter will show how the lessons learnt in both preparing for, 
and in conducting amphibious operations in the Pacific shaped the 
development of amphibious warfare as we know it today. 
 
Literature review 
The only work found by the author to be taking a similar 
transnational approach to the development of amphibious warfare 
is a chapter by Millett in the book Military Innovation in the Interwar 
Period.18 While a detailed and informative study, it is limited by its 
concentration on the interwar and early war periods and its reliance 
on mainly secondary sources, albeit highly regarded secondary 
sources.  Another work taking a transnational approach is Clifford’s 
Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 
                                                
17 As described earlier, vehicles able to fully function both in water and on land. 
18 A. R. Millett, “Assault From The Sea: The development of amphibious warfare 
between the wars – the American, British, and Japanese experiences” in Military 
Innovation in the Interwar Period, New York, 2005, pp. 50-95. 
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1920-1940.19 Clifford argues that the British and Americans 
developed in parallel two separate systems of amphibious doctrine, 
resulting in two systems in which each “fundamentally was identical 
to the other.”20 Clifford consulted extensive British archival material 
during his study, and gives a picture of a Britain poorly prepared to 
conduct amphibious operations and largely unconvinced of their 
necessity in a future European war. This contrasts badly with the 
American developments of both a functional doctrine and of a 
future wartime role during the same period.  
 
The key reference for any study of US amphibious operations in the 
Pacific War remains Isely and Crowl’s 1951 study, The US Marines 
and Amphibious War.21 Both authors worked on the official US 
Marine history of World War Two. This study goes further than the 
official history in its analysis of amphibious operations. The study 
was the result of a joint project between Princeton University and 
the US Marines. Complete access was granted to both records and 
personnel. The only omissions in the work were material withhe ld 
for reasons of national security. Fortunately this did not affect the 
conclusions of the study. These were that the success of the US 
Marines was a result of their prewar doctrinal development that was 
perfected as a result of wartime experience. This work remains as 
one of the best works available on US Marine operations in the 
Pacific War. It is however naturally limited by its sole focus of 
American efforts during the war. 
 
                                                
19 K. J. Clifford, Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1920-
1940 , Laurens, 1983. 
20 Clifford, p. 250. 
21 J. A. Isely and P. A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines And Amphibious War: Its Theory, and 
Its Practise In The Pacific, Princeton, 1951. 
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Vice Admiral Dyer’s two volume work The Amphibians came to 
conquer22 is the sto ry of US Navy Admiral Kelly Turner’s important 
role in both the development of amphibious doctrine, and in the 
successful execution of wartime amphibious operations. The 
production of this work is the result of the US Navy’s deliberate 
attempt to have senior officers record their experiences and 
contributions to the war effort. Dyer gives a detailed analysis and 
explanation of both Kelly’s and the navy’s role in wartime 
amphibious operations. Turner did play an important role in the 
development of amphibious warfare and this is reflected in this 
work which is based not only on Turner’s recollections but on 
Dyer’s research in US navy archives.  
 
US Marine General Holland 'Howling Mad' Smith’s biography Coral 
and Brass,23 co-written by Percy Finch, gives an account of Smith’s 
role in the development, and conduct, of amphibious operations by 
United States forces in the Pacific. General Smith’s role in the 
prewar development of amphibious doctrine is also covered. More 
interestingly is his controversial view that “Tarawa was a mistake”.24 
This postwar viewpoint appears to belong to Smith alone, as, 
according to Alexander, every other high ranking officer involved in 
Operation Galvanic spoke out against his assertion.25  While 
General Smith uses his memoirs to defend his wartime actions, 
they still provide a useful and important resource in telling the story 
of the US Marines' role in developing US amphibious doctrine, 
particularly during the interwar period. 
 
                                                
22 G. C. Dyer, FMFRP 12-109-I The Amphibians Came To Conquer Vol. I, and FMFRP 
12-109-II The Amphibians Came To Conquer Vol. II, Washington, 1991. 
23 H.M. Smith and P. Finch, Coral and Brass, New York, 1949 
24 Smith and Finch, p. 134. 
25 J. H. Alexander, Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa , Annapolis, 1995, 
p.243. 
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Lorelli’s To Foreign Shores26 is a study that encompasses all 
American amphibious operations in World War Two. Lorelli covers 
these operations in depth, but does little analysis of the prewar 
development of doctrine or equipment.  Lorelli’s work is valuable as 
it is the only work to cover all American amphibious operations in 
World War Two and the interrelationship between the various 
theatres.  
Joseph Alexander’s Storm Landings. Epic Amphibious Battles In 
The Central Pacific27 details several US Marine operations in the 
Pacific in order to illustrate the development of a new class of 
amphibious operation postulated by Alexander. This class was the 
'Storm Landing'. This thesis follows in part Alexander’s theory that 
this class of operation developed during the Pacific War and formed 
the blueprint for modern operations. 
 
Singapore: The Japanese Version28 by Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, 
former chief of operations and planning staff for the 25th Japanese 
Army during the Malayan Campaign, is one of a small number of 
Japanese accounts that have been translated into English. Tsuji 
provides a through account of the campaign, though at times 
perhaps overstating his personal role in the success of the 
campaign. Nevertheless, Tsuji’s role was an important one, and he 
was well placed to be aware of many factors affecting the Japanese 
operations. Also of great value is the inclusion of an English 
translation of the wartime Japanese pamphlet Read This and the 
War is Won. This pamphlet gives a great deal of information on 
Japanese amphibious procedures and on the official justifications 
for the conflict.  
                                                
26 J. A. Lorelli, To Foreign Shores , Annapolis, 1995. 
27 J. H. Alexander, Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific, 
Annapolis, 1997. 
28 M. Tsuji, Singapore: The Japanese Version, London, 1966. 
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Another Japanese memoir is Samurai29 written by Saburo Sakai. 
Sakai was the highest scoring Japanese Navy fighter pilot to 
survive the war and provides an enthralling account of his 
experiences during the war, as the Japanese Empire moves from 
early victories to defeat. Of special interest to this study is his 
description of his unit’s efforts to maximise the range of their aircraft 
for the attack on the Philippines. This account is a useful source for 
any researcher interested in Japanese naval aviation during the 
Pacific War. Given the importance the Japanese attached to air 
support of amphibious operations, Sakai’s inside view of the culture 
of the Japanese Navy air arm, and its relations with both the 
Imperial Army and other branches of the navy, reveals how poor 
those relations could be. 
 
Evans and Peattie in their work Kaigun Strategy, Tactics, and 
Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941,30 give a 
detailed examination of Japanese amphibious developments and 
operations from the late nineteenth century to Pearl Harbor. It also 
details the growing prominence of Japan’s army in the realm of 
amphibious development during this period. 
 
Two major schools of thought exist as to the state of Japan’s 
amphibious preparedness on the eve of the Pacific War. The first, 
typified by Von Lehmann in his essay, Japanese Landing 
Operations in World War Two,31 argues that Japan had the best 
amphibious doctrine in the world as a result of extensive combat 
                                                
29 S. Sakai, M. Caidin, and F. Saito, Samurai, London, 1960. 
30 D. C. Evans, and M. R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the 
Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941, Annapolis, 1997. 
31 H. G. Von Lehmann, “Japanese Landing Operations in World War Two”, in Assault 
From The Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare, Annapolis, 1993, pp. 195- 
201. 
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operations against China. The second school, typified by Drea in 
The Development of Imperial Japanese Army Amphibious Warfare 
Doctrine,32 believes that Japanese amphibious doctrine contained a 
fatal flaw in that it was not designed to conduct assault landings 
against determined opposition. Both sides of this debate have 
merit, as while the Japanese did conduct successful landings in the 
face of serious opposition such as at Koto Bharu, Malaya, in 1941, 
they also were repelled in their first attempt to take Wake Island.  
 
The present author has been unable to find any works detailing 
both Allied and Japanese amphibious equipment used during the 
Pacific War. The closest is Conway’s All The World’s Fighting Ships 
1922-1946.33  This work, while containing technical information on 
larger amphibious vessels contains little in the way of information 
on landing craft. The lack of a unitary work describing the landing 
craft of all three powers can cause the Japanese contributions to 
the development of the modern form of landing craft to be easily 
overlooked.   
 
Norman Friedman’s U.S. Amphibious Ships And Craft:  An 
Illustrated Design History34 is a superbly illustrated study of the 
development of US landing craft. This work details the impact of 
both British and Japanese designs on the creation of US craft, as 
well as wartime experience into the design of current US 
amphibious forces. Jerry Strahan’s Andrew Jackson Higgins And 
                                                
32E. J. Drea, "The Development of Imperial Japanese Army Amphibious Warfare 
Doctrine", in In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army , 
Lincoln, 1998, pp. 14-25. 
33 R. Gardiner, (editor), Conway’s All The World’s Fighting Ships 1922-1946 , London, 
1980. 
34 N. Friedman, U.S Amphibious Ships and Craft: An Illustrated Design History, 
Annapolis, 2002. 
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The Boats That Won World War II35 is a well researched study that 
details the role of Higgins in both designing US craft, but also in 
creating them in the numbers required by the demands of war. 
Naturally, its focus remains on the production of landing craft rather 
than their employment. 
 
 Arms and Armour’s Allied Landing Craft of World War Two ,36 a 
reprint of the wartime ONI37 publication, provides details on all 
Allied landing craft and ships, including those based on local 
Australian patterns. Designed as a planning and information guide 
for Allied staffs, it contains an illustration and technical data on 
every major piece of amphibious equipment used by Allied forces in 
World War Two. 
 
Merriam Press’s Japanese Landing Craft of World War II38 is based 
on the report of the post-war US Naval Technical Mission to Japan. 
However, it suffers from poor quality reproductions of diagrams and 
photographs of equipment mentioned. Fortunately, the high quality 
of diagrams, photographs, and illustrations contained in 
reproductions of ONI 225-J Japanese Landing Operations and 
Equipments39 more than make up for this shortcoming. Ideally, both 
should be consulted together as the postwar report acts as a 
control for the wartime report. Both of these works are of value to 
this study as accurate information on Japanese amphibious 
equipment is difficult to obtain in English. 
 
                                                
35J. E. Strahan, Andrew Jackson Higgins and the Boats that won World War II, Baton 
Rouge, 1994.  
36 A. D. Baker, Allied Landing Craft of World War Two, London, 1985. reprint of US 
Navy, ONI 226 Allied Landing Craft and Ships, Washington, 1944. 
37 Office of Naval Intelligence. 
38R. Merriam, Japanese Landing Craft of World War II: U.S. Naval Technical Mission to 
Japan, Bannington, 2006. 
39 US Navy, ONI 225 J Japanese Landing operations and equipment, Washington, 1943. 
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Of works dealing principally with amphibious warfare, four works 
stand out for consideration. First is Bernard Fergusson’s The 
Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations,40 which details 
the development of British amphibious warfare from the interwar 
period through to the Suez Crisis. This work provides an excellent 
overview of British amphibious operations in the first half of the 
twentieth century. While Polmar and Mersky’s Amphibious Warfare. 
An Illustrated History41 gives an Americo-centric view of the 
development of amphibious warfare paying particular weight to the 
American role in the development of modern amphibious 
operations, particularly the category of vertical assaults. 
 
Speller and Tucker’s Strategy and Tactics Amphibious Warfare The 
Theory And Practice Of Amphibious Operations In The 20th 
Century42 attempts to explain and define amphibious operations 
using a variety of case studies. This results in a series of quite 
robust definitions and is thus a valuable reference for any study of 
amphibious warfare.  
 
The final work is Assault From The Sea: Essays on the History of 
Amphibious Warfare.43 This useful collection of essays ranges from 
the Battle of Marathon (490 B.C.), through to the Falklands War. A 
study wide ranging in scope, it encompasses work written by 
respected military historians and profession naval officers. This 
author in the preparation of this thesis has consulted many of these 
essays. 
 
Sources 
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The Pacific War was an extremely well documented conflict, 
providing a wealth of archival material to future researchers. 
Material is maintained in the archives of all the combatant powers. 
By far the biggest archives are those of the United States military. 
This is a result of three main factors: deliberate documentation, 
material generated by daily activity, and the acquisition of captured 
material.  
 
The US military went to great lengths to document its involvement 
in World War Two. This was achieved by sending historians, 
journalists, and camera crews into the field to record events. The 
resulting material includes films, photographs, monographs, 
transcripts of after action interviews, and such classic accounts of 
the Pacific War as Sherrod’s Tarawa 44 give a vivid eyewitness 
account of the chaos and carnage of an amphibious assault. 
 
The various service and campaign histories produced by the United 
States military are generally well written, and attempt to be 
objective in their interpretation of events. This is due in part to the 
quality of the authors, and partly due to the desire of the US military 
to create histories that would not only tell the story of its armed 
forces in the conflict, but also act as a learning tool for future 
generations of service personnel. In order to achieve this, historians 
were recruited during the war and literally sent into the field to 
record operations. These historians had access to service 
personnel of all ranks, and would commonly conduct after action 
interviews of units in order to ascertain what had occurred. These 
interviews, coupled with more formal reports complied by various 
unit headquarters, would  allow the creation of accurate 
monographs and official histories which would be both well written 
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and informative. For an excellent overview of this process see 
James MacGregor’s article The Naked Truth of Battle.45 
 
Of all the US Military archives, the US Marine archive is the most 
useful to any study of amphibious warfare in the Pacific. This is 
because the archive holds the Historical Amphibious File 
collection.46 This contains a vast range of material including plans 
for landing craft, photographs and intelligence summaries. The 
collection contains historical documents relating to amphibious 
operations conducted by other powers and is an important source 
for any student of amphibious warfare. This study has drawn 
heavily on material from this archive, as it is both one of the most 
comprehensive and freely accessible collections of primary sources 
available on amphibious warfare. 
 
In contrast are the difficulties faced in obtaining primary source 
material on British amphibious development. Very little British 
material is available online, and it is all subject to Crown copyright. 
This means that the reproduction of British primary source material 
for private sale to collectors and researchers alike is rare, unlike 
that for American material in which there exists a large industry. To 
obtain the material requires the researcher to travel to Britain, and 
visit archives that are often lacking even electronic indexes. This 
thesis depends for much of its research on the British aspect of 
amphibious development on secondary sources based on research 
in British archives. 
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While much material on Japanese operations during the war was 
destroyed, both as a result of Allied military action and deliberately 
by the Imperial Government after the surrender before Allied 
occupation forces arrived, significant Japanese material did survive. 
Generally this was documentation captured in the field such as can 
be found in the US Marine archives. In addition, General 
MacArthur’s occupation government created a series of 
monographs in the immediate post-war period detailing Japanese 
operations and equipment. These reports were produced as a 
result of interrogations of Japanese personnel, assessment and 
testing of equipment, and the examination of surviving 
documentation. 
 
The value of the Internet to researchers in this period is immense. 
Sites maintained by the US military allowing researchers to freely 
download material and search online have made serious research 
in this period accessible to any individual with an internet 
connection.  
 A growing trend, spearheaded by the US military, is for the official 
histories of the period to be made freely available through 
governmental websites. Currently, the official US Marine 47 and US 
Air Force Histories48 are available in downloadable pdf format. The 
exception to this is the US Navy histories, which, due to copyright 
concerns, cannot be so treated.49 In addition, the official history 
websites of all four US services have many other primary source 
materials available for use in either pdf or html format. The 
Hyperwar site is especially useful for researchers as it has many 
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49Works created by US Federal employees are automatically released into the public 
domain. As S. E. Morison was not a Federal employee at the time he wrote the US Navy 
histories, he retains the copyright of his work. 
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US Navy manuals pertaining to amphibious warfare available in 
html format on its site.50 
 
The Australian government, through the Australian War Memorial 
website,51 has also made its official histories available in pdf format, 
while the New Zealand Government has its official history available 
in html format.52 Pdf versions are available of the New Zealand 
Histories, but must be ordered and paid for. This policy is in direct 
contrast to the approach taken by both the United States and 
Australian governments. As pdf versions of documents are of 
greater value to the researcher, due to the greater accuracy in 
production, this policy is unusual to say the least. The Australian 
War Memorial site is also home to the Australia-Japan Research 
Project which will be continuing its efforts to translate Japanese 
material into English. Given the difficulties of translation, and the 
value of Japanese sources to any serious researcher of the Pacific 
War, having the material freely available is tremendously valuable. 
 
By far the best resource on the internet for information on the 
Imperial Japanese Army is the website maintained by Taki.53 Taki is 
the pseudonym used by Akira Takizawa, a Japanese histo rian who 
specialises in the study of the Japanese Imperial Army. Taki’s site 
is extremely well presented with a huge collection of wartime 
photos of Japanese equipment including landing craft and 
amphibious vehicles. The site is based on a variety of Japanese 
sources, most of which have not been widely translated into 
English.  The result is a site that provides statistical information on 
a variety of equipment types used by the Imperial Army. This data 
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includes production figures, technical details, and date of entry into 
service. Taki is able to use Japanese sources to point out the 
shortcomings in English language reference material, which are 
often caused by poor translation.  
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Chapter Two From Quebec to 'Albion' 
After Gallipoli it became widely believed by many observers that 
opposed landings had become outmoded in the face of magazine 
fed bolt action rifles, machine guns, quick firing artillery, and the 
improvements in communications brought about by railways and 
the telegraph. The view was that these improvements had given a 
decisive advantage to the defender over any possible attack from 
the sea. This ignores the fact that technological advances 
throughout the nineteenth century had also improved the striking 
power of amphibious forces, and that amphibious operations had 
faced considerable disadvantages since before the beginning of the 
eighteenth century.   
 
This chapter will seek to place the ill fated 1915 Gallipoli landings in 
a wider historical context, demonstrating that far from being an 
isolated failure, amphibious operations had always been risky 
affairs with a high proportion of failures.54 This chapter will also 
seek to demonstrate that on the eve of World War One 
technological developments had resulted in the production of the 
modern battleship, a near perfect platform for the naval gunfire 
support of amphibious operations. The Allied failure at Gallipoli will 
be placed in the wider context of amphibious operations conducted 
during World War One, and it will be demonstrated that its failure 
was the result of factors that had resulted in failure for other 
expeditions, rather that any special circumstances resulting from 
the technological developments occurring in the nineteenth century. 
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Overview amphibious warfare 1750s to 1914  
The naval supremacy that Great Britain enjoyed from the mid 
eighteenth to early twentieth centuries gave the Royal Navy the 
means to land British troops on virtually any suitable coast.  This 
ability did not automatically equate to success. During the Seven 
Years War (1756 to 1767) the British conducted amphibious 
operations against both France and her colonies, and from 1762 
onwards against the far flung Spanish empire. The majority of these 
early operations were failures, the most famous being the abortive 
expedition by Admiral Byng to lift the siege of Fort Mahon, Minorca. 
Byng had defeated a French fleet, but felt he lacked the force 
required to effect a landing and lift the siege, and retired his fleet. 
This decision was to result in his court martial and execution by 
firing squad.  
  
Expeditions by the Royal Navy on the French coast against 
Rochfort, in 1757, and St Malo, in 1758 also resulted in a lack of 
success.55 British amphibious operations in North America were 
also initially unsuccessful, with the 1757 attempt to seize the 
French fortress of Louisburg ending in failure. Not until the second 
expedition was launched in 1758 was Louisburg captured,56 and 
entrance to the St Lawrence secured. Success at Louisburg paved 
the way for the launching of an operation aimed a t the capture of 
Quebec, the seat of French administration in North America.  
 
In 1759 the British sent an expedition to capture Quebec, under the 
command of Admiral Saunders and General Wolfe. Both were 
issued orders that emphasised the importance of interservice 
cooperation, a view that Wolfe endorsed fully after his experiences 
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in earlier amphibious operations during the war.57 While an initial 
frontal assault landing failed, a subsequent amphibious flanking 
manoeuvre succeeded in forcing the French garrison to engage the 
British force on terrain advantageous to the British.58 With the 
capture of Quebec it appeared that the British had finally 
discovered a successful method for conducting amphibious 
operations after nearly three years of war. 
 
 Ample opportunity to repeat the success of Quebec would come 
with the entry of Spain into the war as a French ally in 1762. 
Spanish possessions in both the Philippines and the Caribbean 
would be overcome by a series of successful amphibious 
operations conducted by large British forces well versed in the 
conduct of combined operations.59  These forces were also 
equipped with flat bottomed boats which could operate in waters 
too shallow for regular ships boats.60  Another innovation was the 
employment of single deck frigates to provide naval gunfire 
support.61 As these vessels were of smaller draft than other 
warships, they were able to operate closer to shore and provide 
relatively more accurate gunfire than ships further out to sea. 
 
The key lessons of amphibious warfare, that of careful planning and 
of the coordination of the naval and military forces involved, had 
been learnt as a result of operational experience.  The dismal 
record of British amphibious operations during the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) reveals that these lessons were 
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not institutionalised. Neither had the important lesson of using 
sufficient force to achieve the objective.   
 
A study of amphibious operations conducted by the British during 
this period reveals that the majority of these campaigns that failed 
did so as a result of the landing force being too small to achieve the 
aimed strategic objective. While the actual landings occurred with 
little disruption, using ship to shore methods perfected in the Seven 
Years War, the subsequent land campaigns generally resulted in 
failure. The successful landing in 1799 by a joint Russo-British 
force in the Netherlands was negated by the force’s inability to 
expel French forces from the territory, due in part to the small size 
of the force landed.62 This was repeating an earlier pattern of 
landing French émigré forces back in France in sizes too small to 
effect a decisive outcome on even a local level. 
 
The major exceptions to this were the 1801 Expedition to Egypt that 
conducted a fiercely opposed landing at Aboukir on March 8 th, and 
resulted in the expulsion of the French military presence from 
Egypt,63 and the unopposed amphibious lodgement of British forces 
at Mondego Bay, Portugal, on August 1st 1808,64 which marked the 
beginning of British involvement in the Iberian Peninsula and the 
defeat of Napoleon’s forces in Portugal and Spain. 
 
Improvements in the weapon systems that European armies and 
navies used in their conflicts at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century had largely been gradual, but the nineteenth century would 
bear witness to exponential changes brought about primarily by the 
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industrial revolution. Many writers have called this process of rapid 
technical change and its resulting impact on how wars were fought 
as a 'Revolution in Military affairs'65. Throughout the greater part of 
the nineteenth century, technological advances resulted in 
improvements in all facets of warfare. The resulting advances in 
infantry weapons, communication, naval ordnance, ship propulsion, 
construction and design gave military and naval commanders both 
new tools and new options for conducting campaigns.  
 
The Crimean War (1854-1856) saw the introduction of several new 
technologies into the fray. While infantry small arms and artillery 
had changed little from the Seven Years War into the Napoleonic 
period,66 the Crimean War saw the usage of the rifle musket, a 
weapon with eight times the effective range of the smoothbore 
muskets used in earlier conflicts.67 Other innovations included the 
usage of steam powered transports and warships, and the usage of 
a new type of naval ordnance, the shell firing gun. 
 
The naval superiority of the joint Franco-British navies over that of 
Russia allowed the Franco-British forces to attempt landings almost 
at will. Yet despite having command of the sea, failures still 
occurred. The 1854 Anglo-French expedition against Petropavlosk 
in the Russian Far East resulted in failure. Despite having a six to 
one advantage in firepower, the landing force was repulsed in its 
                                                
65 W. Murray, "Thinking about Revolutions in Military Affairs", JFQ, Summer 1997, pp. 
69-76. 
66 R. Gray, (editor), Weapons: An International Encyclopedia from 5000BC to 2000AD, 
London, 1990, p. 308. 
67 For a detailed comparison between the flintlock smoothbore musket and the percussion 
cap rifle musket see P. J. Haythornwaite, The Colonial Wars Source Book , pp. 35-37.  
 33 
attempts to land.68 The commander of the British force, perhaps 
with a view to Admiral Byng’s fate, shot himself after this failure.69  
 
The main Anglo-French landing in the Crimea was unopposed, but 
was quite disorganised. Landing operations commenced on 
September 14th 1854 and took four days to complete. No tents had 
been landed on the first night, so that when a storm broke the 
British troops were left without shelter.70 The tents would not be 
ordered ashore until the 17th when the artillery was also unloaded. 
Even then the force faced shortages of provisions and animal 
transport.71 Perhaps more surprising is that the Russians passively 
observed the entire landing operation with no attempt made to 
disrupt its progress.72  In contrast the French force landed without 
incident, and completed its landing with such speed that it was able 
to offer the British force additional boats.73 
 
The landing techniques used during the Seven Years War would 
remain largely unchanged throughout the Napoleonic Wars and into 
the Crimean War. Essentially the same system of ship to shore 
movement occurred with troops landed in ship’s boats or other 
small craft pressed into service. Heavily defended sections of the 
enemy coast were usually avoided, as whilst the invading army was 
unloading it was extremely vulnerable to attack. This was due to the 
piecemeal way in which it would be forced to unload, and the 
slowness of unloading artillery and horses onto shore.  One 
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advance in the Crimean War had been the use of steam powered 
ships to transport the force to the landing area, and the use of 
steam powered launches to land troops ashore and tow other 
boats.74  The usage of steam power meant that an amphibious 
expedition was no longer dependent on the wind for mobility. The 
other major difference was that some of the warships covering the 
landings were equipped with shell firing guns. The naval gunfire 
support that they could deliver was far greater than had been 
available previously. 
 
While it had always been possible for an invading force to unload 
under the protection of the guns of its supporting warships, in 
practice the gunfire support these ships could provide was limited. 
Naval ordnance, while often larger than land based weapons, was 
limited by the lack of stabilisation needed to counteract the pitch 
and roll of a ship’s movement at sea.75 Naval gunfire support of 
amphibious operations was further limited by the lack of available 
optics and the lack of an explosive shell. A supporting fleet would 
find it difficult to accurately hit targets with any devastating  effect. 
Surprise was thus an important factor in amphibious operations, as 
prepared resistance could be could be devastating to an unloading 
force. In an age where warfare was dominated by three mutually 
supporting arms (cavalry, artillery and infantry) each highly 
dependent on each other for support, the difficulties of transporting 
and unloading of horses would also cause problems. As many 
horses could potentially die during a voyage, an army could suffer 
great losses in its cavalry arm before unloading had even begun. 
Furthermore, as horses were the ‘prime mover’ of artillery pieces, 
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the mobility of that arm could be greatly reduced by the deaths of 
horses in transit. 76 
 
The adoption in 1837 of long range explosive shell firing guns by 
the French Navy was a major technological innovation soon copied 
by the other major powers. Shell firing guns had been in 
widespread use with land forces throughout the Napoleonic Wars, 
but their successful adoption by the French Navy was as a result of 
a radical redesign by French General Paixhans.77 
 
In order for a shell firing gun to be used aboard ship, it had to 
conform to the weight and size parameters of existing naval 
weapons.  Shell firing guns on land were generally heavier in order 
to cope with the stress of firing the shell. Paixhans redesign 
reinforced the breech of the gun, where most of the stress was 
believed to occur, but reduced the amount of material along the rest 
of the barrel. The resulting weapon was thus the same length and 
weight as existing guns, but much greater in its destructive 
potential. 78 
 
The power of this new ordnance was soon realised by most navies 
and was aptly demonstrated by the French Navy at Vera Cruz in 
1837 reducing the coastal fortifications, and inflicting 400 
casualties, without the  loss of a single ship.79  The utility of shell 
firing artillery in amphibious operations was further demonstrated 
by the success of United States General Scott’s 1847 expedition to 
Vera Cruz. Scott used purpose built shallow draft ‘surf boats’ to 
land his force. He then proceeded to encircle the city and reduce it 
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by a combination of land and ship based artillery. 80 Scott was thus 
able to defeat the city without having to conduct a costly assault.81 
 
The new weapons were just as effective against other ships. In 
1853 a Russian fleet of six ships, equipped with the new guns, 
engaged a Turkish fleet armed with older non shell firing guns. The 
resulting engagement at the Turkish port of Sinope resulted in the 
destruction of the entire Turkish force of seven ships with the 
Russians suffering no loss.82 However, it is in the results of the 
gunnery where the difference shows. The Turks inflicted no less 
than eighty four hits on the Russian flagship Imperilritz Marie 
resulting in no serious damage.83 However, when the Russian guns 
hit a target the effect was devastating. Had the Turks also been 
equipped with shell firing guns the result may have been less one 
sided. 
 
The logical counter to the destructive power of the new armament 
was to be found in armouring ships. When the French Navy used 
ironclad monitors to bombard the Russian port of Kerch, during the 
Crimean War, the monitors were able to bombard the Russian 
coastal batteries with impunity, as the Russian guns were unable to 
penetrate their armour, even with the use of the new shell firing 
guns. 
 
The impact of the American Civil War (1861-1865) on this process 
of military innovation was to take two major forms. The first was 
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that in the wake of the clash between the ironclads CSS Merrimack 
and the USS Monitor the superiority of ironclad over wooden 
warships had been decisively proven, as had the value of the 
revolving gun turret.  The second was that the experiences of the 
American Civil War showed the methods of the Napoleonic Wars 
could no longer be used in conflicts where both sides were 
equipped with modern weapons and trained in their use. It also 
demonstrated the great interrelationship between littoral warfare 
and amphibious warfare. 
 
The problem for the US Navy in attempting to conduct these 
operations was that at the beginning of the war they were equipped 
solely with wooden ships, and were attempting to engage forts 
armed with shell firing guns.  In the littoral campaigns the US Navy 
was forced to engage in while conducting a close blockade of 
Confederate ports, it became particularly vulnerable to shore 
batteries, mines, and the occasional ironclad venturing out from 
port. The development of the US Navy’s own ironclads helped with 
this, but the US Navy was largely confined to conducting the war in 
the littorals. However, this was the accepted way of blockading a 
port. Eventually, it would be seen the best way for the Union to 
blockade a Confederate port was to seize it with joint land and sea 
operations.84  
 
While improvements were being made to the armament and 
protection of ships, changes were being made to the way ships 
propelled themselves. While sail powered ships were only limited 
by the availability of wind and the provision of ships stores, 
enabling ships to remain at sea for long periods of time, steam 
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powered ships were limited in their endurance by the amount of 
coal they could carry. Steam powered ships also had the 
disadvantage that until the development and widespread adoption 
of the stern mounted screw, they had stern and side mounted 
paddles that were vulnerable to enemy fire. Steam ships did have 
the advantage of being able to move without being tied to the 
prevailing winds, and as the technology improved became faster 
and larger that similar sail powered ships. Throughout the 
nineteenth century as warships evolved into the modern form of the 
pre-dreadnought battleship, ships became larger and heavier. Their 
destructive potential became greatly multiplied, but their range was 
greatly reduced and tied to the availability of coal bunkering 
stations. In addition developments in naval ordnance such as rifled 
barrels for greater range and accuracy, breech loading weapons, 
increases in calibre, better fire control systems, better armour, 
better engines, and better design meant each succeeding 
generation of warships was better than the last. This process of 
development would culminate with the launching of HMS 
Dreadnought in 1906, a revolutionary ship that was to be the 
prototype for the modern battleship, and was superior in weight of 
fire and range to all ships then in existence.85 
 
The creation of modern powerful battleship fleets was in part driven 
by the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan was an US Navy 
officer during the civil war and his experiences of the US Navy’s 
close blockades and bombardments  of Confederate fortifications 
made him dubious about the value of any form of sea based power 
being projected onto the shore.86 Mahan became convinced by his 
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wartime experience, coupled with his readings of British Naval 
history, and the writings of Clausewitz, that the correct use of a 
navy was to destroy the enemy’s fleet. This was the basis of his 
highly influential theory of sea power and its role in history.  
 
In short, the premise was that only by commanding the sea could a 
nation ensure success in terms of commerce and national prestige. 
In wartime this could only be achieved by seeking out the enemy 
fleet and destroying it.  To conduct commerce raiding or 
amphibious operations was to potentially weaken the concentrated 
striking power of ones fleet.  Once the enemy’s fleet was found and 
destroyed these operations were largely unnecessary, as ones 
opponent, without the protection of their fleet, would soon be 
brought to the negotiating table before one needed to press home 
the advantage. The influence o f this theory would shape the 
composition of fleets, their training, and war plans of several 
powers.   
 
However, successful projection of naval power onto the shore 
continued throughout this period. For while naval planners were 
seeking to create better capital ships in order to wage the next 
Trafalgar, they were also creating better and more advanced 
systems of naval gunfire support for amphibious operations. This 
was entirely coincidental, but by creating more powerful warships 
they were increasing the ability of a fleet to support land operations. 
 
Improvements in the design of ships gave commanders greater 
scope in both how quickly forces could be sent to an area, but also 
how much force could be sent. In colonial operations the 
progressively increasing striking power of the fleets of the great 
powers allowed them to reduce virtually any fortress, and land large 
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numbers of well equipped troops under the protective umbrella of 
their firepower. The loading and unloading of these forces was still 
similar to those employed in earlier periods. While the transport 
ships had become larger, troops were still landed using ships 
boats, lighters, and other small craft. All of these craft left the troops 
vulnerable as they disembarked, and often resulted in them 
becoming disorganised even during unopposed landings. The 
biggest innovation was the usage of steam powered tugs to tow 
lighters loaded with men and equipment to shore. 
 
Conversely, this also meant that local control of the sea was a 
priority for any amphibious operation. An enemy fleet could 
devastate a landing if it was able to get near it. While many 
observers took the defeat of the Russian fleet at Tsushima by the 
Japanese during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, as being 
proof of Mahan’s theory of the decisive sea power, it was actually 
the earlier attack on Port Arthur that was the real lesson. In order 
for Japan to land the military forces it needed to seize territory, it 
had to ensure local command of the sea. The most effective way of 
doing this was wiping out the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. Once this 
was done, troops could be landed with no risk of Russian 
interference. While the Japanese had not completely destroyed 
local Russian navy forces during the first part of the war, they had 
managed to claim effective control of the local sea area. This was 
more in accordance with the theories of British naval strategist Sir 
Julian Corbett, and his writings on amphibious warfare.87 
 
By 1914 the potential value of naval gunfire support was the 
greatest it had been in any point preceding, and further the utility of 
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this naval gunfire support often greatly exceeded the value of land 
based artillery in range, accuracy, and rate of fire. Throughout the 
period examined, amphibious operations remained difficult 
undertakings due to factors of geography, tenacity of enemy 
resistance, and poor planning and execution. However as naval 
armaments improved, so did the likelihood of success, so long as 
the attacking force was able to maintain at least local command of 
the sea, and was confining its objectives to those within the range 
of naval gunfire. 
 
Amphibious Operations in World War One 
During World War One, 1914-1918, a number of amphibious 
operations were conducted. While the 1915 Gallipoli landings are 
probably the best known, the British had conducted other 
amphibious operations before then. 
 
The first, the 1914 deployment of New Zealand troops to seize the 
then German colony of Samoa, was a success. 1914 would also 
see two other amphibious operations conducted. The first was the 
Anglo-Japanese expedition against the fortified German colony of 
Tsingtao, China. The landings were made some distance from 
Tsingtao and were unopposed.88  The landing force went on to 
invest Tsingtao, with Allied naval gunfire support being directed by 
spotter aircraft.89 Tsingtao surrendered on November 7th 1914, 
after a campaign that resulted in 5755 Japanese, 75 British, and 
700 German casualties.90 
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1914 also saw a more farcical attempt to seize a German colony by 
amphibious assault. The operation aimed to seize German East 
Africa by gaining control of the port of Tanga. The operation was an 
unmitigated failure, the root cause of which was poor planning. 
Tanga has been described as embodying “almost every known 
conceivable error in the theory and practise of Combined Ops” 91 
 
Briefly put, the Tanga operation had ill trained troops land at night, 
in an area the enemy knew well, after informing the enemy that 
they would be arriving. In addition many of the troops were 
exhausted after suffering from seasickness and cramped conditions 
for around a month aboard their transports. To make matters 
worse, before leaving India, many of the troops had been issued 
new weapons that they were unfamiliar with, and could not use 
effectively.92 
 
Major General Aitkin, the commander of the expeditionary force 
had decided to continue with the operation after learning that that 
any chance of surprise had been lost due the Royal Navy insisting 
that it inform the German governor that a local truce was to be 
ended, before any operation could proceed.93  
 
German defences around Tanga were thus ready and prepared for 
Aitkin’s landing at 2200 on the night of November 2nd. Aitkin’s 
initial advance on Tanga township was repulsed, and the terrain, 
German counter attacks, and the unsteadiness of much of Aitkin’s 
force hindered further attempts. On November 5th, Aitkin 
evacuated his force, leaving behind large amounts of rifles, 
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ammunition, machine guns, and other stores. The British had 
suffered over 800 casualties, while the much smaller German force 
had only suffered the loss of 60 men.94   
 
While the strategic aims of the operation, the reduction of German 
forces in East Africa, had been sound, the planning and execution 
of the operation was poor resulting in failure – a fate earlier British 
amphibious operations had suffered for the same reasons. The 
strategic aims behind the Gallipoli campaign were also sound. If the 
Dardanelles could be forced, then Constantinople and the bulk of 
Turkish war industry could be directly threatened, resulting in 
Turkey dropping out of the war. In addition the resulting access to 
Russia’s Black Sea ports would allow France and Britain access to 
badly needed grain, and the Russians to badly needed weapons to 
equip their armies.  
 
The means and methods necessary for forcing the Dardanelles was 
a problem that had vexed British military planners for some time 
before World War One. Between 1900 and 1914, no less than four 
separate staff studies had looked into the problem.95  The general 
consensus of these plans was that to attempt to force the straits 
with ships alone “was unlikely to attain any useful purpose”96 and 
that the operation would require the deployment of several 
thousand troops in addition to a large number of warships. Indeed 
the 1908 study by the War Office recommended the deployment 
and for the landings and bombardment of coastal fortification to 
occur simultaneously.97 
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Apart from stressing the large amount of military resources, all of 
these plans stressed the need for, and the difficulty of, achieving 
surprise for the operation. In essence, for the operation to succeed 
significant numbers of troops would need to be committed to action 
simultaneously and the Turks had to have no prior warnings of the 
operation. Any advance warning of the operation would give the 
Turks ample time to bolster their defences, which could result in the 
operation’s failure. Despite the recent experience of Tanga, and the 
conclusions of the prewar staff studies, the Dardanelles campaign 
was conducted in a piecemeal fashion with each step giving ample 
warning of the next. 
 
For the straits to be opened, both the series of Turkish minefields 
and the coastal batteries had to be eliminated before the Turks 
could reinforce their shore defences. On February 19th 1915, 
Admiral Carden, commanding a force of 12 capital ships, engaged 
the coastal forts with long range bombardment.  Despite a lack of 
return fire it was obvious that to eliminate the forces a close 
bombardment was necessary.  Bad weather prevented this until 
February 25th, when Carden’s deputy, Admiral de Robeck, with a 
combination of naval gunfire and landing parties, destroyed the gun 
positions at Kuru Kale and Sadd-el-Bahr.  Despite this success, 
Turkish reinforcements, backed by mobile batteries of 6 -inch 
howitzers, forced the landing parties to withdraw.  The element of 
surprise, vital to the pre -war plans, had been lost. 
 
While the battleships of Carden’s fleet were well protected against 
these howitzers, the accompanying force of mine sweepers was 
not.  This resulted in them being unable to clear the channel of 
mines due to the refusal of their civilian crews to face artillery fire 
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while clearing mines. Because of continued bad weather, the 
seaplanes used as spotters for naval gunfire were unable to fly,98 
so the fleet was unable to eliminate the mobile batteries without 
moving closer.  To do so, they risked being sunk by mines and 
waiting for better weather only allowed the Turks to increase their 
defences. 
 
In order to solve this impasse, Carden’s chief of staff, Commodore 
Keyes, scoured the fleet for volunteers to man the minesweepers. 
On March 13th, six minesweepers and a cruiser HMS Amethyst 
attempted to clear the minefields.  Four minesweepers were sunk.  
Further attempts were made on the following two successive 
nights.  These attempts were also repulsed. Under the constant 
pressure from London to force the straits, and faced with these 
repulses, Admiral Carden relieved himself of command under 
medical advice. 
 
Faced with messages urging haste from London, and the failure of 
light forces to remove the minefields, de Robeck made an attempt 
on March 18th to force the narrows with his battleships.  While 
initially successful, this attack soon faltered with three battleships 
sunk by mines. 
 
Keyes was convinced that another attack would succeed.  He 
based his assessment on his estimates of Turkish ammunition 
stocks that he believed to be virtually expended,99 and his appraisal 
of the strength of the Allied fleet. The arrival of reinforcements, 
consisting of six battleships (four British and two French), combined 
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with his re-crewing of the surviving minesweeper trawlers with 
naval crews, in addition to equipping destroyers with minesweeping 
gear, meant the fleet still remained capable in Keyes' opinion of 
clearing the straits.  Keyes’ arguments initially swayed de Robeck 
but by March 22nd de Robeck had decided the army had to be 
used.  Despite consternation at the Admiralty, de Robeck’s opinion 
as admiral on the spot was supported. The decision was then made 
to force the s traits by landing a sizable body of troops on the 
Gallipoli peninsula and at Kum Kale on the Asiatic coast.  The 
resulting delay between the last naval attack on the 19th of March 
and the eventual landings on the 25th of April had given German 
General Liman von Sanders ample time to reorganise Turkish 
defences and conduct intensive training of his forces. 
 
The subsequent failure of the campaign stems from this point. Had 
even half the 74,800 troops used on the April 25th landings been 
ready and available to  support the naval operations in March, it is 
virtually certain the straits would have been forced. The failure to 
have these troops available stems from two main sources, first the 
demands of a global war, and second extremely poor planning.  
 
The landings failed, despite immense heroism on the part of the 
Allied troops, to achieve their stated objectives. Partially, this was 
due to limited numbers of craft being available to land the troops, 
because of which only 30,000 troops were able to be landed on the 
first day.  The beaching of SS River Clyde had not gone as 
planned, the original plan being to get a large number of men to the 
beach safely by beaching a large ship, as opposed to transporting 
them ashore in small boats, in a manner similar to the LSTs 100 of 
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World War Two. Instead, it resulted in a ‘turkey shoot’ for Turkish 
machine gunners.  
 
 Also the lack of effective communications resulted in confusion, 
and many local successes were not reinforced, but largely the fault 
lies with General Hamilton. By remaining on the battleship, HMS 
Queen Elizabeth, Hamilton remained unable to coordinate the 
operation, resulting in the fleet being unable to deliver supporting 
fire due to a lack of communication with the shore, and land forces 
being unaware of the overa ll situation. While Hamilton’s presence 
would not have solved all these problems, it would have reduced 
their effect.101 It is also possible that if Hamilton had been ashore 
he might have realised that the Turkish forces had also suffered 
heavily, and with some 34,800 men still left to come ashore, 
Hamilton might have been able to exploit this. Instead Hamilton 
gave the order to dig in, in order to regroup his forces and 
consolidate his position. This respite also gave the Turks the 
chance to bring up reinforcements. 
 
Despite the sacrifice of many brave men on both sides over the 
coming months, a stalemate developed with Hamilton’s forces 
bottle up in two separate areas, Anzac, and Cape Helles. A 
subsequent landing on August 6th was designed to land sufficient 
forces at Suvla so that the Turkish forces blocking the advance up 
the peninsula would be outflanked and obliged to withdraw, thus 
clearing the way for a general advance towards the narrows. The 
key to this plan was that forces landed at Suvla would rapidly 
expand out of their beachhead and seize both the Chocolate and 
Green Hills. Possession of these would allow them to attack the 
Tekke Tepe ridge. This would be supported by a breakout from 
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Anzac designed to both cover operations at Suvla, and seize the 
Sari Bair Ridge. Holding these features was the key to out flanking 
the Turks on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The plan resulted in failure, 
when General Stopford, in command of the landing force failed to 
seize the hills in front of his landing beach. 
 
After the failure at Suvla, the Allies could either reinforce or 
withdraw their forces.  With other theatres competing for resources, 
and the likelihood of success becoming ever more fleeting, the 
decision was made to evacuate the Allied positions. Suvla and 
Anzac were the first to evacuate on the night of 19th/20th 
December 1915. The operation went without hitch with only two 
men wounded at Anzac. The withdrawal at Anzac and Suvla freed 
up Turkish forces for use against the Helles position, which had had 
its strength reduced from 40,000 at the end of 1915 to only 15,000 
by January 7th, 1916, when the last Turkish offensive was 
launched. The attack, while featuring the heaviest Turkish 
bombardment of the campaign, failed to break the British line. Many 
Turkish infantry also refused to advance during this attack, probably 
sensing that after the withdrawal of troops from Anzac and Suvla, 
Helles was soon to follow. 102 On the night of January 8th/9th this 
was proved correct with the successful evacuation of Helles. The 
success of the evacuations was due to careful planning and 
preparation, with devices such as automatic firing rifles used to 
maintain the illusion of occupancy until the troops had departed. In 
view of the history of the campaign as a whole, this is somewhat 
ironic. 
 
Despite the failure of the Dardanelles campaign, the British still 
viewed amphibious operations as being credible.  A number of 
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assets suitable for amphibious operations had been kept in home 
waters during the Gallipoli campaign including a number of 
armoured landing craft. A variety of feasibility studies and 
experiments with landing equipment were conducted by the Royal 
Navy during the war, even after the failure of Gallipoli. These 
experiments included attempting to solve the problem of getting 
tanks ashore. The purpose behind keeping these assets in home 
waters was to maintain the ability to allow the launching of a cross-
Channel invasion should the military situation prove it necessary.103 
 
The Royal Navy also conducted a series of cross-Channel raids in 
1918, with the objective of causing disruption to the German U-Boat 
campaign. These raids, while only limited successes, were planned 
with the utmost care, and often had ships purpose built for them. 
The British war record of amphibious warfare was not a happy one, 
but neither was it entirely without success. In particular the Royal 
Navy would prove highly successful in conducting evacuations. 
 
The Germans conducted very few amphibious operations during 
World War One.  The largest operation they conducted was 
Operation Albion, which was to seize the strategic Baltic Islands of 
Oesel, Dagoe, and Moon at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga. By 
seizing these islands, the Germans could secure the Gulf of Riga, 
and directly threaten Petrograd. The German Navy had proposed 
the seizure of these islands as early as 1890, as part of plans for 
use in the event of a Russo-German war.104 The idea had been 
proposed throughout the war, but the German Army doubted the 
navy’s ability to maintain sea communications with the islands if 
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they were taken.105 In 1917, Russia was on the verge of collapse, 
and Germany desperately needed to knock Russia out of the war 
before the impact of American involvement was felt on the Western 
Front. While German troops were within two days normal march of 
Petrograd, they were unable to directly threaten the city due to their 
advance being blocked by forest and marsh.  The operation would 
thus act as a coup de grâce, knocking Russia out of the war.  
 
The historiography of this operation is of particular interest. The 
chief of staff of the expedition, Lieutenant General von 
Tschischwitz, wrote a history intended to preserve the knowledge 
gained about amphibious operations during the operation for future 
generations of German officers. This book, The Army and Navy 
during the Conquest of the Baltic Islands in October 1917,106 goes 
into great detail about the planning, preparation, and execution of 
the operation. 
 
 As Germany had no tradition of amphibious warfare the planners 
had to reinvent the wheel based on their observations of the 
Gallipoli campaign, and examining the problems on a practical 
basis. Naturally a work of such nature would be of interest to any 
organisation developing its own amphibious doctrine. Interestingly 
enough, this work was translated into English by the US military 
during the period it was formulating its own amphibious doctrine. 
Both the US Army and the US Marine Corps held copies of the 
work during the period they were developing their own amphibious 
doctrine.  
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Planning for the operation involved the gathering of information on 
the islands' defences. This was achieved by using both spies and 
aerial reconnaissance.107 The chain of command for the expedition 
was also clarified in a Field Order from Eighth Army Headquarters. 
This field order formed the basis for the operational plan for the 
expeditionary force, and outlined the objectives of the expedition 
and the responsibilities of each service. A great deal of effort was 
spent before the operation in ensuring the integration of Army and 
Navy communication systems, even going to the extent of 
exchanging radio officers to act as liaisons. 
 
The operation was wargamed, and proved to be a success.108 
Detailed planning was undertaken for the operation, with no detail 
proving too small for consideration. Meteorological surveys were 
undertaken to ensure good weather with the embarkation being 
delayed because of this. The delay in embarkation was spent in 
training, familiarising the troops with the small craft they would use 
to land on the island. In addition to commandeered barges and 
prams, the Germans also used horse scows for the landing of 
horses and vehicles. “These are pontoon-shaped boats, rather long 
and flat bottomed, the broad rear gate of which would fold down 
and serve as a landing gate”.109  
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Photo 1. German Horse Scow being loaded. (IWM Collection)110 
 
The invasion force would consist of the 42nd Infantry Division, 
consisting of three infantry regiments and its supporting troops and 
artillery. In addition, the force would have an additional regiment of 
Bavarian infantry, five bicycle battalions, two squadrons of cavalry, 
and three heavy artillery batteries. This resulted in a grand total of 
24,596 men. 
 
The naval component would consist of 19 transports, and 11 
dreadnoughts. As Germany only had 24 dreadnoughts available at 
this stage of the war, the number of capital ships allocated to this 
operation seems rather high. However, as part of increasing level of 
war weariness experienced in Germany as a whole, unrest 
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amongst the fleet was on the increase. As such the admirals were 
always keen for any opportunity to exercise the fleet.111 
 
The troops were embarked on October 9th, with the fleet sailing on 
the 11th, under a protective umbrella of aircraft patrolling for 
submarines. The landing took place on the 12th, under the cover of 
the fleet's guns. While the Russians put up spirited resistance, the 
Germans had allocated enough force to ensure success. The 
landings had been a complete success, and the footholds gained 
allowed the successful continuation of the operation, with the 
conquest of Oesel being completed by the 16th. The Germans then 
turned their attention to Moon Island, landing troops on the 17th, 
the Russians surrendering a little after midnight on the 18th. A 
landing had been made on Dagoe Island on the 15th, but Russian 
resistance was not eliminated until the 20th of October.  
 
Tschischwitz, in his book, goes to great lengths to stress the 
importance of cooperation between the navy and army as being 
vital for the success of the operation. While accepting that by 1917 
Russia was virtually defeated, he points out that the success of this 
operation was not a foregone conclusion, and that but for the 
careful planning, preparation, interservice co-operation the 
expedition could have resulted in failure. Tschischwitz also stresses 
that these are the keys to a success amphibious operation, and that 
they should not be forgotten, as in the future the German people 
may have need of them.112 All three of these factors were absent in 
the British operations at Gallipoli. Operation 'Albion' stands as an 
example that opposed landings could be conducted successfully 
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with the technical means available to military and naval 
commanders during World War One. 
 
Planning the Future  
The process of planning for the next war begins with the end of the 
last. The end of War World One was no exception. The planning of 
expeditions to contain the ‘Red Menace’ of communism, put down 
various colonial insurrections, and cope with the instability caused 
by the dissolution of three major empires occupied the staffs of the 
victorious Allied powers. The process of trying to assimilate the 
lessons taught by the war was also occupying the thoughts of many 
theorists and military staffs. The war had also introduced many new 
weapons, and various theorists sort to champion them, or portray 
them as being an exception brought about by unusual 
circumstances. Efforts were made to draw parallels with earlier 
conflicts to see if that could aid any explanation as to what had 
occurred, for it was clear that the war had not ‘ended by Christmas’ 
as had been widely believed in 1914. 
 
The sheer scale of the war had also had its impact on this process. 
The financial and human cost of the war was immense. The huge 
cost in human life helped fuel a pacifist movement in many 
countries. This had the effect in the western democracies of 
encouraging disarmament, leading in part to treaties such as the 
1922 Washington Naval Limitation Treaty, and a desire to reduce 
military budgets. Partially, this desire to reduce military spending 
sprang from the financial burden of the war, and the large war 
debts even the victorious Allies were facing. 
 
The events of the war were analysed by military theorists hoping to 
explain what had occurred, and to determine what, if any, lessons 
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could be learnt from both the successes and failures. In the study of 
amphibious warfare, “The Dardanelles were fought all over again, 
in printers ink and at the Staff Colleges, in Britain, the United 
States, and Australia.”113 Partially, this was done in an attempt to 
explain what had occurred, either to condemn, as Liddell Hart 
would, opposed landings as being impossible, or to see if past 
mistakes could be avoided. For each of the powers focused on in 
this study, World War One had resulted in victory, but each would 
emerge with conclusions shaped by both their own experiences, 
and their interpretations of the war as a whole.  Over the next 
twenty years this would result in a number of interesting 
developments. 
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Chapter Three Interwar Developments and Operations 
 
For the purposes of this study, the 'interwar' period is defined as 
being the period between the end of World War One and the 
beginning of the Pacific War on December 7th, 1941. 
 
During this period the development of amphibious warfare was of 
great interest to the militaries of Japan, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom. However, this interest was to manifest itself in 
very different ways. This was a result of the dissimilar wartime 
experiences of each nation, the political and economic conditions of 
each nation, and the quite diverse concerns of each nation.  
 
The immediate postwar period saw the militaries of both the major 
and minor powers attempt to integrate the lessons and new 
technologies of World War One into the way they would fight future 
wars. The impact of World War One was immense, both in the 
sheer scale of the conflict, and in the way new technologies were 
used to fight it. Each of the three powers in this study conducted 
extensive staff studies on the Gallipoli campaign in an attempt to 
determine what happened and if opposed amphibious operations 
were possible. 
 
World War One had in effect caused a revolution in military affairs 
as a result of the application of new technologies such as aviation, 
light automatic weapons, armoured vehicles, and chemical 
weapons. Combined with new doctrines and organisational 
concepts these radically changed the fundamental character and 
conduct of military operations. World War One had seen the 
introduction, and widespread adoption, of these new technologies 
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and theorists spent much of the interwar period debating over their 
employment in future conflicts. 
 
The immediate postwar period was characterised by instability in 
the territories of the former Central Powers and the former Russian 
Empire.114 The landing of forces where these interventions took 
place followed the nineteenth century pattern of operations, with the 
landing of forces away from defences, and the establishment of a 
defensive perimeter that allowed the landing of more forces. 
 
Allied intervention in Russia was a result of the desire of Britain, 
Japan, and the United States to reclaim war material that had been 
sent to Russia during the war.  These expeditions soon became 
involved in Russia’s civil war, eventually resulting in the Allies' 
evacuation of 'White' non-communist forces following the success 
of the Bolsheviks in the civil war. These evacuations followed the 
traditional pattern of amphibious operations. The Allied naval forces 
arrived at a port, picked up the evacuees, and then left. The 1920 
March evacuation of the Port of Novorossiisk took place amid 
scenes of chaos. Despite the wholesale desertion of White forces 
abandoning the city’s defences to join mobs of refuges, the 
evacuation was protected by a curtain of Allied naval gunfire, 
preventing the advance of Red forces. Despite this the evacuation 
was a mixed success as there were too few transports to evacuate 
all who wished to flee.115 The final evacuation of White Russian 
forces from the Crimea on November 14th 1920 marked the end of 
the Russian Civil War. This evacuation was carried out in an orderly 
fashion with White Russian troops conducting an orderly fighting 
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retreat allowing the embarkation of over 144,000 troops and 
civilians onto a fleet of 126 ships of various types.116  
 
The human and material cost of World War One resulted in a 
number of attempts to prevent further conflicts by the use of the 
concepts of collective security, open diplomacy, and 
disarmament.117  The formation of the League of Nations was 
meant to result in the institutionalisation of these concepts and 
provide a mechanism for their enforcement. As the United States 
did not join the League, and Japan left in 1933, it failed to achieve 
these goals. 
 
Disarmament was an issue that did meet with some limited 
success. The 1921 Washington Naval Limitation Conference 
resulted in the signing of a treaty in 1922 that limited the size of 
each signatory’s fleet. The treaty, while placing strict limitations on 
the size and number of battleships, contained no limitations on 
amphibious warfare vessels, and only slight limitations on aircraft 
carriers.118 Both of these would be of great importance in the 
coming conflict in the Pacific.  
 
British Developments 1919-1941 
The end of World War One saw Britain theoretically in possession 
of a significant capability to conduct amphibious operations. With 
the vast size of the Royal Navy, Britain had the naval assets 
required to transport, protect, and support an amphibious operation, 
but it lacked an efficient means of transporting men and material 
from ship to shore.  
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In addition the Dover Patrol,119 during the tenure of Commodore 
Bacon, had conducted experiments with the aim of finding a rapid 
method for disembarking troops and even tanks on the Belgian 
coast,120 and had conducted two major amphibious raids on 
German installations at Zeebrugge and Ostend in 1918. The 
operations of the Dover Patrol, and the failures of Tanga and 
Gallipoli had left Britain with a large and varied body of recent 
operational experience.  
 
However, despite this excellent foundation, and its long and proud 
tradition of conducting naval operations, Britain would enter World 
War Two with only the most rudimentary amphibious capability. 
This erosion of Britain’s amphibious capability was the result of 
three main factors: flawed analysis of wartime experiences, 
reduced defence expenditure, and the absence of a defined need 
for the capability. 
 
The spectre of Gallipoli was to loom large over the postwar analysis 
of amphibious operations. Both the Army and the Navy desired to 
know what could be learnt from the mistakes made at Gallipoli. 
Whilst the Gallipoli campaign had resulted in failure, its failure had 
not discredited the entire concept of amphibious operations. 
Indeed, the fact that the British continued to develop plans in 1917-
1918 for a landing on the coast of German occupied Belgium, 
shows that amphibious operations were still viewed with merit in 
some quarters. 
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However, Gallipoli, the largest amphibious operation of the entire 
war, had resulted in failure and in 1919 the British Admiralty 
established the Mitchell Committee to analyse the campaign in 
detail and produce a report explaining why.121  The same year, an 
interservice exercise was held at Camberley Army Staff College. 
This exercise was based on the Gallipoli campaign and the 
participation of both Army and Navy veterans of the campaign. The 
result of this exercise was for the college commandant, W.H. 
Anderson, to call for the establishment of an interservice committee 
to see how the experiences of the last war could be integrated into 
British amphibious doctrine.122 The resulting Anderson Committee 
had representatives from the Royal Navy, the Army, and the 
fledgling Royal Air Force.  Its first effort was the production of a 
chapter on combined operations for the 1921 Army Field 
Regulations and a recommendation that the joint amphibious 
doctrine receive further analysis.123  
 
 Unfortunately, it was this concept that amphibious operations were 
primarily a combined operation that was to result in problems. At 
the same time that the lessons of Gallipoli were being examined, 
the Admiralty was looking at another kind of combined operation, 
that of the defence of naval bases. The Admiralty was concerned 
about the impact of airpower on the defence of its naval bases, an 
issue complicated by the absorption of naval aviation into the Royal 
Air Force. 
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 A series of interservice exercises on the defence of Singapore and 
Hong Kong were held at the Army Staff College.124  While the 
exercises resulted in reports recommending a thorough review of 
the 1913 Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, the 
resulting interservice committee resulted in a “staunch defence of 
the status quo, service independence, and rejection of the 
importance of preparing for opposed landings”.125 This result was 
hardly surprising given the financial pressures on military budgets. 
World War One had been enormously expensive for Britain, in both 
financial and material terms. Britain had gone from being a creditor 
nation with a strong economy, to being a debtor nation with large 
war debts, extensive Imperial defence commitments, and a need to 
reduce defence expenditure. This was to be achieved by reducing 
forces, selling surplus equipment, reducing exercises, and 
minimising research and development. 
 
The development of amphibious doctrine was thus to be hampered 
by interservice politics in a time of decreasing military budgets. 
While amphibious operations were not completely ignored at the 
school level with exercises and lectures being regularly conducted 
at both at the Naval War College126 and the Army Staff College, 
only two major exercises were conducted during the 1920s using 
troops.127 And these, the 1924 landing of troops in the Bay of 
Bengal by Rear Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, and the 1928 
landing of troops in the Moray Firth in Scotland, were the result of 
the initiative of local commanders.128  
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So while the 1920s would see the revision of the combined 
operations manual in 1925 and numerous school studies o f 
amphibious operations, the assumptions these theoretical 
classroom exercises made would remain unchallenged by practical 
experience in field exercises.  At the same time, a growing opinion 
was emerging in the British military that opposed landings were 
now impossible in the face of modern artillery, machine guns, and 
air power.129 Many of these misgivings over the absolute power of 
the defensive could have been resolved if exercises had been 
conducted. Furthermore, what doctrine did emerge was based on 
unchallenged assumptions, creating a distorted view of amphibious 
operations. The prevailing assumptions were that for an 
amphibious operation to succeed, it had to be conducted with the 
element of surprise, preferably under the cover of darkness, and 
that an assault on a well defended beach was doomed to failure.130 
These assumptions were codified in the subsequent review of the 
combined operations manuals in 1931. 
 
This prevailingly pessimistic view of amphibious operations was 
compounded by the British view that amphibious operations had to 
be conducted with the cooperation of all three services, and that 
naturally any doctrine for conducting amphibious warfare had to 
involve all three services in its production. Unfortunately, the focus 
of the Army was on colonial campaigns, and later in the mid thirties, 
continental operations, which the Army believed would only involve 
transport operations and not amphibious operations. The Royal Air 
Force believed that airpower had rendered amphibious operations 
obsolete, and as such tendered little support for the development of 
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amphibious doctrine.131 This left only the Navy with an ongoing 
interest in amphibious warfare, but without the cooperation of the 
other services, it was unable to solve the problem alone.  
 
The one organisation that could have claimed amphibious 
operations as a niche role was the Royal Marines but in 1922 they 
were faced with a drastic reorganisation due to financial pressures. 
This reorganisation resulted in the merger of the Royal Marine 
Artillery Regiment with the Royal Marine Light Infantry Regiment, 
and the closing of some base depots.132 This merger cost the Royal 
Marines their organic artillery capability, resulting in a dependence 
on the Army for providing artillery support in any future exercises or 
operations. The loss of this artillery component reduced the Royal 
Marines' ability to conduct amphibious operations alone in the 
spearhead role that the US Marines were training for during this 
same period.   
 
In 1923, the Admiralty established the Madden Committee to 
determine the role of the Royal Marines during wartime. The 
committee was headed by Admiral Sir Charles Madden, and 
consisted of four naval officers, and two marine officers.133 In 1922 
the committee concluded that the wartime functions of the Royal 
Marines were: 
 
1.  To provide detachments for larger surface units of the Royal 
Navy, capable of acting as gun crew and as shore parties. 
2.  To provide forces capable of the seizure and defence of 
temporary bases, and conducting raids on enemy coastlines. 
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3.  To act as a liaison between the Army and the Navy.134 
 
However, despite establishing the role of the Royal Marines as a 
wartime amphibious striking force, the Madden Committee still 
placed the provision of shipboard detachments as the Royal 
Marines' primary role. Also, the report omits two other roles for the 
Royal Marines; the first being the guarding of naval bases during 
peacetime, and the second providing units for service with the Army 
in the field.135 By placing shipboard detachments at the  top of 
priorities for the Royal Marines, budgetary priority was given to 
fulfilling this goal. Indeed the limited increase in the size of the 
Royal Marines went towards manning ships detachments.136 The 
omission of providing guard detachments for naval bases, and units 
for service with the Army in the field was designed to avoid 
encroaching on functions that were traditionally the domain of the 
Army.137 While the assumption of these duties could have resulted 
in a larger marine force, better equipped for amphibious operations, 
they would have resulted in a lack of goodwill from the War Office.  
 
So while the reforms envisioned by the Madden Committee 
recognised the potential value of the Royal Marines as an 
amphibious force, they ultimately served to preclude the 
development of such a force by giving its development a lower 
priority in a time of budgetary constraints. These budgetary 
constraints that resulted from the vast debts incurred during the war 
were further strained by the onset of the Great Depression i n the 
early 1930s. The need for cutting military budgets, whilst still 
making a credible imperial defence, resulted in few funds being 
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available to cover all commitments, let alone fund the required 
expansion of the Royal Marines. The Madden reforms were to 
remain, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, a promise unfulfilled.  
 
In 1934, Admiral Lord Cork and Orrery, Commander in Chief of the 
Home Fleet, conducted the last major British amphibious operation 
of the interwar period. Forty two ships of the Home Fleet were used 
to land an Army Brigade group against an opposing brigade group 
at the mouth of the Humber River.138 At the conclusion of the 
exercise, designed to test communication techniques,139 Lord Cork 
and Orrery stated “a great deal more investigation and experiment 
will be necessary before it can be affirmed that it is possible in 
these days to land a division on open beach against opposition”.140  
 
At this time, the Japanese had been routinely conducting division 
sized amphibious exercises since 1920. In addition, while the 
Japanese had been developing and experimenting with the 
specialised ships and small craft required for amphibious 
operations, the British continued to utilise the surface units of the 
Royal Navy for transporting personnel and equipment during 
exercises, and landing them in the ship’s boats of the warships 
involved. However, in administrative exercises of ship to shore 
logistics, a flat bottomed, bow ramped, landing craft was used, 
despite the British not having a craft like that either in service or 
development.141 The Japanese had a craft with those 
characteristics, the type ‘A' Daihatsu, in service since 1930.  
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The Admiralty was not unaware of the development, being made in 
amphibious warfare by Japan and the United States, but it was not 
until 1936, after a report by Royal Navy Captain Bertram Watson, 
that the Admiralty was able to persuade the War Office and the Air 
Ministry that further study of amphibious operations were 
required.142 Finally, in 1938, after nearly two years of interservice 
bureaucratic wrangling, the Chiefs of Staff established the Inter-
Service Training and Development Sub-Committee, which in turn 
established the Inter-Service Training and Development Centre 
(ISTDC), at Eastney Barracks, Portsmouth.143 The mandate of the 
ISTDC was to cover the development of all interservice operations. 
While the Navy was interested in the development of amphibious 
doctrine and equipment, the Army and the Royal Air Force were 
more interested in the development of airborne forces.144 
 
Two events occurred during this two year interval which served to 
influence the development of British amphibious thought. The first 
was the 1936 Republican invasion of the Nationalist held Balearic 
Islands, during the Spanish Civil War. Despite having artillery, air, 
and naval support, the invading Republican forces were forced to 
withdraw from their beachhead due to the intervention of modern 
Italian airpower, bombing and strafing Republican forces with little 
opposition.145 This served to strengthen the Royal Air Force view 
that amphibious operations were particularly vulnerable in the face 
of modern airpower.146 
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The second event was the outbreak of the Second Sino -Japanese 
War in 1937. The scale of the Japanese landings at Shanghai, and 
at other locations on the Chinese coast, served to reinforce the 
Admiralty’s view that Britain had allowed its amphibious capacity to 
decline to an unacceptable level. 
 
The opening of the ISTDC occurred only two months before the 
Munich Crisis in 1938, which served to focus all three services 
towards the immediate possibility of another European war against 
Germany. As this war was unlikely to offer the need for the 
employment of amphibious operations, development of such 
capability was accorded a lower priority.147 The 1938 Combined 
Operations manual reflected the belief that Britain would not require 
an amphibious capability in the next war.  While the ISTDC did 
conduct some experimentation and theoretical exercises before the 
outbreak of war with Germany in 1939, these experiments and 
exercises were both small in scale and based on the faulty 
assumptions of the 1920s and early 1930s.148 
  
By the time the British economy was starting to recover from the 
Depression, the prospect of a new European war resulted in 
rearmament priorities being focused towards the projected needs of 
that war. The belief by airpower theorists that an invading 
amphibious force could be defeated by airpower alone was also to 
greatly retard the development of British amphibious theory.149    
 
Because it was believed that in any future European war, as in the 
last war, British troops would be able to use French ports, 
amphibious warfare became a much lower priority for military 
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spending.150 The expulsion of Allied forces from the continent 
following the fall of France in 1940 was to put the need for 
amphibious forces sharply back into focus. 
 
Japanese Developments 1919-1941 
World War One had been a successful war for Japan, resulting in 
territorial gains in the Pacific and China in exchange for little 
materiel or human cost. Japan had conducted several amphibious 
operations during the war, but these had all been unopposed 
landings. The Navy had seized the German-held Caroline, 
Marshall, and Marianas Island groups, while the Army had landed 
troops on the Chinese mainland before beginning the siege of the 
German fortress at Tsingtao. 
 
These operations had all followed the traditional nineteenth century 
pattern of having light forces land on an undefended shore, creating 
a lodgement that would allow for the disembarkment of the rest of 
the force. However, operations against undefended shores could 
not always be guaranteed, and the Allied failure at Gallipoli had 
aptly demonstrated the difficulties of conducting operations against 
a well defended shore. As a result, the Japanese mili tary started to 
develop the techniques and equipment required for conducting 
opposed landings.151 
 
While both the Japanese Navy and Army had an abysmal record of 
interservice co-operation, amphibious operations were the one area 
in which both cooperated effectively with each other.152  This co-
operation was born out of strategic necessity due to the nature of 
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Japan’s geography. As Japan is an archipelago, in order to project 
military force on to mainland Asia, or into the Pacific, an 
amphibious capability was required.  
 
While both services developed amphibious forces, the respective 
forces evolved along very different paths. The Navy had 
traditionally projected power ashore in the form of lightly armed 
landing parties. Rikusentai (Naval landing party) units were also 
used as garrison units at naval installations. Rikusentai were 
composed of sailors who were given minimal infantry and small 
arms training and could be deployed as and where the need arose, 
as up to a third of a ship’s company was available for such 
operations.153  This naval rapid reaction force was normally 
deployed to quell disturbances, or to protect Japanese lives and 
property.154 Any operation that required the landing of a division or 
larger sized force would necessitate the involvement of the Army.155  
 
 As a result of its study of Gallipoli, the Japanese Army had 
reached two conclusions, the first that they should not rely solely on 
the Navy to organise amphibious operations, and secondly, that 
future landings would require both more speed and more force.156 
These requirements spurred the Army into developing a wide range 
of special landing craft, transports, and other equipment to fulfil this 
role. As a result of this development, and the Army’s growing 
political dominance, the Army would gradually come to dominate 
amphibious development in Japan.  
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This dominance would see the Army develop its own fleet of troop 
transports, operated by the Rikugun Un’yubu (Army Transportation 
Department). This organisation had extensive ties into Japan’s 
shipping industry and was responsible for the management of port 
facilities used by the Army, operating the Army’s fleet of ships and 
landing craft, and conducting research into new designs of 
amphibious equipment.157 Much of the research into new designs of 
ships and craft was done in co-operation with the Navy, although 
the Army had the resources to conduct this work alone.158 
 
Beginning in 1920, the Japanese Army and Navy conducted a 
series of joint amphibious exercises. These exercises were 
conducted throughout the 1920s and routinely involved the landing 
of division sized forces. In 1926, the 5th, 11th, and 12th Divisions 
were assigned to the Rikugun Un’yubu for training in amphibious 
warfare. This was a result of these units being designated for an 
invasion of the Philippines in the event of a war between the United 
States and Japan.159  
 
These exercises were used to work out the problems posed by 
amphibious operations. Techniques for conducting naval gunfire 
support, ship to shore movement, and communication and control 
were all tested. New types of equipment were also experimented 
with, such as new designs of landing craft and amphibian vehicles. 
The resulting experience gained from these exercises by the Army 
and Navy, was codified in 1932 in Tairiku sakusen koyo (Outline of 
amphibious operations). This document was the result of five years 
of deliberations by both services and clearly laid down the 
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responsibilities of respective commanders at each level, and at 
each stage of any operation.160 
 
The series of experiments with new equipment designs during 
these exercises had also yielded positive results. In 1930 the 
Japanese Army adopted into service the type ‘A’ landing craft. This 
purpose built craft had a shallow draft and a bow ramp and was, 
according to contemporary US Marine observers, “obviously 
designed to negotiate surf and shallow beach landings”.161  The 
value of such a craft for both assault landings and logistical 
purposes is immense, as in addition to having good 'sea 
keeping',162 the ramp would allow the speedy unloading of troops or 
equipment. Neither the United Kingdom nor the United States had a 
comparable craft at that that time, and neither would develop one 
until the 1940s.  
 
 
 
Photo 2. US Navy model of Japanese Daihatsu Landing craft. (Source ONI 225J) 
The exercises of the 1920s had also revealed the need for a 
purpose designed amphibious warfare ship, the Shinshu-maru. Laid 
down in 1933 and completed in 1935, the Shinshu-maru, was able 
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to handle thirty seven landing craft with its derricks and cranes.163 
Its stern doors allowed it to launch and recover landing craft at the 
rear of the ship, allowing it to function in a similar manner to a US 
Navy LSD (Landing Ship Dock).  The Shinshu-maru was an 
advanced purpose designed ship, which had design features that 
would not be seen in United States or British ships until the 1940s. 
 
Events in China would give both the Army and Navy the chance to 
test their amphibious forces in combat. The first opportunity 
occurred on January 28th, 1932, at Shanghai. After a series of 
incidents and provocations between Japanese and Chinese forces, 
fighting broke out between the Rikusentai garrison and Chinese 
forces. While the fighting at first only involved Navy forces, as the 
fighting intensified Army forces became involved to prevent the 
Navy garrison from being overrun.164 
 
The Rikusentai performed very badly in the resulting street fighting, 
despite having air and naval gunfire support. The main reason for 
this was the limited training the Rikusentai had received in infantry 
operations. A US Marine analysis concluded that they “showed little 
knowledge of infantry tactics and failed miserably”.165  
 
Nor were the Rikusentai to fare better in conducting amphibious 
operations. On February 3rd, an attempt was made to seize the 
Chinese Woosung Fort. Control of this fort would give the Japanese 
free access to both the Yangtze and Whangpoo Rivers. Despite 
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naval gunfire support, the assault was repulsed “with considerable 
losses”.166 
 
After continued bombardment from February 4th to February 6th, a 
further attempt was made to seize the fort. The results of the 
bombardment were minimal, due to the usage of armour piercing 
rounds.167 Because these rounds were designed to penetrate the 
armour of an enemy warship, they lacked the explosive power 
necessary to destroy concrete fortifications. The need for high 
explosive rounds for bombardments had been recognised since 
exercises dating back to 1926,168 but as these rounds were of 
limited use against enemy warships they were often not carried 
aboard in amounts sufficient for effective shore bombardment.  
 
A mixed Army and Navy brigade of 3500 men was landed under 
the protection of naval gunfire some distance from the fort on 
February 7th. During the night of February 7th/8th, and throughout 
the day of February 8th, numerous attempts by the Japanese to 
cross Woosung Creek were repelled with heavy losses.169 This was 
despite having air and naval gunfire support, and the usage of 
pontoon bridges to replace those the Chinese had burnt. Further 
attempts to seize the fort were abandoned, but the fort was 
subjected to aerial attack throughout the remainder of the fighting. 
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Figure 4 Situation Map Woosung Area.170  
The fighting at Shanghai continued into May 1932, as both the 
Chinese and Japanese increased the forces involved. Eventually 
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the Japanese agreed to a truce restoring the January 28th 
positions, and withdrew the bulk of their forces by May 31st.171 
 
While the disembarkation of the mixed brigade had been 
unhindered, the operation had failed to achieve its objective. 
Valuable lessons had been learnt by both services that would be 
incorporated into future training. The landing of the mixed brigade 
had been conducted by the Navy, and had left the Army 
unimpressed with the way the landing had been conducted. This 
was due to the Navy using unarmoured landing craft and 
transporting inadequate amounts of stores.172 The Navy was 
unimpressed with the performance of its ground troops and took 
steps to remedy the situation. This involved the formation of 
permanent SNLPs (Special Naval Landing Party). These units, 
named after their respective home bases, were the size of a 
reinforced infantry battalion,173 with an organic heavy weapons 
company equipped with light artillery.  In effect the Navy created its 
own standing army, which was equipped and trained along the 
same lines as Army units.174 Despite the Navy’s ground forces 
becoming virtual copies of the Army’s forces in terms of equipment 
and tactics, the Navy continued to deploy its amphibious forces 
from its warships, rather than the specialised ships used by the 
Army.175 
 
Joint exercises between the Army and Navy would continue into the 
1930s, with the role of the Navy shrinking into one of providing 
convoy protection and naval gunfire support. While the Army would 
develop a range of transport ships, and landing craft for its 
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amphibious forces, the Navy relied on transporting its SNLPs on 
warships that would be better suited to supporting the rapid 
operations envisioned by the Navy. 176 
 
The outbreak in 1937 of the Second Sino -Japanese War would see 
the employment of both the Navy’s and the Army’s amphibious 
forces. The Japanese were able to quickly wrest control of China’s 
coastal waters with their superior navy.177 The resulting blockade 
enabled the Japanese to land forces at will on suitable locations on 
China’s coast. While this gave the Japanese the freedom to land 
forces at undefended locations on the Chinese coast, it was 
sometimes necessary for the Japanese to conduct opposed 
landings over the next three years. 
 
While the Japanese were ultimately successful in all of these 
operations, this success was sometimes only the result of grim 
determination. The landing at Liuho, in 1937, was strongly 
opposed, with success only resulting after the third attempt.178 
Likewise, early efforts at Shanghai were rebuffed and only 
succeeded after the commitment of more resources.179 The 
willingness of Japanese commanders to sustain heavy casualties in 
order to achieve objectives, and the zeal of Japanese troops to 
sacrifice themselves in the Emperor’s name would become 
legendary.  However, as the firepower and quality of their 
opponents increased, this would result less in success, and more in 
slaughter. 
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Figure 5. Japanese Landing Operations in China. 180  
 
As the war in China changed from the short war initially planned, 
the demand for more men and materiel increased in order to break 
the deadlock. As a result of this increased commitment, more 
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Japanese divisions were sent to China.181 This increased 
deployment included the release of the Army’s three amphibious 
trained divisions for service in China. As the scale of the fighting 
increased around Shanghai one of these divisions, the 11th Infantry 
Division, sustained heavy casualties. The Army high command felt 
this was a result of concentrating on amphibious training at the 
expense of other more traditional training.182  As a result, no more 
divisions would receive specialist amphibious training.  
 
This development was also partially due to the success that the 
Japanese had in conducting unopposed landings in the traditional 
pattern. The war in China had shown the Japanese that while it was 
still necessary to conduct the occasional opposed landing, it was 
also possible with naval and aerial supremacy to conduct 
unopposed landings. Since every landing would no longer 
necessitate an Asian Gallipoli, it was no longer believed necessary 
by the Army high command to train divisions to the same high 
standard of amphibious operations as previously thought, as such 
the number of specialist amphibious trained divisions was dropped 
from three to just one.183 
 
The success of German paratroopers in Norway and the Low 
Countries during 1940 inspired the Japanese to develop their own 
airborne forces.184 While both the Army and Navy developed 
airborne units, the Navy units were intended to assist in the seizing 
of naval bases and in amphibious assaults.185 The Navy planners 
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were not blind to the advantages that a vertical envelopment could 
provide in an amphibious assault, a function now provided in 
modern operations by the use of helicopters. 
 
With the German successes of 1940, and the continuing economic 
measures taken against Japan by the US, the Japanese turned 
their strategic focus away from China, and the Russian Far East, 
towards the virtually undefended European colonies of South East 
Asia. With Britain committed to a European war it was not winning, 
the Japanese believed that this opportunity, combined with their 
amphibious capacity, would result in speedy victories and a short 
war.  
 
As a result of the intensive training and development during the 
years 1919 to 1941, and the wartime experience gained in China, 
the Japanese had considerable amphibious capability. By 1941, the 
Japanese were the world’s leading practitioner of amphibious 
warfare. They had the most advanced equipment, they had nearly 
two decades' worth of experience in conducting division sized 
landing exercises, and they had conducted several successful 
wartime operations in China. The Japanese military thus had 
justification to believe that future operations would be just as 
successful. The Japanese military believed that any future 
amphibious operations would not pose any problems that had not 
already been solved as a result of experience gained in exercises 
or wartime operations. Buoyed by this confidence, a military 
mission was sent to German occupied France in 1940 with the 
purpose of offering the Germans advice in the planning of 
Operation Sealion, the invasion of England. Fortunately for the 
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British, the Germans did not accept the offer of Japanese 
assistance.186 
 
United States Exercises and Developments 
Unlike Japan and Britain, the United States had not conducted a 
wartime amphibious operation since the Spanish American War in 
1898. Despite this lack of recent experience in conducting 
amphibious operations, the United States was to produce a 
comprehensive doctrine for the conduct of amphibious operations 
that would provide the underpinning principles for all United States 
amphibious operations in World War Two.187 However, while this 
doctrine was able to provide the theory, many of the technical 
solutions required to fully enact it were not developed until after the 
beginning of the Pacific War.   
 
The process of developing United States amphibious doctrine 
began with the assumption of the amphibious spearhead role by 
the United States Marine Corps (USMC) as its raison d’être. This 
occurred as a result of US Marine officers seeing such a role being 
the natural employment of the corps,188 and the importance of such 
operations to the successful outcome of War Plan ORANGE.189 
The importance of controlling secure anchorages in the various 
incarnations of ORANGE190 led to the US Marines having the 
opportunity to create a niche role as the amphibious force required 
to secure the required anchorages. The adoption of this role had 
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187 J. A. Isely, and P. A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines And Amphibious War: Its Theory, and 
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tangible benefits for the US Marine Corps as it would justify the 
continued existence of the corps against repeated US Army 
attempts to absorb it during periods of slim military budgets.191 
 
While the United States had ended World War One as a creditor 
nation, its strategic position in the Pacific had deteriorated with the 
acquisition by Japan of strategic island groups which were formerly 
German territories. The United States ‘Open Door’ policy in China 
was also threatened by the Japanese assumption of German 
territorial concessions in China.  Coupled with the development of 
oil fired ships with both greater range and ease of replenishment 
than their coal fired predecessors, the United States was faced with 
a radically different strategic environment than had existed prior to 
World War One. 
 
This resulted in a reevaluation of War Plan ORANGE, and its 
operational requirements. In 1921, USMC Major Earl H. Ellis 
conducted a study of how and where this possible war would be 
fought, and what the role of the US Marines was to be in this 
conflict. The resulting report, codified as Operational Plan 712 
Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, plainly outlined what 
Ellis viewed that role as, 
 
“In order to impose our will upon Japan, it will be necessary 
for us to project our fleet and land forces across the Pacific 
and wage war in Japanese waters. To effect this requires that 
we have sufficient bases to support the fleet, both during its 
projection and afterwards. As the matter stands at present, we 
cannot count upon the use of any bases west of Hawaii 
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except those which we may seize from the enemy after the 
opening of hostilities.”192 
 
Ellis also outlined the structure of the force needed to achieve such a 
role. The US Marines then began a process of tailoring itself both 
structurally and doctrinally towards achieving this goal. The existing 
doctrine for amphibious operations was extremely limited in its scope 
and inadequate for achieving the objectives of ORANGE.193 Simply 
put, the methodology to conduct major amphibious operations did not 
exist, and neither did the equipment. In order to correct these 
shortcomings, the US Marines embarked on a program of staff 
studies and practical exercises.  
 
 The 1920s saw a variety of techniques and equipment tested during 
exercises. These experiments were often marked by mistakes with 
the planning and coordination of the forces involved,194 but these 
failures resulted in the US Marines gaining valuable information 
about amphibious operations. These experiments were also helped 
by knowledge the US Navy had gained from the Royal Navy during 
World War One. Despite the failure of Gallipoli the Royal Navy had 
continued to plan for further amphibious operations, and experiment 
with designs for new landing craft. During the period of closeness the 
two navies had experienced during the later part of the war, this 
knowledge had been passed on to the US Navy.195  
 
To facilitate the training required to achieve the operational 
requirements of ORANGE, training grounds on the Puerto Rican 
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islands of Vieques and Culebra were acquired in 1923. The 
selection of these islands was a result of their geographical 
similarity to Japan’s newly acquired Pacific Mandates.196 
 
1924 saw the US Marines testing the Christie amphibious tank, 
while exercises in 1925 were based on the Gallipoli campaign and 
its assorted problems. The resulting expanded skill base of the 
Marines saw them being assigned in the 1927 edition of the Joint 
Action Of The Army And Navy manual the wartime mission of 
conducting land operations in support of the fleet including the 
initial seizure and defence of advanced bases.197  
 
Despite the codification of the Marines' amphibious role in Joint 
Action, the series of amphibious exercises ended that year with the 
deployment of Marine forces to both Nicaragua and China.198 This 
deployment required the bulk of Marine troop strength with 
insufficient troops left to conduct further amphibious exercises. 
When US forces were withdrawn from Nicaragua in 1933, and with 
the provision in the 1933 edition of Joint Action  for the Marines to 
conduct opposed landings, the US Marines gained both the 
opportunity and the mandate to reorganise itself into the Fleet 
Marine Force (FMF). Traditionally the Marines had been divided 
into small discrete self contained units. The new FMF organisation 
placed the Marines into one command more suitable for 
deployment as an amphibious task force.199 
 
This process of organisational change was as a result of changes 
being made to the US Marines' amphibious doctrine. In 1931 the 
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US Marines created a board of marine officers, and one US Navy 
officer, with the task of producing a text on amphibious warfare. 
The deliberate inclusion of a US Navy officer was in order to gain 
the naval point of view of amphibious operations and create an 
informal channel of communications for discussion of the boards 
work within the US Navy. The intent was to create a work that 
would serve as an official US Navy doctrinal publication. 200 
 
The board was assisted in its task by both the staff and students of 
the Marine Officers School at Quantico. The normal course -work 
was temporarily suspended, as the school became a think tank 
dedicated solely to solving the problems posed by amphibious 
operations. By a process of reviewing the experiments and 
exercises of the 1920s, and reverse engineering the mistakes of 
the Gallipoli campaign,201 the Marines identified several key areas 
of importance to planning an amphibious operation. These areas 
were the command relationships within the task force, naval gunfire 
support, air support, ship to shore movement, combat unit loading, 
and the usage of shore parties. Together these formed the basis of 
the chapters contained within the 1935 Tentative Manual of 
Landing Operations.202 However, despite this comprehensive 
approach to the problems posed by amphibious operations, it was 
recognised by both the US Marines and US Navy that much work 
was still required, resulting in the revival in 1935 of the Fleet 
Landing Exercises (FLEXs) to test and expand on these concepts. 
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1935 also saw the production of a US Army General Staff Study, 
Historical Study of Landing Operations, by the then Colonel G.S 
Patton.203 This study was an analysis of nineteen amphibious 
operations ranging from Sir Francis Drake at Cartagena, Columbia 
in 1588, to the then recent Japanese operations at Shanghai in 
1932. Patton noted a correlation of certain factors occurring in 
successful operations, and compiled a list of factors likely to occur 
in successful operations. Essentially this list of factors was a 
restatement of the traditional view that success was most likely to 
occur in unopposed la ndings on suitable beaches. 
 
Patton however did not endorse this view, nor refute it, instead 
stating that the study had derived no conclusions “due to the 
impropriety of circulating these conclusions in a summary of this 
nature”.204 One conclusion that Patton did state was a departure 
from the US Army preference for having landing ships beach 
ashore in the manner of the SS River Clyde at Gallipoli, or later 
LSTs.205 While beached the ships would be vulnerable, but this was 
considered an acceptable risk in light of the benefits to be gained 
by the resultant speed and ease of unloading.206 Patton argued 
instead for the usage of small armoured craft in the initial wave of a 
landing so as to disperse enemy fire across a multitude of targets, 
as opposed to having enemy fire concentrated on fewer higher 
value targets.207 US Army views on amphibious operations were 
still firmly tied to the earlier traditional model of operations. 
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While the US Marines were clearly in the forefront of amphibious 
development, amphibious operations were still of interest to the US 
Army, with the US Army Command School at Fort Leavenworth 
collecting information and reports on foreign operations.  As the 
role of the command school was to train officers in the use of large 
formations of ground forces, a number of Marine officers were 
posted there during the period that the Tentative Manual of Landing 
Operations was created. 
 
Two of the operations that the command school had gained 
detailed information on were Operation Albion, the 1917 German 
campaign against Russian held Baltic Islands, and the 1925 Franco 
Spanish landing at Alhucemas Bay.  These two operations should 
have been of special significance to the US Marines as they were 
successful operations conducted in the face of opposition from a 
hostile shore – exactly the type of situation the Marines were 
expecting to encounter in future operations in the Pacific. 
 
These two operations drew much from the mistakes of Gallipoli in 
their planning. While neither operation faced opposition on the 
scale of Gallipoli, they solved in their planning and execution many 
of the issues of command, control, communications, logistics, naval 
gunfire support, and ship to shore movement that had bedevilled 
the Gallipoli campaign. Many of the principles outlined as being 
vital to the success of these operations appear in the US doctrine 
laid down in the Tentative Manual. 
 
While no direct mention is made of these reports or these 
operations in the development of the US Marines doctrine, this 
material was available at Leavenworth during the creation of the 
Tentative Manual. Given that these operations are examples of 
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post Gallipoli successful opposed landings, and that the reports on 
these operations can be found in US Marine archives, it is 
reasonable to assume that the creators of the Tentative Manual 
were aware of them and possibly influenced by them. 
 
The resumption of FLEXs in 1935, to be conducted on an annual 
basis, was to mark a period of intense review and testing of the 
Tentative Manual before it was accepted by the US Navy as an 
official doctrinal publication in 1938208 as FTP 167 Landing 
Operations Doctrine United States Navy 1938.209  The process of 
experimentation did not end with the adoption of this document. 
Further changes were made in 1941 with a major revi sion of FTP-
167 occurring as a result of feedback from experiences in FLEXs. 
Changes included the recommendation that LVTs be used for 
crossing coral reefs and transporting men and materiel directly 
inland without unloading on the beach.210 Other changes included 
additional material on the role of aviation in amphibious 
operations,211 and the inclusion of a section on salvage operations 
conducted during a landing.212 Tactical air support of amphibious 
operations was aided by the decision that Marine pilots were to 
receive infantry training in order to increase their appreciation of 
ground combat resulting in smoother integration of air power in 
amphibious operations.213  
 
Despite the advances that the US Navy and Marines made in 
doctrinal development, serious deficiencies remained in the 
equipment available. With each successive FLEX it became 
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abundantly clear that standard Navy ships boats were unsuitable 
for landing operations and that specialised equipment was 
necessary, as was the employment of specialised transport ships 
rather than Navy warships.214 US Navy planners were not unaware 
of the pitfalls of using warships as transports and had planned in 
wartime to mobilise civilian ships of the US merchant fleet to act as 
transports and other fleet auxiliaries. Unfortunately, by 1930 the US 
merchant fleet was both old and slow, with few ships fast enough 
for naval use. The formation of the Maritime Commission in 1936 
was to enable the production of merchant ships to standard designs 
that could be easily converted to useful transports and auxiliaries in 
wartime.215     
  
The provision and procurement of specialised landing craft and 
other amphibious equipment could not be so easily solved. A great 
deal of interest was displayed in the appearance of Japanese 
landing craft in 1937.216 These shallow drafted, bow ramped, and 
armoured landing craft were far in advance of anything in US 
inventories at the time. Despite this interest, and technical advice 
rendered by friendly Japanese officers,217 the United States would 
not produce a craft with similar features until 1941. 
 
Advances were made in the acquisition of other equipment. The 
creation by Donald Roebling, in 1937, of an amphibian tractor for 
use as a rescue vehicle in the swamps of Florida attracted the 
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attention of Marine officers who saw the potential of such a vehicle. 
After extensive testing and modifications to meet both Navy and 
Marine standards the Roebling tractor was adopted in 1941 as the 
LVT1,218 for use as an amphibian supply vehicle.219 
 
The US Army’s involvement with FLEXs was limited to sending 
teams of observers until FLEX 3 in 1937, when it sent 61 officers 
and 731 enlisted men to take part in the landing operations. FLEX 4 
saw the Army send 42 officers and 547 enlisted men to take part in 
a series of landings which involved the landing of light tanks and air 
support in an exercise far in advance of previous FLEXs.220 
 
The Army was also absent from FLEX 5 in 1939, but a form of 
amphibious training was conducted by General Frank Keating with 
a series of simulated landings known as the 'Alfalfa assaults'. 
Elements of the 15th Infantry Regiment were loaded in trucks, 
taken to an alfalfa field, unloaded, and advanced through the alfalfa 
towards a simulated shoreline.221 The Army’s alternate exercise to 
FLEX 6 was a landing exercise in Puget Sound involving a division 
of 9000 men and 1100 vehicles loaded on Army transport and 
cargo ships. The Navy was to provide warships to act as support 
for the landing, and escort for the convoy. The exercise quickly 
degenerated when it became apparent that the crews of the Army 
ships were unaware of Navy convoy procedures and their cargoes 
were not combat loaded. In addition the Navy warships only carried 
sufficient small boats to land 1550 of the 9000 troops afloat. As a 
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result the exercise became a transport operation with the division 
being taken to Monterey.222  
 
Despite its collection of data on foreign operations, the US Army’s 
operational knowledge and experience of amphibious operations 
was still minimal. The events of the Munich Crisis made the Army 
view a future European war as more likely, and realise that it might 
not be able to rely on the usage of friendly ports. This realisation, 
coupled with the results of its own exercises and developments, led 
to the adoption in 1941 of FTP-167 as Army manual FM 31-5 
Landing Operations on Hostile Shores.223 Because of the advances 
made by the US Navy and Marines, it was possible to set up 
training centres where Marine instructors initially trained the Army 
personnel. The adoption of FTP-167 allowed the Army to walk in 
the footsteps of both the Navy and Marines without the lengthy 
development process that had resulted in its creation. The United 
States had created the blueprints for amphibious operations, all that 
remained was to create the tools. 
 
Preparing for War 
When the Pacific War began, Britain found itself in the midst of a 
European war, in which its forces had been expelled from the 
continental mainland, and had seen its continental allies 
conquered. Britain’s interwar focus on the techniques needed for 
fighting a European war had resulted in amphibious development 
receiving a low priority. As such, limited defence funds had been 
spent on other more urgent priorities such as the modernisation 
and expansion of the Royal Air Force. However, the p rewar neglect 
of amphibious operations resulted in Britain having to rebuild its 
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amphibious capabilities on a timetable dictated by the changing 
fortunes of war.  
 
The eve of the Pacific War saw Japan in possession of a 
formidable amphibious striking force , capable of conducting 
multiple operations virtually simultaneously. This force was battle 
seasoned, and well equipped with specialised landing ships and 
equipment. The demands of the war in China had blunted the edge 
of this force as the Army was forced to use its dedicated 
amphibious divisions in the conventional infantry role. The losses 
suffered by these three divisions in China resulted in the cessation 
of specialised amphibious training by the Japanese Army. This 
meant that the loss of institutional memory amongst the rank and 
file of these specialist divisions – the personnel who would actually 
conduct the landings – was not replaced by new amphibious 
trained personnel. This reduction in the pool of amphibiously 
trained soldiers, while not removing Japan’s amphibious capability, 
must have reduced it. 
  
The United States had also developed a respectable amphibious 
striking force as a result of the US Marines transforming 
themselves into a dedicated amphibious force. While the United 
States lagged behind the Japanese in terms of landing ship and 
craft design, they were actively closing the gap. In other areas of 
equipment the United States had seized the lead, such as in 
mechanised amphibian vehicles. The adoption of the Roebling 
tractor was to provide the US Marines with a vehicle capable of 
crossing the coral reefs found around many of the islands identified 
as vital to ORANGE’s success. The Roebling tractor would also 
serve as the foundation for a generation of truly amphibian tanks 
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and armoured personnel carriers that were to enter service in World 
War Two.  
 
The biggest achievement of the United States during the interwar 
period was the creation of a robust amphibious doctrine. This 
doctrine, while amended in detail by operational experience during 
the war, was to codify the principles that are the foundation of all 
modern amphibious operations. This achievement would ultimately 
serve to both overshadow Japan’s technical achievements and 
assist in the rebuilding of Britain’s amphibious capabilities. 
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Chapter Four Development of Equipment 
 
During the Pacific War a vast array of different types of equipment 
were produced by all the major combatant nations.  By 1945 the 
Allies had produced no fewer than 117 different types of landing 
craft, barges, ships, and amphibian vehicles, designed for 
conducting amphibious operations.224 Nor were the Allies alone in 
producing multiple equipment types. By 1943 the Allies had 
identified 8 main types of landing craft alone in Japanese 
service.225 
 
Amphibious operations also necessitated the involvement of other 
forms of equipment apart from that used to transport the landing 
force from its ships to the shore.  Equipment used for conducting 
amphibious operations could thus fall into one or more of the 
following broad categories: 
· Ships used to transport the landing force and its supplies to 
the landing area. 
· Warships used to provide naval gunfire support, airstrikes, 
and a defensive screen for the fleet and the landing zone. 
· Aircraft used to provide airstrikes, air defence, and 
observation. 
· Ships used to provide command, control, and 
communication facilities. 
· Ships, craft, and amphibian vehicles used to transport 
troops, equipment, and supplies, onto the landing zone. 
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· Amphibian vehicles used to provide fire support for the 
landing force. 
· Specialist combat engineering vehicles and equipment. 
· Specialist logistics equipment. 
· Hospital ships and medical facilities. 
 
Whilst all these differing forms of equipment were often vital to the 
success of a landing operation, other factors were the catalyst for 
their development.  For example the development of aircraft used 
by both sides to contest air superiority over a landing site was 
driven by the demands the war placed on all aspects of aerial 
combat, not just the demands created by amphibious operations. 
Likewise, the improvements to infantry small arms used in 
amphibious landings were the result of advances made to increase 
the firepower of the infantryman in all combat situations.226  To fully 
explore all these various factors in full would be beyond the scope 
of this study which is limited to looking solely at those 
developments which were necessitated by the requirements of 
amphibious operations, either as a result of doctrinal requirements 
or operational experience gained during the war. As such the 
primary focus will be on landing ships, landing craft, and amphibian 
vehicles.  
 
Traditionally the difference between a landing ship and a landing 
craft is that the landing ship is able to transport itself across the sea 
to the landing zone, whereas the landing craft has to be transported 
to the landing zone and then launched into the water and be able to 
be beached on the shore.227 This traditional distinction was 
changed during World War Two with the development of landing 
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craft with ranges of over 1000 miles,228 and of landing ships that 
were designed to beach and discharge their cargo directly on the 
shore.229  
 
The changing nature of amphibious equipment was driven partially 
by doctrinal requirements, partially by operational experience, and 
partially by strategic necessity. The Japanese, the United States, 
and the United Kingdom had all identified the basic requirements 
for amphibious equipment during the interwar period. The degree to 
which these requirements had materialised into useful equipment 
by the beginning of the Pacific War varied greatly. 
 
The basic requirements were for ships that had the speed and 
endurance to operate with the rest of the fleet, whilst able to 
transport a reasonable number of landing craft into the area of 
operations. For landing craft the basic requirements were for a fast 
craft with a low centre of gravity capable of beaching itself on the 
shore. 
 
At the beginning of the Pacific War only Japan had sizeable 
numbers of ships and craft in service meeting those requirements. 
Both the United States and the United Kingdom lagged behind 
Japan, but by war’s end they had surpassed Japan in both 
technical achievement and in sheer scale of production. 
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Type Nationality Number 
Produced 
Shinshu Maru Landing craft carrier Japanese 1 
Akitsu Maru Landing craft carrier Japanese 2 
T103 Class Fast Transport  Japanese 63 
Daihatsu Landing Craft  Japanese 3229 
LSD American 25 
LST 2 American 982 
LCI(L) American 1000 
LCVP American 22,492 
LSI(L) British  
LST 1 British 3 
LCM 1 British 30 
LCA British 2030 
Table 1. Total wartime production of most common landing ships and craft.230 
 
All three powers in this study displayed considerable innovation in 
their technical developments. During the interwar period, a  series of 
military exchanges and cordial relations between members of each 
nation’s armed services facilitated the free exchange of ideas and 
information. Japanese forces operating in Shanghai during 1937 
freely showed off their landing craft to USMC Officer Victor Krulak, 
and even contributed to his report on these craft to his 
headquarters.231 
 
This interchange of ideas continued during the Pacific War, but the 
form in which it occurred changed. Exchanges of ideas between the 
Allies and Japan were the result of capturing or observing enemy 
equipment, while exchanges between the United States and the 
United Kingdom involved key designers such as the United States’ 
boat builder Andrew Higgins developing a close working 
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relationship with British naval construc tor Rowland Baker during the 
visits of British technical missions to the United States.232 
 
Rowland Baker was appointed during the war to supervise the 
design and construction of amphibious vessels in British service. 
Under his supervision, the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors 
maintained smooth working relationships with private ship and boat 
building firms. This was in stark contrast to the acrimony which 
existed between the US Navy’s Bureau of Ships (BuShips) and 
some of its contractors, most notably Andrew Higgins of Higgins 
Industries. This smoother and less problematic approach to 
amphibious design allowed the British to make rapid developments 
despite starting later than the United States. 
 
British Developments 1940 – 1945 
The interwar development of amphibious equipment by the United 
Kingdom was greatly hampered by the official view that amphibious 
operations were unlikely to occur in any future European war. This 
official view was bolstered by theorists such Liddell Hart who 
viewed amphibious operations as being virtually impossible due to 
the vulnerability of amphibious forces to enemy airpower.233 
 
The small amount of development that did occur happened under 
the direction of the Landing Craft Committee.234 This committee, set 
up in 1921, had the task of creating craft capable of meeting the 
requirements of both the Admiralty and the War Office. The 
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resulting craft, Motor Landing Craft (MLC 1 and MLC 10), were 
flawed from the start due to the errors in these requirements.235  
 
These requirements were that the MLCs had to be transportable on 
existing troop ships, be lightweight, and had to be capable of 
unbeaching themselves. Using a complicated pump arrangement 
that used jets of water to dislodge the craft from the beach solved 
this prerequisite. This resulted in a craft with both low power and 
poor endurance.236 
 
The worst feature of the design was the placement of the cargo 
deck above the waterline. While this allowed ease of loading and 
unloading similar to a modern ‘roll on - roll off’ ferry, it also resulted 
in a very high centre of gravity. When loaded the craft had an even 
higher centre of gravity that had dramatic implications for the craft's 
stability at sea. During a trial conducted in the mid 1930s, five 
MLCs were ballasted to simulate a full load and put under tow from 
a destroyer to establish if the low speed of the underpowered craft 
could be overcome by towing. The result was that all five craft 
capsized and the design was abandoned.237 
 
British interwar experimentation with amphibian tanks also yielded 
similar disappointing results, with no vehicle being accepted into 
British service. As these designs largely utilised flotation pontoons, 
the resulting prototypes were generally small with limited armament 
and light armour and usable only in calm water.238 Other nations 
were interested in the British designs, with production models of the 
Carden Lloyd Light Amphibious Tank being sold to the USSR, 
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Japan, Thailand, and the Netherlands, in 1932.239  The British 
would not renew interest in the development of amphibian tanks 
until World War Two with the adoption into service of the Duplex 
Drive system.240 
 
With the establishment of the ISTDC at Portsmouth in 1938, 
development of two new types of landing craft began. These craft 
were to have a simpler design and avoid the pitfalls of the MLC’s.241 
The two new craft were designed by British firm Thornycrofts and 
were to be the basis of the successful wartime Landing Craft 
Assault (LCA), and Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM). 242 
 
 
Figure 6.  drawing of LCM 1 (ONI 226) 
 
                                                
239 HAF Box 39, Folder 718A-C, Borg-Warner Corporation, Research, Investigation & 
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241 Brown, p. 142. 
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 The first prototype of LCA was ready in august 1939,243 but 
production was initially limited due to higher defence priorities. 
While the fall of France in 1940, and the expulsion of the British 
from the continent, would result in landing craft production gaining a 
higher priority due to a vastly different strategic environment, it was 
still necessary to use World War One vintage X-Lighters to support 
early operations in North Africa.244 
 
Figure 7. Picture of LCA (ONI 226) 
Shortages of equipment in the aftermath of Dunkirk even affected 
raiding operations. The first commando raid launched against the 
Germans used RAF rescue launches instead of landing craft as no 
landing craft were yet available. In the aftermath of the fall of 
France even the availability of small arms to conduct training for 
operations was limited. 245 However, once landing craft were 
available to equip the commando raiding units, they were increased 
from a troop of 47 men and 3 officers into a troop o f 60 men and 
three officers, thus fitting “exactly into two landing craft.”246 
 
The LCA was armoured to protect the crew and passengers from 
small arms fire. It also featured overhead protection from aircraft 
machine guns, and a Bren light machine gun for self defence. It 
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could carry up to 35 men and 800 pounds of equipment.247 But 
most importantly, it had a bow ramp allowing rapid and smooth 
discharge of men and equipment onto the shore. A report compiled 
by US Marine officers noted that the LCA had several advantages 
over the rampless and unarmoured US Higgins Eureka craft the US 
Marine’s then standard landing craft.248 Conversely, an earlier 
British supply mission to the United States noted that the 18kt 
speed of the Higgins Eureka was greater than that of the 11kt LCA, 
and that this difference in speed would produce a superior raiding 
craft. Subsequently, the Eureka entered British service in October 
1940 as the Landing Craft Personnel (Large), or LCP(L).249 
 
 
Figure 8. Drawing of Higgins Eureka boat - the LCP(L). (ONI 226) 
The interwar development of the LCM by the British was the result 
of a desire to provide a way of landing tanks safely on the shore. 
This first British design became known later as the LCM(1). The 
first LCM(1) was able to carry either a 16 ton tank or 100  troops. It 
had a bow ramp, and its cargo deck was below its waterline giving 
greater stability. The US Navy’s Bureau of Ships (BuShips) 
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investigated the craft for its own purposes but decided against 
adopting it, preferring to pursue development of its own design for a 
tank landing craft.250 Higgins Industries in the United States had 
produced a similar craft. This craft had superior performance to the 
BuShips design, and the British became interested in it as it could 
be used to augment the numbers of LCM(1) currently in British 
service. Higgins’ craft impressed the British, as did his confidence 
in being able to produce the craft quickly. Higgins’ craft later 
became designated the LCM(2), and was adopted into both United 
States and British service. As the war progressed it became 
apparent that the increasing size of tanks entering service would 
require larger landing craft, this would lead to the production of the 
LCM(3) by Higgins Industries and its widespread adoption by the 
Allies. 
 
 
 
Photo 3. Photo of LCM 2  (ONI 226) 
As new landing craft had been developed it became necessary to 
develop a new class of ship to transport them to the area of 
operations. The requirement for such a ship was not issued until 
April 1940, when it was recognised that conducting amphibious 
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operations might prove necessary. The resulting Landing Ships 
Infantry (LSI) were converted from merchant ships. As the war 
progressed they were provided with increasingly better and more 
powerful davits allowing additional and heavier landing craft to be 
carried.251 
 
 
 
In the aftermath of the British evacuation from Dunkirk in 1940, 
Winston Churchill ordered the development of a landing craft 
capable of carrying a 40 ton tank, larger than any tank currently in 
British service. This was a result of Admiralty assessments of the 
requirements of any future invasion of Europe.252 Until Britain was 
in a position to mount the liberation of occupied Europe, British 
military planners decided to uti lise a traditional British strategy 
against dominant continental powers of conducting raiding 
operations and mounting campaigns on the enemy’s peripheral 
territories.253 While this strategy gained the British experience in 
conducting amphibious operations, it became apparent that the 
delays caused by a parent ship recovering smaller landing craft 
posed unacceptable risks to planning hit and run raiding operations. 
Ideally, a craft was required that could carry a large raiding force, 
beach, discharge the force, recover them, and then unbeach itself.  
Additionally, after the failure of the unsuccessful 1940 expedition to 
Dakar, Churchill ordered the development of a ship capable of 
transporting tanks anywhere in the world and discharging them 
directly onto shore.254 These three design concepts were to result 
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respectively in the Landing Craft Infantry or LCI, the Landing Craft 
Tank or LCT, and the Landing Ship Tank or LST. 
 
These three new designs were produced in the United Kingdom, 
and proved satisfactory. However, Admiralty projections for the 
future invasion of Europe, and the projected operational 
requirements of the Mediterranean theatre, necessitated the 
production of these vessels in greater numbers than could then be 
currently produced in Britain.  
 
 
Figure 9. Picture of LCT 1 (ONI 226) 
As British shipbuilding was becoming stretched by the demands of 
the Battle of the Atlantic, these new vessels could only be produced 
in the United States. In addition, due to shipping constraints the  
new vessels would have to be capable of crossing the Atlantic 
Ocean under their own power. The final restriction was that in order 
for these vessels to be produced under Lend-Lease provisions, the 
new designs would have to be adopted into service by a branch of 
the US military.255 As the idea of larger vessels capable of beaching 
and discharging their cargo directly on to the shore fitted the US 
Army’s approach to amphibious operations, and the design of the 
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LCT suited US Navy and Marine ideas, the process of adoption 
proved to have few hurdles. 
 
For US production facilities to be used under Lend-Lease 
conditions, a design had to be accepted into service by the US 
military. For this to occur, a design had to meet criteria specified by 
one of the branches of the US military. A series of joint ventures 
resulted, wherein British staff requirements produced design 
concepts that were then altered to suit both parties before being 
manufactured in the United States. This also resulted in a partial 
standardisation of types between US and UK forces, and a 
uniformity of nomenclature for Allied amphibious equipment.256  
This nomenclature would later be expanded to include the craft 
produced by Australia for its own use.  
 
Thus LCTs manufactured in Britain by the British became types 
LCT(1), LCT(2), LCT(3), LCT(4), LCT(8), and LCT(9), while the 
United States produced versions became LCT(5) and LCT(6). 
Similarly, the British made LSI became the LSI(S), with the more 
numerous US version becoming the LSI(L). The various marks of 
LSTs produced in the United Kingdom were LST, LST(1), LST(3), 
and LST(4), with the United States model becoming the LST(2). 
 
Once the basic designs of landing craft and ships had been 
developed, variants soon appeared to meet requirements for 
specialist roles. Many of these roles were to provide additional fire 
support for the landing in either a direct or general fire role, or to 
provide anti aircraft fire. Other roles included the provision of repair 
facilities, mine clearing, supply of fuel and water, and the provision 
of command, control and communication facilities.  
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The development of specialised armoured combat engineering 
vehicles was a direct development of experience with had been 
gained at Dieppe, the Torch landings in North Africa, and the 
invasion of Sicily. The knowledge gained during those operations 
had shown that in order to quickly exit the beach and expand the 
beachhead into the surrounding territory, it would be necessary to 
overcome not just enemy strongpoints and beach defences but the 
terrain of the landing site itself. 257 As a result a variety of 
equipments were tested in preparation for use in the planned 
invasion of Europe. These vehicles were designed to provide the 
landing force with the combat engineering facilities needed to 
overcome a variety of obstacles such as bunkers, minefields, 
ditches, and soft or loose terrain. Employed at Normandy as the 
British 79th Armoured Division they proved remarkably successful in 
that role.  
 
The British also developed a means of providing an inflatable 
canvas screen for use as a floatation device by tanks. Previous 
methods experimented with were limited in the size of the tank they 
could use. By using this device it was hoped to augment the 
number of tanks arriving on the landing beaches, above those that 
could be carried by available landing craft.  The resultant Duplex 
Drive system allowed a tank to be launched from a LCT at sea and 
proceed towards shore under its own power where the canvas 
screen could be easily collapsed and the tank used as normal.258 
While the initial tests had used British Valentine tanks, the final 
production model used the M4 Sherman tank.259  
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Japanese Development 
Japan started the Pacific War with an amphibious force that had 
both excellent purpose designed equipment, a sound doctrine for 
landing operations, and combat experience gained during the 
conflict with China. 
 
The equipment used by Japan at the beginning of the war benefited 
from the experience gained from amphibious exercises conducted 
during the 1920s and 1930s. This knowledge was further refined by 
lessons learnt in combat operations in China. Despite having 
developed and produced a range of ships and craft before the 
Pacific War, which performed extremely well during Japan’s initial 
offensives, neither the Japanese Army, nor Navy, neglected further 
development.  
 
However, the Japanese Navy and Army had different approaches 
to amphibious operations. The Navy’s view was that its amphibious 
forces should be light and capable of rapid deployment as a rapid 
reaction force or for spearheading larger amphibious operations. As 
such SLNP formations were organised in a manner designed to 
enable quick transport by destroyers and other fast ships, and were 
equipped with a variety of automatic weapons including 
submachine guns – particularly in parachute units.260 German 
successes with its airborne forces in Europe had inspired the 
creation of similar units in Japan. The German success in Norway 
in particular had shown that paratrooper units could be used to 
vertically envelop enemy forces during amphibious operations. This 
usage of paratroop forces fitted in well with the Navy’s view of its 
usage of its existing ground forces. While both the Japanese Army 
and the opposing Allies developed airborne forces, only the 
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Japanese Navy did so with the specialised mission of creating a 
vertical flank to amphibious operations. 
 
The Army had the responsibility of conducting major amphibious 
operations, and as such produced a variety of ships and craft to 
fulfil this role. These included craft to provide fire support for the 
landing, as well as ships to transport the landing force to the area of 
operations. As a result of extensive experimentation conducted 
during amphibious exercises in the 1920s, the Japanese Army had 
been able to develop a bow ramped craft capable of unloading 
directly onto shore. This craft, the type ‘A’ Daihatsu landing craft 
entered service in 1930 and was superior to any craft then currently 
in service with either the United Kingdom or the United States. The 
Daihatsu did no t replace the earlier Shohatsu landing craft in 
service, despite this smaller craft lacking both the ramp and 
carrying capacity of the Daihatsu, as the Daihatsu was to be a 
vehicle carrying craft and the Shohatsu was to carry personnel. 
Both craft were successful designs and performed well under 
combat conditions in China and the Pacific War.261 Variants of 
these craft included both wooden versions as steel was diverted to 
other purposes, and the mounting of additional weapons to create 
support craft capable of conducting raiding operations and 
providing fire support to landing operations.262 
 
In 1935 the Japanese Army commissioned the Shishu Maru as a 
purpose designed landing craft carrier. This ship was able to launch 
20 Daihatsu craft via its stern doors, whi lst simultaneously loading 
other craft through ports in its sides.263 When used in operations at 
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Shanghai in 1937, this ship generated a great deal of attention from 
the US Marines and US Navy officers present, and featured in 
reports sent back to the United States.264 
 
Figure 10. drawing of  Shishu Maru (ONI 225J) 
The Shishu Maru  was also capable of carrying aircraft as cargo, 
and acting as a tender for floatplanes that could be used to support 
amphibious operations.265 This feature was incorporated into later 
designs of landing craft carriers, such as the Akitsu Maru class 
launched in 1941-42. These ships were designed with a flat top 
similar to aircraft carriers, and were used to transport aircraft and 
supplies to outlying outposts. Plans were made to extend the flight 
deck of the Akitsu Maru in order to allow the recovery of aircraft, but 
the war ended before this could be enacted.266 
 
With the entry into service of the new type 97 ‘Chi-Ha’ medium tank 
in 1937, the Japanese Army started work on the creation of a 
landing craft capable of transporting it. The successful Daihatsu 
was used as a basis for the new craft, which was essentially an 
enlarged Daihatsu landing craft. The new Toku-Daihatsu, or 
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Special Daihatsu, entered service in 1940 and was able to carry 
120 troops or a single type 97 tank.267  
 
The Japanese continued the process of design and development of 
amphibious equipment throughout the war. This process continued 
even after the Japanese military had lost the strategic initiative and 
the ability to conduct large scale offensive landings as a result of 
the aircraft carrier losses at the Battle of Midway, and the piercing 
of the outer defence screen with seizure of Tarawa Atoll by US 
forces in 1943.   
 
Despite the loss of the strategic initiative the Japanese still had 
valid reasons for continuing to develop their amphibious forces. The 
Japanese military had to consider the employment of amphibious 
equipment for other tasks such as the transport of troops and 
supplies between outposts with little infrastructure.268  Furthermore 
amphibian vehicles were used to defend against Allied landings, 
and were required as part the doctrinal requirement of conducting 
an amphibious counterstroke against any successful Allied 
landing.269  While no such counter landings were ever conducted, 
the production of equipment usable in such a role continued 
throughout the war. 
 
Thus the intended purpose for many items of Japanese equipment 
is often unclear. An example is the Japanese Navy’s upgrading of 
the Chi-Ha medium tank’s armament from a 57mm gun to a 120mm 
gun.270 Very small numbers of this variant were produced late in the 
war, but whether its purpose was to act as a specialised combat 
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engineering vehicle to destroy enemy strongpoints during landing 
operations, (as in the case of the 95mm close support howitzer 
armed Centaurs of the Royal Marines on D-Day at Normandy),271 
or to act as a general heavy fire support vehicle for conventional 
armoured formations in the Japanese Navy’s ground forces, (as in 
the manner of 105mm armed Sherman tanks in the US Army), 272  is 
unknown. Either option is equally plausible, but due to the scarcity 
of sources in both Japanese and English it is impossible to be 
certain. 
 
The necessity of supplying outposts with limited port facilities 
resulted in the development of the Japanese Yusokan Class. These 
vessels had to be able to land their charge directly onto shore, have 
sufficient endurance and speed to complete their journey between 
islands under cover of darkness, and look unimportant enough as 
to avoid aerial attack should they be seen by Allied aircraft during 
the day.273 Superficially the resulting Yusokan Class looked much 
like the Allied LCT, but unlike the LCT it was used only for providing 
logistical support between friendly shores. 
 
Despite having conducted its first tests with amphibian tanks in 
1926, and the purchase of British commercial models in 1932, 
Japan did not have an amphibian tank enter service until 1942 with 
the introduction by the Japanese Navy of the lightly armed and 
armoured Type 2 Amphibious Tank ‘Ka-Mi’.274 This tank, based on 
the Type 95 light tank, was equipped with detachable flotation units 
similar to British tanks purchased by Japan in the 1930s. 
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Further developments resulted in the Type 3 Amphibious Tank ‘Ka-
Chi’ in 1943. This was the heaviest and most powerful amphibian 
tank to enter service with the Japanese Navy, and was armed with 
a 47mm gun. 275  Improved amphibious performance was gained by 
incorporating the flotation units as part of the hull. Like the earlier 
‘Ka-Mi’, the ‘Kai-Chi’ was designed to be transportable on the deck 
of a submarine, a feature shared by other Japanese amphibian 
craft, such as the Katsusha.276 This vehicle was able to carry 40 
troops and was armed with two torpedoes277. The vehicle would 
thus be useful for both conducting amphibious raids and operations 
against enemy landing forces. However, no record exists of it being 
used in either role. 
 
 
Name Production 
Amphibian truck Suki 198 
Type 2 Amphibious Tank Ka -Mi 184 
Type 3 Amphibious Tank Ka -Chi 19 
Table 2. Total Japanese Amphibian Vehicle Production (Source Taki) 
 
A more successful amphibian design was the Suki, an amphibian 
truck. Like the United States, the Japanese realised the utility of an 
amphibian truck, as it would allow cargoes to be taken from ships to 
any point on shore without the necessity of reloading the cargo onto 
another vehicle. The Japanese approach to the design resulted in 
essentially a wheeled boat, whereas the United States produced a 
truck that could float. The Suki was able to carry both cargo and 
personnel and was deployed throughout the Pacific.278 
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Photo 4. Japanese Amphibian Truck Su-Ki. (IWM photo)279  
 
Only the major types of Japanese amphibious equipment have 
been mentioned here as large numbers of individual prototype 
models and variants were produced and played little part in the 
overall development of amphibious equipment, nor in the conduct 
of operations conducted during the war. The Japanese did develop 
many of the ideas behind modern amphibious ships and craft, and 
were the first to solve many of the technical problems in developing 
these vessels. The Japanese continually developed new 
amphibious equipment and demonstrated a keen awareness of the 
importance of integrating airpower into amphibious forces. This 
awareness is reflected in both the creation of paratroop units to 
spearhead amphibious operations, and the creation of landing craft 
carriers with integral aircraft, such as the floatplanes carried by the 
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Shishu Maru . The Japanese displayed great imagination in creating 
innovative amphibious equipment that was studied in detail by other 
powers. The United States had paid keen interest in Japanese 
developments before the war, and after the war a US Navy 
technical mission extensively investigated Japan’s amphibious 
equipment and the process of its development.280 
 
United States Development 
As a result of the series of FLEXs281 conducted during the interwar 
period the US Marines had developed a robust and comprehensive 
doctrine regarding amphibious operations. This doctrine FTP-167 
Landing Operations on Hostile Shores emphasised factors such as 
combat loading transports,282 ship to shore movement, and naval 
gunfire support, but also stressed the importance of planning in 
amphibious operations in that they were more than just delivering 
troops onto a beach. Because of this FTP-167 was able to not only 
show the best way to use existing equipment but also point the way 
forwards for what would be needed for the future. 
 
By emphasising logistics as well as combat in planning amphibious 
operations, a number of innovations in cargo handling were 
developed such as forklifts and the introduction of pallets for cargo. 
The level of information given on them in US Marine sta ff planning 
guides shows the importance that was placed on these 
equipments,283 and that one of the concerns raised in the post-
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action analysis of Tarawa was how well the pallets had performed 
under combat conditions. 
 
Another boon to logistics was the adoption of the Dukw in 1942. 
Essentially an amphibian version of the standard two and a half ton 
US Army truck, the Dukw was able to transport supplies from ship 
to shore and beyond without the need for unloading and 
transferring the cargo to a new vehicle.284 
 
Figure 11. Information on Dukw (ONI 226) 
The testing of landing craft designs during the interwar period had 
proved the requirement for purpose built craft. From the results of 
this process the US Navy had developed the specifications for 
these craft and passed them to BuShips. The US Army had 
developed its own ideas about the future conduct of amphibious 
operations, and rather than the multiple small craft envisioned by 
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the US Navy and Marines, they preferred the concept of less craft 
capable of greater endurance and carrying more.  
 
As a result of this thinking in the US Army, the British concepts of 
the LCI and the LST were adopted into service with the United 
States. As such both designs could be produced under Lend–
Lease conditions. While it was originally intended for these craft to 
be used in assault and raiding roles, their usual employment was to 
discharge troops and cargo directly onto shore as part of the 
consolidation of a landing. In addition the ability of the LST to beach 
itself made it extremely useful in the Pacific where port facilities 
were often rudimentary. 
 
During the process of trials and testing before the procurement of 
the Higgins Eureka boat, many US Marine Officers noted that the 
designs produced by BuShips were inferior to those produced by 
other parties, in particular those produced by Higgins Industries285. 
At the same time reports were being received on landing craft used 
by the Japanese, as well as those in British service. Both the British 
and Japanese had introduced into service an armoured bow 
ramped landing craft prior to 1940. The Eureka was accepted into 
United States service in 1940, having proven itself superior to the 
BuShips design.286  
 
The Higgins design was unarmoured and fast with excellent 
seakeeping characteristics with a hard chin allowing it to beach 
even on stony shores. It was able to carry 25 to 36 troops, and after 
July 1942 was known as the Landing Craft Personnel or LCP. 
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While information on the successful use of ramped landing craft by 
the Japanese had been known since 1937, this feature was not 
viewed as being a critical design factor compared to either speed or 
sea-keeping. Contemporary designs by US Marine Officer Victor 
Krulak, source of many photos of ramped Japanese landing craft, 
show that the postwar importance he placed on ramps were not 
necessarily reflected in his contemporary designs.287 
 
Experience gained in conducting amphibious operations soon 
showed the utility of bow ramped craft. As a result Higgins was 
approached in 1941 to install a bow ramp on his Eureka boat, and 
was shown a picture of a bow ramped Japanese craft by a U.S. 
Marine Officer.288 Higgins installed the ramp and the resulting 
design became the Landing Craft Personnel, Ramped or LCP(R). A 
similar craft was also designed for light vehicles, being the Landing 
Craft, Vehicle or LCV. As both of these craft were extremely similar 
in size, shape, and performance it was decided to standardise both 
into one design, the Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP). The 
LCVP was able to carry 36 men or a 6000 lb vehicle or 8,100 lb 
general cargo and became the standard landing craft for this role in 
Allied operations.289 While LCPs, LCP(R)s, and LCAs were still 
used for operations this was as a result of landing craft production 
not being able to keep up with the demands of multiple theatres.290  
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Figure 12. Drawing of LCVP ( ONI 226) 
Higgins also produced a tank lighter291 that proved superior to the 
BuShips design. This craft the LCM(2) was produced as result of a 
December 1941 request to Higgins Industries to produce a landing 
craft capable of carrying a light tank. Higgins produced the 
prototype in 60 hours. It was capable of carrying a 16 ton tank and 
had a bow ramp.292 This craft would lead to the development of the 
LCM(3) which became the standard Allied craft for landing a single 
tank. 
 
This standardisation was a result of the increasing co-operation 
between British and United States designers. The impact of British 
ideas on the design of amphibious equipment, coupled with United 
States ideas about the conduct of amphibious warfare, resulted in 
the development of several new classes of amphibious vessels. 
Designers in the United States viewed British naval constructor 
Rowland Baker with a great deal of respect. His ideas contributed 
greatly to the development of the Landing Ship Dock, or LSD, a 
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292 A. Adcock, WWII US Landing Craft , Carrollton, n.d. , p. 15. 
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ship that was able to launch loaded landing craft by flooding its 
stern and releasing the craft out the back. The advantage to this 
technique was that craft could be launched while the ship was still 
moving giving greater protection to the ship and speeding the 
launch of the landing force. The technique was used with success 
at Tarawa in 1943 with LCMs carrying tanks. British influence was 
seen in the design of a class of dedicated headquarter ships for 
amphibious operations. Events during Operation Torch and later at 
Tarawa would prove the value of such ships. 
 
The US Marines were well aware that coral reefs surrounding atolls 
in the Pacific could pose problems for landing craft and had desired 
an amphibian tractor capable of crossing reefs. With the 
introduction into service in 1941 of the Landing Vehicle Tracked or 
LVT, the US Marines had gained a vehicle capable of fulfilling this 
role. Based on the Roebling tractor the LVT was originally designed 
to be used for logistics purposes. Testing was conducted in Fiji to 
see if armoured LVTs were capable of a reef crossing. Because the 
testing was successful it was used as an assault transport for the 
first time at Tarawa, along with the improved LVT2. The success of 
the LVT resulted in an increase in the machine guns carried and 
the development of armoured support vehicles based on its hull. 
The LVT(A)-4 had an open turret mounting a 75mm howitzer, while 
the LVT(A)-1 had an enclosed top and mounted a 37mm gun in its 
turret. These were able to provide direct fire support to the landing 
force, and could function as tanks once on land. 
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          Figure 7. 
Picture of LVT 4 (ONI 226) 
The desire to increase firepower in US Marine units led to the 
unofficial usage of machine guns from crashed aircraft by Marines. 
These guns were adapted for infantry usage and were known as 
stingers.293 As the war progressed the Marine divisions received 
more automatic weapons and gained heavier tanks. Marine units 
also received greater numbers of flamethrowers and flame tanks 
that were used to neutralise bunkers in beach defences. This 
added to the shock value of each division, essential since the small 
size of islands in the Pacific generally precluded any form of 
surprise as to where a landing would occur. 
 
The development of modern equipment 
The postwar landing craft in use today bear lineal descent from the 
ramped landing craft designed by Higgins, a craft that was directly 
influenced by the Japanese invention of the bow ramped landing 
craft. This process of development is not limited to just landing 
craft, for modern amphibious warfare vessels such as the US 
                                                
293 G. Rottman, US Marine Corps 1941-45, Botley, 2004, p. 8. 
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Navy’s Iwo Jima class are also the synthesis of design concepts 
that evolved as a result of the Pacific War. The Japanese desire to 
integrate airpower with amphibious operations saw the creation of 
landing craft carriers capable of carrying aircraft. The idea of having 
organic airpower in an amphibious taskforce had also occurred to 
the Americans who dispatched carrier forces as part of all Pacific 
amphibious operations. The concept would finally find fruit in the 
postwar development of modern US Navy ships such as the Wasp 
class, that combine the features of both escort carriers and LSDs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 5. US Navy Wasp Class Amphibious Assault ship (US Navy Photo) 
 
The layout of these ships is very similar to that of Japanese landing 
craft carriers of the Akitsu Maru  class,294 which like all Japanese 
ships were studied postwar by the US Navy’s technical mission. 
Likewise the current generation of amphibious armoured fighting 
vehicles in use today owe much to the work of the USMC who not 
only pioneered the creation of a fully tracked amphibious vehicle, 
but also its applications in amphibious operations. The creation of 
                                                
294 For technical data see  R. Gardiner (editor), Conway’s All The World’s Fighting Ships 
1922-1946 , London, 1980, p. 213. 
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these key types of equipment owes much to both interwar 
development and operational experience during the war. 
 
Photo 6. Akitsu Maru Class Landing Craft Carrier (US Navy Photo)
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Chapter Five Amphibious Operations during the Pacific 
War 
 
The outbreak of hostilities in Europe during 1939 had at first very 
little direct effect on conditions in the Pacific. This was despite the 
majority of the area being colonial possessions of, or otherwise 
affiliated to, European states that were to suffer major reverses 
during the early part of World War Two. 
 
Initially these effects were limited to the uptake of merchant 
shipping for military purposes by respective governments, and the 
imposition of rationing on territories controlled by combatant 
powers. This gap in shipping though was partly filled by neutral 
carriers. The war in Europe also caused supplies of manufactured 
goods to be reduced. German commerce raiders also caused 
disruption to sea lanes  of communication, most notably with mine 
laying activities and the shelling of the phosphate mines at 
Nauru.295 
 
The rapid German successes in Europe during 1940 resulted in the 
creation of a strategic environment favourable to Japanese 
interests.  The invasion and occupation of their homelands left 
French and Dutch colonies bereft of any support from Europe.  The 
British continuation of the war against Germany left its dominions 
and colonies in a similar, but less precarious situation. As a result 
Japan was able to make increasingly larger demands on these 
territories to supply raw materials. These raw materials were 
needed to supply the demands of both the Japanese domestic 
economy and the demands of the war in China.  Japan was also 
                                                
295 RN Naval Intelligence Division, B.R. 519 Geographical Handbook Series: Pacific 
Islands Vol. II Eastern Pacific, London, 1943, p. 693. 
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able to secure basing rights in French Indochina, and obtain the 
cessation of road and rail communications to China.  
 
Traditionally, Japan had looked towards China and the Russian Far 
East as a source of resources and living space for its increasing 
population.  This northward policy of expansion had resulted in 
some successes, such as the acquisition of Manchuria. However, it 
had also resulted in unsuccessful military confrontations with the 
USSR, a war in China that appeared to have no quick conclusion in 
sight, and had resulted in trade sanctions on vital imports and the 
exports required to pay for them.  With this in mind, the Japanese 
decided to ‘go south’ to seize resources by force, thus beginning 
the Pacific war. 
  
In order to achieve the conquest of these territories, and conduct a 
knockout blow against the United States, Japan had to conduct a 
series of rapid virtually simultaneous operations against targets 
spread throughout the Pacific. Naturally these involved amphibious 
operations. These operations ranged from small parties informing 
locals of a change of ownership, through to large scale assaults. 
The goal of these operations was not just to seize resources, but 
neutralise enemy forces, and obtain territories suitable as air and 
naval bases to act as a defensive perimeter for their new empire.  
 
The Pacific war presented geographical challenges quite unlike 
those encountered during the campaign against Germany. Unlike 
the European theatre, planners in the Pacific were often confronted 
with having to plan operations in areas that were not fully mapped. 
The general paucity of accurate information available is 
demonstrated aptly by the misidentification of the Tenaru River on 
Guadalcanal, a mistake not rectified until after the war, despite 
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being the site of a pivotal battle.296 In addition, meteorological and 
hydrological data was often lacking, and in some areas only 
anecdotal in nature.297 Lines of communication298 in the Pacific 
were both long and easily disrupted by enemy activity or local 
weather conditions.  In addition, these lines of communication were 
often underdeveloped, with many locations in the Pacific lacking 
even basic infrastructure. Air communications across the Pacific 
were still in their infancy, with many new routes only being opened 
just before the outbreak of hostilities.299 Cable and wireless 
communications were also prone to disruption, either by seismic 
activity breaking cables,300 or by atmospheric conditions disrupting 
signals. Limited numbers of wireless stations capable of relaying a 
signal meant that minimal redundancy in the broadcasting network 
existed in transmitting a signal should such a problem occur. 
Further complications to signal communications developed for the 
Allies with the seizure of American cable facilities on Guam early in 
the war. Sea communications had to be conducted over long 
distances, often to destinations with either limited or non-existent 
port facilities. This infrastructure had to be developed as the war 
progressed, not just to support offensive operations, but in order to 
merely maintain the forces required to defend Allied territory. 
 
Amphibious operations conducted by the Western Allies against 
German forces in Europe had the advantage of being conducted in 
                                                
296 F. O. Hough, V. E. Ludwig, and  H. I. Shaw, Pearl Harbor To Guadalcanal: History 
of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II Vol. I, Washington, n.d. p. 256.  
297 The classic example is the neap tide controversy at Tarawa. Only one man of the 
numerous ex-residents was able to warn of the possibility of a dodging tide on the 
invasion date.  
298 Sea lanes, Air lanes, and Signal communications. 
299 For an indepth look at the development of prewar air routes see K., Williams, Army 
Air Forces Historical Studies No. 45: Development of the South Pacific Air Route, n.p., 
1946. 
300 RN Naval Intelligence Division, B.R. 519 Geographical Handbook Series: Pacific 
Islands Vol. I General Survey, London, 1945, p. 39. 
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areas where meteorological, hydrological, and topographical factors 
were all well known. Operations conducted in the European theatre 
also had the advantage of having shorter lines of communication 
and a more highly developed infrastructure. Furthermore, in the 
areas where operations were to be conducted it was possible to 
select areas of coastline that allowed the landing of craft and ships 
directly onto the shore. Most importantly, they all occurred in areas 
where land based Allied air power could be used to support 
amphibious operations. In the Pacific, these factors were either 
unknown, or presented problems that had to be solved, such as 
coral reefs preventing direct access to island beaches.301 The 
tropical climate of the Pacific presented its own challenges to 
maintaining personnel and equipment. Both sides attempted to 
educate their forces in methods suitable for coping with the 
environment by soliciting advice from those who had experience of 
the area before the war.  The means of disseminating this 
information to personnel ranged from the issuing of literature 
through to the creation of educational films on various subject 
matters.  
 
The Japanese produced, and issued, 40,000 copies of the 
pamphlet Read This Alone – And The War Can Be Won, to troops 
embarking on amphibious operations in South East Asia.302 This 
pamphlet contained much in the way of both propaganda and 
useful advice on campaigning in the tropics, in addition to less 
useful information on the medicinal value of snake liver. However, 
the importance of weapon and equipment maintenance in tropical 
conditions is emphasised, as is the need to conserve water and 
                                                
301 The most famous example of this was at Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands. 
302 M. Tsuji, Singapore: The Japanese Version , London, 1966, p. 29. A translation of the 
pamphlet can be found in Appendix 1 pp. 237-275. 
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petrol. In addition the righteousness of the Japanese cause is 
stressed throughout. 
 
Allied attempts to combat the paucity of information available on 
many parts of the Pacific resulted in the reprinting of t he Royal 
Geographical Society’s Pacific Handbook, and the creation of a 
superb four volume handbook by the Royal Navy, which was 
completed in 1945.303 
 
Impact of experience gained in other theatres 
The impact of operations in other theatres had been felt even 
before war began in the Pacific. This resulted from the 
observations, and the conclusions drawn from those observations, 
made by the militaries of both the United States304 and Japan305 on 
events in the European war.  Of keen interest to both militaries was 
the German employment of airborne forces. This stimulated the 
development of parachute forces in both Japan and the United 
States, and in Britain too.306 The German success in capturing 
Crete, despite British dominance of the surrounding waters, clearly 
showed the potential of airborne forces. The large German 
casualties suffered in taking Crete also demonstrated the pitfalls of 
airborne operations, the high casualties resulting in "the end of the 
German airborne forces".307  
                                                
303 RN Naval Intelligence Division, B.R. 519 Geographical Handbook Series: Pacific 
Islands Vol. I General Survey, London, 1945. 
RN Naval Intelligence Division, B.R. 519 Geographical Handbook Series: Pacific 
Islands Vol. II Eastern Pacific, London, 1943. 
RN Naval Intelligence Division, B.R. 519 B  Geographical Handbook Series: Pacific 
Islands Vol. III Western Pacific (Tonga to the Solomon Islands), London, 1944. 
RN Naval Intelligence Divis ion, B.R. 519 C  Geographical Handbook Series: Pacific 
Islands Vol. IV Western Pacific (New Guinea and Islands Northward), London, 1945. 
304 G. Rottman and A. Takizawa, Japanese Parachute Forces of World War II , Oxford, 
2005, p. 3. 
305 P. Harclerode, Wings Of War: Airborne Warfare 1918-1945, London, 2006, p. 265. 
306 Ibid, p.197. 
307 German General Kurt Student cited in Harclerode, p.107. 
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The advantage gained in employing airborne forces was that it 
allowed an attacker to vertically envelop an enemy force – in 
essence cutting off or encircling an enemy by threatening their rear 
or flanks.  The Allies would use airborne forces in this role in North 
Africa, Sicily, and Normandy, in support of amphibious assaults.  
 
The success gained by Germany’s mechanised forces in the early 
campaigns in the west had a profound effect on American 
rearmament. As a result the United States committed itself to the 
creation of an army that would be reliant on the internal combustion 
engine. This was partially the result of a belief that the German 
Army consisted solely of mechanised and motorised formations,308 
and partially due to the increased permeation of automobiles 
through American society and industry compared to other 
combatant powers.309  
 
British operations were also studied by the militaries of the United 
States and Japan. The success of the British aerial attack on the 
Italian fleet anchored at Taranto is thought by some to have 
provided inspiration to the Japanese for their attack on the 
American fleet at Pearl Harbor.310 British commando raids were 
closely studied by the United States Marines,311 and provided the 
inspiration for the formation of Marine Raider battalions. The 
passing of the 1941 Lend-Lease Act resulted in closer ties between 
                                                
308 A mechanised formation is one in which the combat elements are largely equipped 
with armoured vehicles, while a motorised formation is one which all its transport 
elements are all motorised. 
309 R. Overy, Why The Allies Won, London, 1996, pp. 224-225. 
310 G. H. Gill, Australia In The War Of 1939-1945: Series Two Navy: Volume II Royal 
Australian Navy, 1942 -1945 , Canberra, 1968, p. xiii. 
311 Two USMC Officers were detached to act as observers on British commando 
operations and equipment. Their 1942 report can be found in the USMC Historical 
Amphibious Files in Box 45 Folder 807. 
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the British and American military establishments, especially in the 
areas of research and development of amphibious ships and 
craft.312 In order for equipment to qualify for ‘lend lease’ status it 
had to be accepted into US service. 
 
With the United States entry into World War Two, the relationship 
between Britain and the United States further developed with the 
exchange of knowledge and experience between the two allies. In 
contrast to this were the squabbles between Germany and Japan 
over the licensing agreements for German technology.313 
 
Both the United States Marines and the United States Navy 
transferred amphibious planning staff between theatres. The 
majority of these transfers were from the European theatre to the 
Pacific theatre. However, many of the United States Marine and 
United States Naval personnel who were involved in the planning of 
amphibious operations in Europe had been involved in the prewar 
amphibious exercises designed to test the new American 
amphibious doctrine developed for use in a future Pacific war.314 
 
Studies and reports on amphibious operations conducted by the 
Allies were distributed between the European and Pacific theatres, 
especially by the United States military. This distribution of 
knowledge throughout the alliance allowed the smooth introduction 
of new equipment from the European theatre to the Pacific theatre. 
                                                
312 Such as the close working relationship between British Naval Constructor  Rowland 
Baker, and US Ship Builder Andrew Higgins, outlined in  D.K. Brown, "Sir Rowland 
Baker, RCNC", in Warship 1995, London, 1995, p. 145. 
313 Chapman, J. "The 'Have-Nots' Go To War: The Economic & Technical Basis of The 
German Alliance with Japan", in International Studies 1984/III The Tripartite Pact Of 
1940: Japan, Germany And Italy, p. 52.  
314While limited in number, these officers did move between theatres and helped facilitate 
the flow of amphibious information. For more details see H. W. Edwards,  A Different 
War: Marines in Europe and North Africa, Washington, 1994.  
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The majority of new items of equipment were to receive their first 
operational usage in the European theatre before being issued in 
the Pacific. This was as a result of the priority that the war against 
Germany had been given, and also as a result of the arms race in 
weapons development caused by the need to maintain parity with 
new German weapon designs. As a consequence of this arms race 
between the Allies and Germany, Allied forces in the Pacific would 
eventually gain a qualitative advantage over much of the equipment 
of their Japanese counterparts. The result was increased firepower 
for Allied ground forces, especially in armoured vehicles, artillery, 
and infantry weapons.  
 
The lack of even basic port infrastructure in many parts of the 
Pacific necessitated the utilisation of ships and craft able to 
discharge their cargoes directly on shore. As a result the majority of 
American amphibious ship production was sent to the Pacific 
theatre.315 In addition, after every amphibious operation in the 
European theatre, ships were sent to the Pacific.316 This resulted in 
a build -up of amphibious assets in the Pacific, which rather than 
just being newly commissioned ships, also had a leavening of 
experienced personnel. In some senior British circles it was felt that 
this accumulation of amphibious assets in the Pacific represented 
an American deviation from a commitment to the ‘Germany First’ 
policy.317 However the sheer size of the Pacific theatre and its 
dependence on sea communications meant that large numbers of 
ships were required just to supply forces. 
 
                                                
315 Author’s study of ship records in USN Dictionary of US fighting ships, an online 
resource of the USN Historical Centre at http://www.history.navy.mil 
316 Ibid. 
317 Bryant, p. 652-53. 
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Although some American planners would question British estimates 
of the number of landing craft required for operations in Europe, 
despite these figures being the result of a joint planning session,318 
it was hardly out of a desire to shortchange European operations as 
put forward by Arthur Bryant in The Turn Of The Tide based on 
CIGS Allanbrooke’s diary. 319 Morison refutes this in his works, 
which demonstrate that the European theatre was well provided 
with landing craft.320 It was to be a common complaint amongst 
amphibious planners in all theatres that they never had enough 
landing craft available.321 
 
Theatre Type           
  LST LCI(L) LCT LCM LCVP LCA 
U.S. in 12th Fleet (U.Kingdom) 168 124 247 216 1089 0 
British in United Kingdom 61 121 664 265 0 646 
U.S. in Mediterranean 23 59 44 185 395 0 
British in Mediterranean 2 32 64 95 0 138 
U.S. on East Coast, U.S.A 95 89 58 57 341 0 
U.S. on West Coast, U.S.A 0 41 1 60 181 0 
U.S. in All Pacific Areas 102 128 140 1198 2298 0 
British on e. Indies Station 0 4 2 67 0 46 
Table 3. Allied Landing Craft serviceable and operational in all theatres 1 June 
1944.322 
 
The United States' commitment towards the policy of ‘Germany 
First’ is demonstrated in part by its deployment of its ground forces. 
In March 1945, out of a total “eighty-nine Army combat ready 
divisions, sixty-eight were now in the European-Mediterranean area 
and twenty-one in the Pacific; all six Marine divisions were in the 
                                                
318 Bryant, p. 656. 
319 Bryant, p. 620, p. 629. 
320 Morison, S. E., American Contributions to the strategy of World War II , London, 
1958, p. 50. 
321 Ibid, p. 49. 
322 Ibid, p. 50. 
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Pacific”.323 This allocation of forces shows that even as the war in 
Europe was drawing to a close, Germany remained the priority. 
 
The Allies waged a global war, while the Axis powers each 
conducted their own separate wars with little attempt at 
coordination.324 What little coordination existed was the result of the 
Axis being faced with common enemies, rather than sharing 
common goals. Unlike the Allies, the Axis were faced with having 
no direct air or sea lines of communication. This added to the 
difficulties of providing any real material assistance to each other. 
While technical missions from each nation visited the other, 
resulting in some exchange of technology, these exchanges were 
never on the scale of those between the United States and Britain. 
 
Logistical demands of global war 
Simply put the United States and Britain were engaged in planning, 
supplying, and fighting a global war. As a result a ll theatres 
experienced shortages of amphibious equipment as operations 
were carefully planned according to the dictates of the grand 
strategy developed at conferences such as Casablanca in 1943. 
The resulting operations had to be able to optimise available 
shipping, and occur according to an agreed timetable. Operation 
Galvanic gives an excellent example of this: despite key equipment 
such as the Appalachian class of amphibious flagships not being 
available due to delays in production,325 the operation had to 
                                                
323 B. A. Allen, and N. Polmar, Codename Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan, 
London, 1996, p. 148. 
324 L. Barber, and K. Henshall, The Last War of Empires: Japan and the Pacific War, 
Auckland, 1999, p. 191. 
325G. C.  Dyer, FMFRP 12-109-II The Amphibians Came To Conquer Vol. II, 
Washington, 1991, p. 611. 
 133 
proceed as planned due to the requirement of the shipping involved 
being needed elsewhere.326  
 
The combination of the United States Lend-Lease law and its vast 
production capacities gave the Allies the means to supply their 
forces with the large numbers o f ships, planes, tanks, trucks, and 
other materiel required to wage war against the Axis powers. The 
United States' production capabilities allowed it to not only supply 
its own forces but to provide significant amounts of equipment to its 
allies. By 1944, the United States alone would comprise 40% of 
global weapon production.327  
 
However, men and materiel are meaningless if they cannot be 
deployed to where they are required and sustained in their 
continued operation. 'Logistics' is the term used to describe the 
system of supplying military forces with the goods and services 
required for their continued employment. This process was 
complicated during the Pacific War by four major factors – 
geographical, limited local infrastructure, lack of local resources, 
and the sheer size of the forces involved. 
 
The Pacific is the world’s largest ocean, being over 166 million 
square kilometres in area.328 In order for personnel, equipment, and 
supplies to reach the front lines, enormous distances had to be 
traversed. Contro l of the vast sea lanes of communication was a 
necessity for supplying forces in the Pacific, as was the shipping to 
carry the supplies. Due to the distances involved it took more 
                                                
326 J. H. Alexander, The Three Days of Tarawa: Utmost Savagery, Annapolis, 1995, p. 
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shipping to move forces in the Pacific theatre than a similar sized 
force in the European theatre.329 
 
Infrastructure in the Pacific during the Pacific War was in many 
locations either rudimentary or non-existent. In some islands, such 
as at Ocean Island,330 due to the lack of port facilities visiting ships 
were forced to use small boats in order to discharge cargo. Even in 
New Zealand with its more extensive port facilities, labour disputes 
created problems due to the volume and nature of the cargo 
involved. Many United States Marines remember the spoilage of 
cardboard packed goods le ft exposed to the weather as a result of 
industrial action by watersiders in Wellington during the preparation 
for Operation Watchtower.331   
 
Both sides had to create infrastructure in areas that had none, 
particularly in regard to air bases. The development of pierced steel 
matting by the Americans allowed airfields to be created quickly, 
but it still had to be transported to the location. Fuel, food, 
munitions, and often water, had to be supplied to forces requiring 
extensive supply lines. The development and usage of amphibian 
vehicles helped solve some ship to shore problems, but the lack of 
port facilities necessitated the creation of a range of specialised 
landing craft and barges which could act as wharves, quays, and 
aid in cargo handling even during an amphibious operation.332 
 
                                                
329 A. W. Gray, "Joint Logistics in the Pacific Theatre", in The Big ‘L’: American 
Logistics i n World War II, Washington, 1997, pp. 329-330. 
330 RN Naval Intelligence Division, B.R. 519 B  Geographical Handbook Series: Pacific 
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1992, p.52. 
332For descriptions and data on these equipments see Staff Officers’ Field Manual for 
Amphibious Operations (Especially as it Pertains to the Pacific Ocean Area): 
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The widespread introduction of palletization by American forces 
during the Pacific War helped to simplify cargo handling. First 
introduced by railroad companies in the nineteenth century for 
general cargo, the savings in both time and labour were dramatic. 
Three days were required to unload a railway boxcar containing 
13,000 cases of unpalletized canned goods. By using pallets the 
task took four hours.333 In addition, warehouse space could be 
saved as palletized goods could be stacked on each other, or on 
racking, by using forklifts.  
 
Mechanized equipment items used by Allied forces in amphibious 
operations were also provided with extensive waterproofing kits, in 
addition to their lubrication and fuel needs, thus adding to the 
demands on Allied logistic trains. While Japanese forces lacked the 
degree of mechanisation of Allied forces, the usage of animal 
transport caused its own special problems. Horses are difficult to 
transport and unload from ships.334 
 
The Japanese also had problems with logistics in the Pacific. Like 
the Allies they used landing craft and amphibian vehicles to aid ship 
to shore movement. As the war progressed the Japanese faced the 
loss of sea and aerial lines of communication due to losses in 
merchant shipping and the Allied strategy of bypassing and 
isolating Japanese outposts leaving them to ‘wither on the vine’. 
This resulted in solutions such as the usage of cargo submarines 
by the Japanese army to supply outposts,335 and the creation of 
large gardens, such as at Rabaul, to feed the garrison.  
 
                                                
333 R. LeBlanc, Pallet Evolved Along with Forklift , article from 
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Japanese operations 
In theory the Japanese military began the Pacific War with a well 
developed and tested amphibious doctrine. As a result of the war in 
China, the Japanese had conducted no less than sixteen major 
amphibious landings between August 1937 and March 1941.336  
These landings had provided the Japanese military the opportunity 
to gain valuable experience in many of the technical aspects of 
amphibious warfare, but had all been conducted in the face of 
minimal, or even non-existent, opposition. Furthermore in all of 
these operations the Japanese had uncontested command of the 
sea and airspace where the operations took place. Before the 
Japanese had attempted to land any military forces on the Chinese 
coast, they had first secured control of China’s coastal waters.337 
The Japanese tried to continue this pattern of secured local 
command of the sea in any area where they intended to land 
forces. The initial seizure of outlying islands of the Philippines was 
in order to secure air bases to protect the invasion force before the 
main invasion some weeks later.  
The operations during the China War had also resulted in the 
Japanese military gaining practical experience in making separate 
coordinated landings under cover of darkness. In addition, the 
Japanese had been able to field test their amphibious equipment 
under campaign conditions, making improvements to equipment as 
needed. With the outbreak of the Pacific War, Japanese forces had 
to conduct a series of rapid coordinated amphibious operations in 
order to secure the territories required to gain the Empire the 
resources it desperately wanted. In addition, territories had to be 
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seized in order to act as staging points for later operations and to 
act as a defensive shield. 
 
During the China War the Japanese had perfected the ability to 
make landings at the point of least resistance. This was facilitated 
by their control of China’s littoral waters and the ability of the 
Japanese to gain air supremacy over the quantitatively and 
qualitatively inferior Chinese air force. Surprise was considered to 
be of greater value than using large scale naval bombardment. 
Airpower was used instead to soften up targets before a landing. 
The integration of airpower in Japanese operations was such that 
American wartime manuals refer to Japanese amphibious 
operations as being ‘Aero-Amphibious’ warfare.338   
 
When the Japanese did encounter determined resistance, such as 
at Wake Island, or at Kota Bharu, it resulted in heavy Japanese 
casualties. To overcome determined enemy resistance Japanese 
commanders proved their willingness to sacrifice the lives of their 
troops in offensive operations.339  The willingness of Japanese 
soldiers, sailors and airmen to lay down their lives was 
demonstrated throughout the war. Indeed Japanese troops would 
often commit suicide rather than face what they believed to be the 
humiliation of surrender.340  
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Date  Location 
7 December 1941 Landings at Kota Baru, Malaya and along  Kra Isthmus, 
Thailand 
8 December 1941 Battan Islands, Philippines 
9 December 1941 Tarawa and Makin Atolls, Gillert Islands. Further 
landings in Malaya 
10 December 1941 Guam, Northern Tip Luzon, Philippines, and Carniguin 
Island, Philippines  
11 December 1941 Landing repulsed at Wake Island, Further Landings in 
Philippines 
14 December 1941 Philippines Landings continue 
16 December 1941 Landings at Sarawak and Brunei, Borneo 
18 December 1941 Landing at Hong Kong 
22 December 1941 Main Japanese Landings take place on Luzon, Lingayen 
Gulf, Philippines 150 miles NNW of Manila.  
23 December 1941 Second, and successful landing at Wake Island 
24 December 1941 Further landings in Philippines, south of Manila 
11 January 1942 Landings at Manado, Celebes Islands, and Tarakan 
Island off east coast of Borneo 
23 January 1942 Landings at Rabaul, Kavieng on New Ireland, 
Bougainville in Solomons, and Kendari in Celebes 
Islands 
24 January 1942 Landings at Balikpapan, East coast of Dutch Borneo. 
Further Landings at Kendari. 
25 January 1942 Landings at Lae, New Guinea 
27 January 1942 Landings at Pemangkat, West coast, Dutch Borneo 
30 January 1942 Japanese seize Dutch Naval base of Amboina 
7 February 1942 Feint landing Pulua Ubin Island 
8 February 1942 Main landings West Coast Singapore 
14 February 1942 Parachute la nding Palembang, Sumatra, NEI 
20 February 1942 Landing Portuguese Timor 
28 February 1942 Landings at Java, NEI 
8 March 1942 Landings Lae and Salamaua, New Guinea 
10 March 1942 Landings Finschhafen, Dutch New Guinea 
1-20 April 1942 Landings Dutch New Guinea 
6 April 1942 Landing Manus Island, Bismark Archipelago 
10 April 1942 Landing Cebu Island, Philippines 
16 April 1942 Landing Panay Island, Philippines 
29 April 1942 Landing reinforcements Mindanao, Philippines 
3 May 1942 Landing Tulagi, Solomons 
5 May 1942 Landing Corregidor, Philippines 
Table 4 Japanese Amphibious operations in the Pacific.341 
The army’s three designated and purpose trained amphibious 
divisions were used as infantry during the China War in order to 
                                                
341 Based on information in S. E. Morison,  History of United States Naval Operations in 
World War II: Volume III The Rising Sun In The Pacific 1931-April 1942, Edison, 2001, 
and L. Morton, United States Army In World War II: The War in the Pacific: The Fall Of 
The Philippines, Washington, 1989. 
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meet the demand for troops.342 Thus the majority of the early 
Japanese amphibious operations were conducted by troops unused 
to amphibious operations. Given the Army’s high reliance on animal 
transport, 343 and the difficulties associated with unloading horses it 
is not surprising that problems occurred during the disembarkment 
of forces, particularly at night.  
 
The invasion of Norway in 1939 by simultaneous amphibious and 
airborne landings inspired the creation of the Japanese Navy’s own 
parachute forces to spearhead amphibious landings.344 The 
purpose of these units was to vertically envelop an opposing force 
whilst a friendly amphibious force conducted its landing. Attempts 
by the Japanese to achieve this at Menado in January 1942, and at 
Palembang later in February were hampered – at Menado by the 
paratroops capturing the objective before the amphibious forces 
could arrive, and at Palembang by the stout resistance of the Anglo 
Dutch defenders.345 The Japanese were not alone in failing to 
achieve coordination between amphibious and airborne units. 
German airborne operations in Norway had not been fully 
integrated with the amphibious component of the invasion, and the 
amphibious component of the invasion of Crete arrived only after 
airborne forces had captured the island.    
 
The capture of Portuguese Timor by a combined amphibious and 
airborne force on February 23rd 1942 marks the first time that a 
vertical envelopment was successfully employed as part of an 
                                                
342 Drea, pp. 19-20. 
343 P. Jowett, The Japanese Army 1931-1945 (1) 1931-42, Oxford, 2002, pp 10-11. 
344 Rottman and Takizawa, p.7. 
345 R. A. Stewart, ‘The Japanese Assault on Timor 1942’, in Assault From The Sea: 
Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare, Annapolis, 1993, p. 203. 
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amphibious operation. The cost was high with only 78 out of 308 
paratroopers surviving the fighting.346 
 
As the war progressed Japanese ability to conduct amphibious 
operations became more constrained. Amphibious assets were 
often employed more in the resupply of garrison forces rather than 
in offensive operations. The design of new classes of amphibious 
support ships such as the Nitto Yusokan reflected this change in 
priorities as it was designed to be fast enough to go between 
islands in the hours of darkness so as to be untroubled by Allied 
aircraft.347 
 
Japanese design approaches were often innovative, but were 
hampered by the low capacity of the Japanese war economy and 
the high demands placed upon it. This resulted in the gradual 
erosion of the technical superiority Japanese amphibious 
equipment had over its Allied counterparts at the beginning of the 
Pacific War. The ability of the Japanese to make full use of 
captured Allied equipment was also reduced due to Japan being a 
less industrialised society. With a much lower rate of motor vehicles 
per capita than any other major power (USA over 200 per thousand 
persons, Germany 16 per thousand persons, Japan fewer than one 
per thousand persons)348 Japanese soldiers often could not operate 
motor vehicles unless they were part of a specialised unit. As a 
result the Japanese were forced to utilise prisoners of war to 
operate captured bulldozers in the Dutch East Indies because the 
Japanese soldiers did not know how to operate them. 349 
                                                
346 Stewart, p. 209. 
347 N. Hancock, and R. Clauson, Characteristics Of Japanese Naval Vessels: Article 10 
Landing Craft , n.p., 1946, p.19. 
348Overy, R., Why The Allies Won, London, 1995, pp.224-225. 
349K. Yoshikichi, “Korean Guard”, p.115, in H. & T. Cook, Japan At War: An Oral 
History, London, 2000, p. 115.  
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Conversely, American forces at Guadalcanal encountered little 
difficultly in using captured Japanese equipment to finish the 
construction of Henderson Field. 350 
 
British operations 
While British troops were never involved in conducting large scale 
amphibious operations in the Pacific theatre, troops from Britain’s 
Pacific colonies, and the dominions of Australia, New Zealand, and 
Canada were.351 With the fall of Singapore and the surrender of the 
Dutch East Indies, Allied command structures were revised, 
resulting in the creation of the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) 
and the Pacific Ocean Area (POA). The Pacific Ocean Area was 
further divided into Northern, Central, and Southern Areas. 
 
 
                                                
350F. O. Hough, V. E. Ludwig, and H. I. Shaw, Pearl Harbor To Guadalcanal: History of 
U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II Vol. I, Washington, n.d. p. 274. 
351 Canada provided troops for the invasion of Kiska, Allied forces landing unopposed on 
August 15th 1943, the Japanese having evacuated unnoticed on July 28th 1943.  
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Figure 13 The Pacific Theatres. 
Both of these areas were to have command structures that in 
theory gave all Allied forces in the region a role in decision making. 
In practice American Officers filled the senior positions in each 
structure.352 As a result Australian and New Zealand forces were 
effectively under American control for the majority of their 
operations. Certainly for amphibious operations this was the case 
as both Australia and New Zealand were dependent on the United 
States Navy to provide logistical and combat support for these 
operations. Conversely, United States forces were dependent on 
both New Zealand and Australia as staging and basing areas, in 
addition to supplying foodstuffs in a form of reverse lend lease.353 
 
The experiences of New Zealand and Australia in conducting 
amphibious operations in the Pacific are on the surface then quite 
similar. Both nations supplied ground forces that conducted 
numerous successful small and large scale operations with the 
direct support of the United States Navy, thus marking the first 
successful employment of either nation in amphibious operations 
since the debacle of Gallipoli. Like their American allies, Australian 
and New Zealand forces in the Pacific conducted numerous 
unopposed landings and reconnaissance missions. However a 
number of larger opposed landings were conducted, either to 
support other landings, or encircle and cut off Japanese positions. 
 
However, beneath this lies two quite separate amphibious 
experiences – due directly to each nation’s differing levels of scale 
                                                
352 US General MacArthur commanded the Southwest Pacific Area, and US Admiral 
Nimitz the Pacific Ocean Area. 
353 For an indepth and detailed discussion of this see Chapter V “Local Procurement in 
the Pacific”, in A. P. Stauffer, United States Army In World War II: The Technical 
Services: The Quartermaster Corps: Operations In The War Against Japan, Washington, 
1990. 
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and scope of commitment to operations in the Pacific. Both nations 
on the outbreak of war with Germany had committed their military 
efforts towards supporting Britain in waging a European war. With 
the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific, Australia opted to bring its 
ground forces back from the Middle East, where they had served 
with distinction, in order to defend Australia from Japanese attack. 
Australia also raised additional forces, and started a crash 
industrialisation program in order to produce modern military 
materials .For Australia the war with Japan had become the main 
priority.  New Zealand, however, decided to keep its troops in the 
Middle East, and raise additional forces for service in the Pacific. 
Ultimately, the ability to sustain a division in both the European and 
Pacific theatres was a luxury New Zealand could not maintain, 
leading to the demobilisation of its Pacific division in late 1944.354  
 
 
Location Date Unit Involved 
Vella Lavella September 1943 NZ 14th Brigade 
Treasury Islands 
(Mono Island) 
October 1943 NZ 8th Brigade 
Green Islands 
(Nissan Island) 
February 1944 NZ 14th Brigade 
Table 5 Major New Zealand amphibious Operations in the Pacific.355  
 
New Zealand and its forces in the Pacific fell under the control of 
the Pacific Ocean Area, and had 3rd Division assigned as part of 
the US 1st Marine Amphibious Corps,356 which operated as part of 
Third Amphibious Force. The New Zealand 3rd Division was never 
employed as a whole division in amphibious operations. Instead its 
                                                
354 O. A. Gillespie, Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45: 
The Pacific, Wellington, 1952, pp. 202-203. 
355 Based on information in Gillespie, and in M. Wright, Pacific War: New Zealand and 
Japan 1941-45, Auckland, 2003. 
356 Gillespie, p. 125. 
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component brigades were used in separate landings.357 As a result 
New Zealand operations were on a much smaller scale than those 
conducted by Australia. Partially this many have been a result of 
the total reliance the division had on American supporting 
organisations during amphibious operations, for unlike Australia, 
New Zealand did not form any of the supporting units required for 
amphibious warfare. In effect New Zealand forces were merely a 
substitute for American ground troops – albeit a highly regarded 
one.358 The integration of New Zealand forces into the American 
chain of command was so complete that the commander of 3rd 
Division was at one stage appointed ‘commanding General Allied 
forces Vella Lavella’,359 thus placing him in direct control of 
American forces. 
 
While the amphibious operations conducted by New Zealand forces 
were small in scale, they were important in achieving the execution 
of the overall Allied strategy of isolating the Japanese garrison at 
Rabaul. New Zealand troops were transported, landed, and 
supported by the United States Navy in all of its actions, with all the 
landings being conducted using the American methods in which the 
division was trained in the New Hebrides.360 The success of New 
Zealand’s amphibious operations in the Pacific can thus be seen as 
further proof of the quality of American doctrine in conducting 
amphibious operations. 
 
Australia, with its larger industrial base and population, was 
capable of sustaining the manpower demands of a larger army, 
forming the II Australian Corps, consisting of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 
                                                
357 Gillespie, p. 121. 
358 Gillespie, p. 141. 
359 H. I. Shaw, and D. T. Kane, Isolation of Rabaul: History of U.S. Marine Operations in 
World War II, Washington, 1963, p.153. 
360 Gillespie, p. 116. 
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9th Divisions and their supporting assets. Both Australia and New 
Zealand raised, organised, and equipped their forces along British 
lines, but as Australia had a larger military, it was able to form the 
specialist amphibious support units that New Zealand was unable 
to.  
 
Most important of these supporting amphibious units was the 1st 
Australian Combined Operations Section. Although small in size 
this unit had the responsibility of not just organising the training, 
planning, and co-ordination of Australian amphibious operations, 
but also for the dissemination and institutionalisation of amphibious 
warfare knowledge within the Australian military.361 The section 
also oversaw the testing of new methods and equipment, in 
addition to receiving reports from Australian amphibious 
engineering and logistical support units on the operational 
performance of equipment and organisations for beach parties.   
 
The Australian Combined Operations section was based on the 
British model and viewed amphibious operations as requiring the 
cooperation of all three services, and as such had personnel from 
the RAAF, RAN, and the Australian Army. In addition, the 
Australians were receiving reports from the British Combined 
Operations headquarters, which were detailed examinations of 
amphibious operations in Europe and suggestions for future 
improvements.362 
                                                
361The function of this unit has been determined through a study of activities recorded in 
its War Diaries for the period September 1944 through to May 1945. Further support for 
this assumption is gained from the archiving of its war diaries as part of the Australian 
War Memorial’s collection of Headquarter Units. 
362 Distribution list contained within the 1943 C.O.H.Q. Bulletin No: Y/1 "Notes on the 
Planning and Assault Phases of the Sicilian Campaign", a detailed 40 page report on 
Operation ‘Husky’. Of 321 copies produced ten were sent to the Australian military. 
Multiple copies were sent to various American military establishments including the 
Marine Corps. 
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Operation Where When Units Involved 
Postern Lae Sept. 4 1943 Australian 9th 
Division 
 Finschhafen Oct. 2 1943 Australian 9th 
Division 
Oboe One Tarakan May 1 1945 Australian 26th 
Brigade 
Oboe Six Labuan Island and 
Brunei 
June 10 1945 Australian 9th 
Division (two 
brigades only) 
Oboe Two Balikpapan July 1 1945 Australian 7th 
Division 
Table 6 Major Australian Amphibious Operations in the Pacific363   
 
The co-operation of the United States Navy in providing not just 
logistical and combat support for operations, but also the 
amphibious training of Australian Divisions was vital. The 
commanders and instructors of the 3rd Amphibious Training Group 
were primarily United States Naval Officers,364 who taught 
American techniques for waterproofing equipment, dealing with 
unloading supplies, evacuating casualties, signal traffic, and using 
LSTs.  
 
Both British and American thinking thus influenced the development 
of an Australian amphibious doctrine. In practical terms this 
resulted in a largely cosmetic usage of British nomenclature, such 
as referring to shore parties as either 'beach groups' or even 
commandos, while making use of American innovations such as 
palletization and fork lift trucks to aid cargo handling.365  
 
                                                
363 Based on information in G. H. Gill, Australia In The War Of 1939-1945 Series Two 
Navy Volume II Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945, Canberra, n. d. 
364 AWM52 Australian Military Forces, Army Headquarters, Formation and Unit 
Diaries, 1939-1945 1/11/2 Miscellaneous 1 Australian Combined Operations Section 
September 1944 – May 1945 , p. 38.  
365 AWM52 Australian Military Forces, Army Headquarters, Formation and Unit 
Diaries, 1939-1945 1/11/2 Miscellaneous 1 Australian Combined Operations Section 
June – September 1945 , p.40. 
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As Australia fell within the authority of the SWPA, Australian 
amphibious operations were conducted under the control of the 7th 
Amphibious Force, which was commanded by an American 
Admiral.  Despite having their own amphibious support units, the 
Australians were still dependent on the United States Navy 
providing logistical and combat support for operations. 
 
With the adoption of the ‘Germany First’ policy by the Allies at the 
January 1943 Casablanca conference,366 Australian requirements 
for landing craft for use in the Pacific became a lower priority. 
Throughout the war production of landing craft would be outstripped 
by the demand for them in each theatre.367 In order to satisfy the 
requirements of their own forces, Australia produced a series of 
locally designed and built landing craft. The Australian craft were 
broadly based on Allied designs then currently in service, being 
shallow draft, bow ramped craft, designed to beach and discharge 
their cargo on the shore.368 Australian forces in New Guinea also 
used captured Japanese craft. 369  
 
                                                
366 A. Bryant, The Turn Of The Tide 1939-1943, London, 1957, pp.5559-560. 
367 S. E. Morison, American Contributions To The Strategy Of World War II, London, 
1958, p. 50. 
368 ONI 226/1, p.31. 
369 The AWM Photo collection contains many pictures of Japanese landing craft being 
used by Australian Forces. See Photos 013324, 150985, 026639, 026640, 0226641, and 
069261. 
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Photo 1. 
Australian gunners unload artillery off a Japanese Daihatsu Type ‘A’ Landing Craft 
captured at Milne Bay, New Guinea. (Source AWM collection 069260) 
 
Initially, US General MacArthur, commander of the SWPA, used 
Australian ground troops for amphibious operations, as they were 
the only troops available to him in sufficient numbers. As the 
number of American divisions available in the Pacific increased, 
Australian units were relegated to relieving American garrisons and 
cond ucting operations to liberate Dutch and British territory. Some 
historians have suggested that MacArthur had a political motive in 
not wanting to use Australian troops in the liberation of the 
Philippines, as he wished it to be a solely American affair.370 
 
 Amphibious operations were conducted by both Australia and New 
Zealand, but were heavily reliant on American logistical and combat 
support.  The amphibious operations conducted by Australian and 
New Zealand forces were conducted using American methods, 
rather than British methods. Interservice, and inter-Allies 
cooperation in these operations were excellent, with both the 
                                                
370 D. Horner, “The ANZAC contribution Australian and New Zealand in the Pacific 
War” in The Pacific War: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima , Oxford, 2006, p. 152. 
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Australian, and New Zealand,371 official histories praising the role 
played by the United States Navy in planning and conducting these 
operations.  
 
As the war in Europe drew to a close, the British started to 
negotiate with the United States over the sending of a Royal Navy 
taskforce to the Pacific. While the amphibious assets of this 
taskforce posed little difficulty with integration into American forces, 
some questions were raised over the suitability of Royal Navy 
capital surface units for joint operations in the Pacific.372 The major 
concern raised by United States Admiral King was the limited 
endurance of the British ships and their inability to replenish at sea 
via US Navy methods.373 A Royal Navy task force did take part in 
Operation ‘Iceberg’, the invasion of Okinawa; however it did so as 
part of an American operation conducted according to American 
methods.  As the Australian and New Zealand amphibious 
experiences had shown, United States forces were able to work 
smoothly with their Allies – provided their Allies used American 
methods.  
 
An American War 
The Pacific War against Japan was the war that the United States 
Marine Corps had been planning for since nearly twenty years 
before. But before the principles enshrined in successive editions of 
War Plan Orange and outlined in Ellis’s Operational Plan 712 could 
be enacted, the Japanese advance needed to be halted and 
contained. While still keeping to the formula of defeating ‘Germany 
                                                
371 The NZ Official history states that on the US Commander of the operation against the 
Treasury Islands “had every reason to congratulate himself on his accurate and 
exhaustive planning”, Gillespie p.154. 
372  N. E. Saratakes, "The Short but Brilliant Life of The British Pacific Fleet", JFQ, issue 
40, 1st Quarter, 2006, p. 87. 
373 US Navy vessels replenished parallel to tankers, while RN ships replenished astern. 
The US Navy system is quicker and can allow two ships to replenish at once. 
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First’, the Allies started to conduct a series of counter offensives. 
US Admiral King built up forces in the Pacific while still maintaining 
a strong presence in the European theatre. The United States 
would emerge as the dominant partner in the Pacific as it provided 
the bulk of the naval forces and materiel needed to prosecute the 
conflict. This build -up of naval forces was necessary even to 
maintain parity with Japanese forces after their early successes.  
 
However wars are not won by maintaining the status quo, they are 
won by destroying the enemy’s forces and their ability to sustain 
their forces in the field. Operation Watchtower, the seizure of 
Guadalcanal, marked the first step in doing that, but it also revealed 
flaws in the execution of American amphibious doctrine, particularly 
in the haphazard loading and unloading of supplies and equipment. 
Despite the emphasis of FTP-167 laid on the importance of 
logistics, the first wartime test revealed the execution of those 
principles was lacking. 
Operation Landing Force When Where 
Watchtower 1st Marine Division   7 Aug 1942 Guadalcanal, Tulagi 
Dipper 3rd Marine Division   1 Nov 1943 Bougainville 
Galvanic 2nd Marine Division 20-Nov-43 Tarawa  
Backhand 1st Marine Division 26-Dec-43 New Britain 
Flintlock 4th Marine Division 31-Jan-44 Roi-Namur 
Catchpole Tactical Group 1 18-Feb-44 Eniwetok Atoll 
Appease 5th Marine Regt   5 March 1944 Volupai-Talasea 
2nd and 4th Marine 
Divisions 
15-Jun-44 Saipan 
3rd M arine Division 21-Jul-44 Guam 
Forager 
   
Stalemate 1st Marine Division 15-Sep-44 Peleliu 
Detachment 4th and 5th Marine 
Divisions 
19-Feb-45 Iwo Jima 
Iceberg 1st and 6th Marine 
Divisions 
  1 April 1945 Okinawa 
  4th Marine Regt   4 June 1945 Oroku Peninsula 
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Table 7. Major US Marine Landings in the Pacific Theatre.374 
Before Tarawa, Allied operations in the Pacific were hastily 
organised counter offensives. The Guadalcanal operation had been 
launched as a response to Japanese attempts to create an airbase 
there.375 Tarawa marked the beginning of the Central Pacific drive 
towards Japan that was the keystone of the prewar ‘Orange’ war 
plan. 
 
Operation Landing Force When Where 
Landcrab 7th Infantry 
Division 
11-May-43 Attu 
43rd Infantry 
Division 
30-Jun-43 New Georgia 
1st Raider Regt 5-Jul-43 Rice Anchorage 
35th Infantry Regt 15-Aug-43 Vella Lavella 
 172nd Infantry 
Regt 
27-Aug-43 Arundel Island 
Toenails  
   
Galvanic 165th Infantry Regt 20-Nov-43 Makin Atoll 
Dexterity 112th Cavalry Re gt 15-Dec-43 Arawa New Britain 
Flintlock 7th Infantry 
Division 
31-Jan-44 Kwajalein 
Brewer 1st Cavalry Division 29-Feb-44 Admirality Islands 
Persecution 163rd Infantry Regt 22-Apr-44 Aitape, New 
Guinea 
Reckless 24th and 41st 
Infantry Divisions 
22-Apr-44 Hollandia, New 
Guinea 
Straightline 163rd Infantry Regt 17-May-44 Wakde-Sarmi, New 
Guinea 
Horlicks  41st Infantry 
Division 
27-May-44 Biak Island 
Cyclone 158th Inf Regt 2-Jul-44 Noemfoor Island 
Globetrotter 6th Inf Division 30-Jul-44 Sansapor, New 
Guinea 
                                                
374Based on information in G. L. Rottman, US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Army & 
Marine Corps, Pacific  Theater, Oxford, 2004. 
375 R. B. Frank, Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle, New York, 
1990, p. 31. 
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Daredevil 31st Infantry 
Division 
15-Sep-44 Morotai Island 
Stalemate 77th Infantry 
Division 
17-Sep-44 Angaur 
 
 
Operation Landing Force When Where 
King II 7th, 24th and 96th 
Infantry Divisions, 
1st Cavalry Division 
20-Oct-44 Leyte, Philippines 
Love III 24th Infantry 
Division 
15-Dec-44 Mindoro, 
Philippines 
Mike I 6th, 37th, 40th, and 
43rd Infantry 
Divisions 
9-Jan-45 Luzon, Philippines 
Mike VI  38th Infantry 
Division 
29-Jan-45 Zambales, 
Philippines 
  11th Airborne 
Division 
31-Jan-45 Nasugary Bay, 
Philippines 
  503rd Parachute 
Regt, 34th Infantry 
Regt 
16-Feb-45 Corregidor, 
Philippines 
Victor III 186th Infantry Regt 28-Feb-45 Palawan, 
Philippines 
26-Mar-45 Kerama Retto Iceberg 77th Infantry 
Division 16-Apr-45 le Shima 
Victor IV 41st Infantry 
Division 
10-Mar-45 Mindanao, 
Philippines 
  163rd Infantry Regt 16-Mar-45 Jolo, Philippines  
Table 8. Major US Army Amphibious Landings in the Pacific.376 
 
The majority of American amphibious landings took place in Pacific 
theatre. The United States Army took part in only thirteen major 
opposed landings in both the European and Mediterranean theatres 
                                                
376 Based on information in G. L. Rottman, US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Army 
& Marine Corps, Pacific  Theater, Oxford, 2004, and J. A. Lorelli, To Foreign Shores, 
Annapolis, 1995. 
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combined.377 But in both theatres the preference was for daylight 
landings with the benefit of mass naval gunfire and close air 
support – exactly the techniques outlined in FTP-167 back in 1938. 
Given that the Marines trained the first two US Army Divisions in 
1940,378 and that the US Army adopted FTP-167 as FM 31-5, its 
manual on amphibious warfare, it is only natural that operations in 
both theatres placed a high value on naval gunfire support.   
 
As each successive operation became increasingly complex both in 
size and scope, further refinements were made to the execution of 
FTP-167’s  core doctrine. Techniques of naval gunfire support were 
improved and perfected, as were the methods of close air support. 
In logistics improvements were made not just with the tools of cargo 
handling but with the techniques in using them. Operation Galvanic 
was to be the ‘spawning ground’ of modern amphibious warfare, as 
it was at Tarawa that hard lessons were learnt – primarily, that a 
frontal amphibious assault against a fortified atoll was possible, but 
that it would cost lives. Tarawa proved the doctrine, all that 
remained was to refine the techniques.379 
 
After Tarawa, training grounds were created based on the 
Japanese defences, both for ground units and for naval units 
engaged in gunfire support. Feedback was sought on every aspect 
of the operation. The staff of 2nd Marine Division, when compiling 
its after-action report, questioned subordinate commanders on 
                                                
377 G. L. Rottman, US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Mediterranean & European 
Theaters, Oxford, 2006, p. 11. 
378 J. A. Isely and P. A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory and Its 
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379 Alexander, Utmost Savagery, p. 243. 
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topics ranging from combat operations to the performance of cargo 
pallets under fire.380 
 
Intelligence information on Japanese weapons, tactics, and 
organisation was distributed throughout the Allied forces, as were 
the reports of troops who had fought the Japanese in various 
campaigns. The British usage of amphibious commando raiding 
forces was also closely studied by the United States, particularly by 
the Marines who developed their own Marine raider units as a 
result of British wartime experience and success.381 The 
employment of raiding and reconnaissance units became 
increasingly vital to gain geographical and hydrographical data on 
landing sites, remove underwater defences, and provide 
diversions.382 
 
As new equipment became available, new uses and adaptations 
were made to it. The LVT began as an unarmoured cargo carrier. 
At Tarawa it became an amphibious armoured fighting vehicle, 
transporting troops directly to the fighting. LVTs would gradually 
gain more armour and firepower, allowing them to support landing 
operations with direct fire and engage enemy forces ashore. 
 
With the prospect of an invasion of Japan, and the advent of the 
atomic bomb, consideration was given to the tactical use of nuclear 
weapons to support the landings. The employment of up to nine 
                                                
380 FMFRP 12-90 Second Marine Division Report on Gilbert Islands Tarawa Operation , 
Washington, 1991, pp. 9-11 (reprint of original 1943 report). 
381 G. Rottman, US Marine Corps 1941-45, Oxford, 2004, p.27. 
382 For an indepth analysis of the importance o f such activity in the Pacific see R. C. 
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bombs was considered,383 giving a taste of the postwar planning 
concerns of the NBC384 battlefield. 
 
Lessons Learnt 
The Pacific War provided the spawning ground for modern 
amphibious warfare. The frank appraisals of failures and successes 
during the war by US officers allowed the prewar doctrine to be 
refined, and for the creation of new equipment to fill niche roles 
identified by actual operations. The perfection of ‘storm landings’ by 
the United States a llowed the creation of a new form of force 
projection with global reach. The creation of self-sustaining task 
forces, with both the combat and logistic elements needed to seize 
and hold an objective across thousands of miles of ocean, was a 
staggering achievement. And it is this achievement that marked the 
evolution of amphibious warfare from merely being the projection of 
military power ashore.  
 
This evolution was a result of the prewar doctrine developed by the 
US Marines for conducting the objectives laid out in War Plan 
Orange, and clearly identified in Ellis’s prewar studies. The 
refinements to this basic doctrine were made not only as a result of 
operational experience, but also by the availability of new 
technology. The ability to use amphibious warfare in its highest 
form of force projection would necessitate having the logistical and 
military infrastructure to support such an operation. The ability to 
immediately project amphibious force globally would become one of 
the hallmarks of a superpower during the Cold War.   
 
                                                
383 T. B. Allen, and N. Polmar, Codename Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan , 
London, 1996, pp. 314-315. 
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The foundations for further development were also laid during the 
Pacific War. The success of the Japanese at Timor in using 
parachute troops to vertically envelop the defenders in support of 
the amphibious landing was to pave the way for future operations. 
While German operations showed the potential of such operations, 
it was at Timor where the principle was first executed successfully. 
The successful use of airborne forces to support Allied landings in 
Europe further reinforced that success.  
 
Studies of Japanese equipment and operations were made both 
during and after the war, with technical missions sent as part of the 
Allied occupation forces. Japanese designs that fused together the 
concept of the amphibious warfare ship and the a ircraft carrier are 
echoed in many post-war designs. With the further development of 
the helicopter during the late 1940s and 1950s, the concept of the 
helicopter carrier was born. This was a result of the success of 
vertical envelopment in supporting amphibious operations during 
the war, but also of the desire of the US Marines to provide a purely 
naval solution to global force projection in the nuclear age.385 
 
Conclusion 
Successful amphibious operations are the result of careful planning 
and preparation, in conjunction with skilful execution. Not only does 
the enemy have to be defeated, but major physical barriers have to 
be overcome to ensure success. The vast distances of the Pacific 
presented all combatants with major geographical challenges that 
forced the development of streamlined logistical systems to support 
operations across vast stretches of ocean. 
 
                                                
385HAF Box 41, Folder 744, Anon., Special Equipment for Amphibious Operations, n.p., 
1946, p.1. 
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All three of the powers looked at in this study had strong traditions 
of successful amphibious operations prior to World War One. The 
military and naval innovations of the nineteenth century had greatly 
benefited the navies and militaries of all three and had provided the 
tools needed to conduct these operations. On the eve of World war 
One these improvements made large scale amphibious operations 
more practical. 
 
British amphibious failures at Tanga and Gallipoli were the result of 
poor planning and execution, rather than proof of the impossibility 
of amphibious operations in the face of machine guns and quick 
firing artillery. However, the latter was the conclusion that was 
widely drawn in the interwar period. This was despite German 
success in the Baltic that occurred under similar technical and 
operational constraints. In addition the Franco-Spanish landings at 
Alcuhumas Bay in 1925 were conducted using similar equipment to 
that available to the British at Gallipoli. 
 
The belief that airpower had made amphibious operations 
redundant was also widespread after World War One, especially in 
Britain where the Royal Air Force was determined to firmly 
establish itself as a third service. This desire by the RAF to 
establish itself resulted in its opposition to amphibious operations 
as being a viable form of force projection. Conversely, the USMC 
was motivated both before and after World War Two to create 
amphibious warfare as being both important and as its specialist 
niche role.  
 
The reverse engineering of Gallipoli by the USMC allowed it to 
create an amphibious doctrine that formed the basis of US 
amphibious operations during World War Two. The American War 
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Plan Orange allowed the USMC to create a specialist amphibious 
role for itself during wartime, particularly in any conflict with Japan. 
As a result USMC doctrine was assault focused with much 
emphasis on the way of planning and conducting operations, but 
still lacking on the eve of the war adequate means to implement 
these operations. As the war continued the equipment required was 
produced, first as a result of copying Japanese designs, and then 
as a result of British influences. 
 
Japanese amphibious developments and experiences in the 
interwar period resulted in the production of equipment that was 
both innovative and superior to that of the Allies at the beginning of 
the Pacific War. However Japan had failed to produce a doctrine 
capable of conducting amphibious assaults in the face of 
determined opposition – Japanese operations relying heavily on the 
élan of their troops rather than superior planning and preparation. 
  
As a result of these respective interwar preparations, the United 
States entered World War Two with superb doctrine and adequate 
equipment, Japan with adequate doctrine and superb equipment, 
and the British with neither.  
 
American systems of logistics gave the means of sustaining 
operations across long distances and in areas with limited 
infrastructure, often by producing the infrastructure required. In the 
Pacific, where often a force would have to bring its own drinking 
water, this ability to maintain long lines of communication was a 
factor vital to victory. 
 
The combination of American amphibious doctrine and logistic 
capabilities and developments resulted in the creation of self-
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contained task forces capable of conducting ‘storm landings’.  The 
United States made deliberate efforts to learn from each 
successive amphibious operation in orde r to improve the next. The 
continual successes of the Americans during the campaigns of the 
Central Pacific drive was a direct result of this process, building 
upon the solid doctrinal base developed during the interwar period.  
 
Japanese innovations in the field of amphibious warfare were 
handicapped by their limited industrial base and by a lack of 
opportunities as military reverses forced them towards a policy of 
reactive and defensive operations. Even so, Japanese designs and 
planning showed a desire to  integrate airpower closely with their 
operations, to the extent of producing ships that combined the 
features of both aircraft and landing craft carriers. In the immediate 
postwar period the Americans closely studied Japanese designs 
and equipment, a prac tice that had first occurred in the interwar 
period. 
 
The geographical and logistical challenges of waging war in the 
Pacific provided the stimulus for revolutionising the way future 
amphibious operations would be conducted both in terms of the 
equipment used and in the way it would be employed. The Pacific 
War saw the creation of new machines and new methods for 
conducting amphibious operations that were the foundation of the 
postwar successes of both the United Nations at Inchon in 1950, 
and the British in the Falklands War. 
 160 
 
Primary sources 
 
Anon. FMFRP 12-90 Second Marine Division Report on Gilbert 
Islands Tarawa Operation, Washington, 1991 (reprint of original 
1943 report) 
 
Anon., C.O.H.Q. Bulletin No: Y/1 ‘Notes on the Planning and 
Assault phases of the Sicilian Campaign’, n.p., 1943.  
 
Anon., Air Publication 1300 Royal Air Force War Manual Part I. – 
Operations, n.p., 1938. 
 
Australian War Memorial (AWM)52 Australian Military Forces, Army 
Headquarters, formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945 1/11/2 
Miscellaneous 1 Australian Combined Operations Section 
September 1944 – May 1945  
 
AWM52 Australian Military Forces, Army Headquarters, formation 
and unit diaries, 1939-1945 1/11/2 Miscellaneous 1 Australian 
Combined Operations Section June – September 1945. 
 
Ellis, E. H., FMFRP 12-46 Advanced Base Operations in 
Micronesia, Washington, 1992 (reprint of original 1921 report) 
 
Historical Amphibious File (HAF) 43 Text for Landing Operations 
1931, letter from The Major General Commandant, To The 
Commandant Marine Corps Schools. 20 th October 1931. 
 
HAF Box 2 Folder 51, Krulak, V. H., Report on Japanese Landing 
Operations Shanghai Area 1937, Shanghai, 1938. 
 
HAF Box 21, Folder 11, Anon., ‘Translations of Captured 
Documents on Lessons Learned by the Japanese in the Attack on 
Wake Island’ in ICPOA Bulletin No. 1-43 Japanese Land Forces 
No. 5, n.p., n.d. 
 
HAF Box 3, Folder 73, Gally, B. W., A History of the U.S. Fleet 
Landing Exercises, n.p. 1939. 
 
HAF Box 34, Folder 638(5), Anon., Tentative Changes In FTP-167, 
n.p., 1940. 
 
HAF Box 35, Folder 654, Oates, C.S., A Critical Analysis of 
Japanese Operations against Shanghai in 1932, and the results 
thereof, Quantico, 1935. 
 161 
 
HAF Box 39, Folders, 718A-C, Borg-Warner Corporation, 
Research, Investigation & Experimentation in the field of Amphibian 
Vehicles, Kalamazoo, 1957. 
 
HAF Box 4, Folder 123, Anon, Japanese Landing Boats Shanghai, 
1937, data collected by USS BULMER, n.p., 1937.  
 
HAF Box 4, Folder 123, Krulak, V. H., The design and Procurement 
of Suitable Landing Boats, n.p., 1939. 
 
HAF Box 4, Folder, 127, Brown, M. G., Japanese Special Landing 
Force Boats And Boat Ships, n.p., 1939.  
 
HAF Box 41 Folder 744, Anon., Special Equipment for amphibious 
Operations, n.p., 1946.  
 
HAF Box 45, Folder 807, Griffith, S. W. and Greene, W. M. , Report 
on Combined Operations Training Centre, Inverary, Argyllshire, 
Scotland 7-19 December 1941, n.p.,1942. 
 
HAF Box 7, Folder 180, Anon., Tentative Landing Operations 
Manual, Washington, 1935. 
 
Hancock, N. and Clauson, R., JM-200-H S-01-10 Characteristics Of 
Japanese Naval Vessels: Article 10 Landing Craft, n.p., 1946. 
 
Patton, G. S., Historical Study of Landing Operations, Fort Shafter, 
1935. 
 
RN Naval Intelligence Division, B.R. 519 Geographical handbook 
Series: Pacific Islands Vol. I General Survey, London, 1945. 
 
RN Naval Intelligence Division, B.R. 519 Geographical handbook 
Series: Pacific Islands Vol. II Eastern Pacific, London, 1943. 
 
RN Naval Intelligence Division, B.R. 519 B  Geographical handbook 
Series: Pacific Islands Vol. III Western Pacific (Tonga to the 
Solomon Islands), London, 1944. 
 
RN Naval Intelligence Division, B.R. 519 C  Geographical 
handbook Series: Pacific Islands Vol. IV Western Pacific (New 
Guinea and Islands Northward), London, 1945. 
 
US Navy, FTP-167 Landing Operations Manual, Washington, 1938. 
 
 162 
US Navy, ONI 225 J Japanese Landing operations and equipment, 
Washington, 1943. 
 
US Navy, ONI 226 Allied Landing Craft and Ships, Washington, 
1944 reprinted in Baker, A. D., Allied Landing Craft of World War 
Two , London, 1985. 
 
US Navy, Joint Publication 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious 
Operations, Washington, 2001. 
 
USMC, Staff Officers’ Field Manual for Amphibious Operations 
(especially as it pertains to the Pacific Ocean Area) Organization, 
Technical and Logistical data, Washington, 1944.   
 
Secondary sources 
 
Official Histories 
 
Anon, War Record, Wellington, 1946. 
 
Anon., United States Army In World War II: The War In The Pacific 
Atlas, Harrisburg, 1998. 
 
Aspinall-Oglander, C. F., History of The Great War: Military 
Operations Gallipoli Vol. 1: Inception of the Campaign to May 1915, 
London, 1992. 
 
Elphinstone, H. C., Siege of Sebastopol 1854-5: Journal of the 
Operations Conducted by the Corps of Royal Engineers Part 1, 
London, 1859. 
 
Gill, G. H., Australia In The War Of 1939-1945: Series Two Navy 
Volume II Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945, Canberra, n.d. 
 
Gillespie, O. A., Official History of New Zealand in the Second 
World War 1939-45: The Pacific, Wellington, 1952. 
 
Hough, F. O., Ludwig, V. E., and Shaw, H. I., Pearl Harbor To 
Guadalcanal: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World 
War II Vol. I, Washington, n.d.  
 
Shaw, H. I., and Kane D. T. Isolation of Rabaul: History of U.S. 
Marine Operations in World War II Vol. II, Washington, 1963. 
 
Shaw, H. I., Nalty, B. C., and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive: 
History Of U.S. Marine Corps Operations In World War II Vol. III, 
Washington, 1966. 
 163 
 
Stauffer, A. P., United States Army In World War II The Technical 
Services: The Quartermaster Corps: Operations In The War 
Against Japan, Washington, 1990. 
 
Long-hsuen, H. and Ming-kai, C. History of The Sino-Japanese War 
(1937 – 1945), Taipei, 1972. 
 
Morison, S. E., History of United States Naval Operations in World 
War II: Volume III The Rising Sun In The Pacific 1931-April 1942, 
Edison, 2001. 
 
Morison, S. E., History of United States Naval Operations in World 
War II: Volume IV Coral Sea, Midway And Submarine Actions May 
1942-August 1942, Edison, 2001.  
 
Morison, S. E., History of United States Naval Operations in World 
War II: Volume V The Struggle For Guadalcanal August 1942-
February 1943, Edison, 2001. 
 
Morison, S. E., History of United States Naval Operations in World 
War II: Volume VII Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls June 1942 – 
April 1944, Chicago, 2002. 
 
Morison, S. E., History of United States Naval Operations in World 
War II: Volume VIII New Guinea and the Marianas March 1944 – 
August 1944, Chicago, 2002. 
 
Morison, S. E., History of United States Naval Operations in World 
War II: Volume XII Leyte June 1944 – January 1945, Chicago, 
2002. 
 
Morison, S. E., History of United States Naval Operations in World 
War II: Volume XIII The Liberation Of The Philippines 1944-1945, 
Edison, 2001. 
 
Morison, S. E., History of United States Naval Operations in World 
War II: Volume XIV Victory in the Pacific, Chicago, 2002. 
 
Morton, L., United States Army In World War II: The War in the 
Pacific: The Fall Of The Philippines, Washington, 1989. 
 
Williams, K., Army Air Forces Historical Studies No: 45: 
Development of the South Pacific Air Route, n.p., 1946. 
 
 
 164 
Books 
 
Adcock, A., WWII US Landing Craft, Carrollton, n.d. 
 
Alexander, J. H., Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the 
Central Pacific, Annapolis, 1997. 
 
Alexander, J. H., Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa , 
Annapolis, 1995. 
 
Allen, B. A. and Polmar, N., Codename Downfall: The Secret Plan 
to Invade Japan, London, 1996. 
 
Anon, The Times World Atlas, London, 2005. 
 
Atkinson, J., Landing Craft from 1926, n.p., n.d.  
 
Bacon, R., The Dover Patrol 1915-1917 Vol. I, New York, 1919. 
 
Barber, L. and Hensha ll, K., The Last War of Empires: Japan and 
the Pacific War, Auckland, 1999 
 
Beevor, A., The Spanish Civil War, London, 1999. 
 
Barker, A. J., Japanese Army Handbook 1939-1945, London, 1979. 
 
Brooks, R., The Royal Marines 1664 to the present, Annapolis, 
2002. 
 
Bryant, A., The Turn Of The Tide 1939-1943, London, 1957,  
 
Bullard, S., (translator), Japanese Army Operations In The South 
Pacific Area: New Britain and Papua campaigns, 1942-43, 
Canberra, 2007. 
 
Cawthorne, N., History’s Greatest Battles: Masterstrokes of War, 
London, 2005. 
 
Chesneau, R., Conway’s All The World’s Fighting Ships 1922-1946, 
London, 1980. 
 
Clifford, K. J., Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and 
America from 1920-1940, Laurens, 1983. 
 
Durnford -Slater, J., Commando , London, 1955. 
 
 165 
Dyer, G. C., FMFRP 12-109 The Amphibians Came To Conquer 
Vol. I, Washington, 1991. 
 
Edwards, H. W., A Different War: Marines in Europe and North 
Africa, Washington, 1994. 
 
Evans, D. C. and Peattie, M. R., Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and 
Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941, Annapolis, 
1997. 
 
Evans, M. H. H., Brassey’s Sea Power: Naval Vessels, Weapon 
Systems and Technology Series, Volume 4, Amphibious 
Operations: The Projection of Sea Power Ashore, London, 1990. 
 
Ferguson, B., The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined 
Operations, London, 1961. 
 
Fletcher, D., Swimming Shermans: Sherman DD amphibious tank 
of World War II, Botley, 2006. 
 
Foss, C. F., World War II Tanks and Fighting Vehicles, London, 
1981. 
 
Frank, R. B., Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark 
Battle, New York, 1992. 
 
Friedman, N., U.S Amphibious Ships and Craft: An Illustrated 
Design History, Annapolis, 2002. 
 
Gardiner, R., (editor), Conway’s All The World’s Fighting Ships 
1922-1946, London, 1980. 
 
Gilbert, M., A History Of The Twentieth Century Volume One: 1900-
1933, London, 1997. 
 
Glover, M., Wellington’s Peninsular Victories, London, London, 
1963. 
 
Gordon, G. A. H., British Seapower and procurement between the 
Wars: A Reappraisal of Rearmament, London, 1988. 
 
Gray, R., (editor), Weapons; An international encyclopedia from 
5000BC to 2000AD, London, 1990. 
 
Hall, T., D-Day Operation Overlord, London, 1993. 
 
 166 
Harclerode, P., Wings Of War: Airborne Warfare 1918-1945, 
London, 2006. 
 
Haythornthwaite, P. J., The Napoleonic Source Book, London, 
1990. 
 
Haythornthwaite, P. J., The Colonial Wars Source Book, London, 
1997. 
 
Hogg, I. V., The Encyclopedia of Infantry Weapons of World War II, 
London, 1977. 
 
Hogg, I., and Weeks, J., The Illustrated encyclopedia Of Military 
Vehicles, Sydney, 1980. 
 
Hoyte, E. P., Japan’s War: The Great Pacific Conflict 1853-1952, 
London, 1987. 
 
Isely,J. A. and Crowl, P. A., The U.S. Marines And Amphibious 
War: Its Theory, and Practise in the Pacific, Princeton, 1951. 
 
Jowett, P., The Japanese Army 1931-1945 (1) 1931-42, Oxford, 
2002. 
 
Keegan, J., The Second World War, London, 1989. 
 
Keegan, J., The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare, 
New York, 1990. 
 
Keyes, A. F., Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations, 
London, 1943. 
 
Lorelli, J. A., To Foreign Shores, Annapolis, 1995. 
 
Marston, D., Essential Histories: The Seven Years War, Oxford, 
2001. 
 
Massie, R. K., Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, And The Coming Of 
The Great War, London, 1993. 
 
Merriam, R., Japanese Landing Craft of World War II: U.S. Naval 
Technical Mission to Japan, Bannington, 2006. 
 
Miller, E. S., War Plan Orange: the U.S strategy to defeat Japan, 
1897 – 1945, Annapolis, 1991. 
 
 167 
Mordal, J., Twenty-Five Centuries of Sea Warfare , London, 1965. 
 
Moorehead, A., Gallipoli, Ware, 1997. 
 
Morison,  S. E., American Contributions To The Strategy Of World 
War II, London, 1958. 
 
Morison, S.E., The Two -Ocean War: A Short History of the United 
States In The Second World War, Boston, 1963. 
 
Overy, R., Why The Allies Won, London, 1995. 
 
Pipes, R., Russia Under The Bolshevik Regime 1919-1924, 
London, 1997. 
 
Plunkett, E., Past and Future of The British Navy, London, 1846. 
 
Polmar, N. and Mersky, P., Amphibious Warfare: An Illustrated 
History, London, 1988. 
 
Richmond, H., Amphibious Warfare in British History, Exter,1941. 
 
Richmond, H., British Strategy Military & Economic: A Historical 
Review and its Contemporary Lessons, London, 1941. 
 
Rottman, G. and Takizawa, A., Japanese Parachute Forces of 
World War II, Oxford, 2005. 
 
Rottman, G., US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Army & Marine 
Corps, Pacific  Theater, Oxford, 2004. 
 
Rottman, G., US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Mediterranean 
& European Theaters, Oxford, 2006. 
 
Rottman, G., US Marine Corps 1941-45, Botley, 2004. 
 
Sakai, S., Caidin, M., and Saito, F., Samurai, London, 1960. 
 
Shaw, H. I., Opening Moves: The Marines Gear Up for War, 
Washington, 1991. 
 
Sherrod, R., Tarawa: The story of a battle, Fredericksburg, 1985. 
 
Smith, H. M. and Finch, P., Coral and Brass, New York, 1949. 
 
 168 
Speller, I. and Tuck, C., Strategy and Tactics: Amphibious Warfare, 
Staplehurst, 2001. 
 
Stanley,R. M.,  Prelude to Pearl Harbor, New York, 1982. 
 
Strahan, J. E., Andrew Jackson Higgins and the Boats that won 
World War II, Baton Rouge, 1994. 
 
Tschischwitz, The Army and Navy during the Conquest of the Baltic 
Islands in October, 1917, Washington, 1933. 
 
Tsuji, M., Singapore: The Japanese Version, London, 1966. 
 
Urban, M., Rifles: Six years with Wellington’s legendary 
sharpshooters, London, 2003. 
 
USMC, Marine Corps History, Quantico, 1962. 
 
Warner, P., Japanese Army of World War II, Reading, 1973. 
 
Weeks, J., Infantry Weapons, London, 1972. 
 
Wilson, T., The Myriad Faces of War, Cambridge, 1986. 
 
Wrangel, P. N., Always with Honour, New York, 1957. 
 
Wright, M., Pacific War: New Zealand and Japan 1941-45, 
Auckland, 2003. 
 
Zaloga, S., Amtracs: US Amphibious Assault Vehicles, London, 
1987. 
 
Articles and Essays 
 
Alexander, J. H., “Across the Reef: Amphibious warfare in the 
Pacific”, in The Pacific War: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima, 
Botley, 2006, pp. 195-210. 
 
Allen, L., “Notes on Japanese Historiography: World War II”, 
Military Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 4, Dec. 1971, p. 133-138. 
 
Anderson, B., “The naval strategy of the Civil War”, Military Affairs, 
Vol. 26, No. 1, Spring 1962, pp. 11-21. 
 
Anon., “RMASC Centaur”, After The Battle, No. 18, 1977, p. 50-53. 
 
 169 
Bittner, D. F., “Britannia’s Sheathed Sword: The Royal Marines and 
Amphibious Warfare in the Interwar Years – A Passive Response”, 
The Journal of Military History, Vol. 55, No. 3, Jul., 1991, p. 345-
364. 
 
Brown, D. K., ‘Sir Rowland Baker, RCNC’, in Warship 1995, 
London, 1995, p. 141-154. 
 
Chapman, J., ‘The “Have-Nots” Go To War The Economic & 
Technical Basis of The German Alliance with Japan’, International 
Studies 1984/III The Tripartite Pact Of 1940: Japan, Germany And 
Italy, 1984, pp. 25 -73. 
 
Crowl, P.A., “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian”, in Makers 
of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton, 
1996, p. 444-154. 
 
Drea, E.J., ‘The Development of Imperial Japanese Army 
Amphibious Warfare Doctrine’, in In the Service of the Emperor: 
Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army, Lincoln, 1998, pp. 14-25. 
 
Erickson, E.J., “Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915”, 
The Journal of Military History, 65, October, 2001, pp. 981-1011. 
 
Falls, C. “Geography and War Strategy”, The Geographical Journal, 
Vol. 112, No. 1/3, Jul.-Sep., 1948, p. 4-18. 
 
Fedorak, C. J., ‘The Royal Navy and British Amphibious Operations 
during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars’, Military Affairs, 
Vol. 52, No: 3, July, 1988, pp. 141-146. 
 
Fleming Polk, J. F., “Vera Cruz, 1847”, in Assault From The Sea: 
Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare, Annapolis, 1993, pp. 
74-78. 
 
Friend, B. and Gardiner, R., ”Amphibious Warfare vessels” in 
Conway’s History Of The Ship: The Eclipse of the Big Gun: The 
Warship 1906-45, London, 1992, pp. 140-150. 
 
Ganz, A. H., ‘”Albion” – The Baltic Islands Operation’, in Military 
Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 2. 1977, pp. 91-97. 
 
Gray, A. W., ‘Joint Logistics in the Pacific Theatre’, in The Big ‘L’: 
American Logistics in World War II, Washington, 1997, pp. 293-
338. 
 
 170 
Harding. R., “Sailors and Gentlemen of Parade: Some Professional 
and Technical Problems Concerning the Conduct of Combined 
Operations in the Eighteenth Century”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 
32, No. 1, p. 35-55. 
 
Horner, D., “The ANZAC contribution: Australia and New Zealand in 
the Pacific War”, in The Pacific War: From Pearl Harbor to 
Hiroshima, Oxford, 2006, pp. 143-158. 
 
LeBlanc, R., Pallet Evolved Along with Forklift, article from 
www.palletenterprise.com 
 
MacGregor, D., “The Use, Misuse, and Non-Use of History: The 
Royal Navy and the Operation Lessons of the First World War”, 
The Journal of Military History, Vol. 56, No. 4, Oct., 1992, p. 603-
616. 
 
MacGregor, J., “The Naked Truth of Battle”, Military Affairs, Vol. 11, 
No. 4, Winter, 1947, pp. 223-228. 
 
Marder, A., ”The Influence of History on Sea Power: The Royal 
Navy and the Lessons of 1914-1918” in The Pacific Historical 
Review, Vol. 41, No. 4., Nov., 1972, p. 413-443. 
 
Millett, A. R., “Assault from the Sea: The development of 
amphibious warfare between the wars: The American, British, and 
Japanese experiences”, in Military Innovation in the Interwar 
Period, New York, 2005, p. 50-95. 
 
Murray, W., ‘Thinking about Revolutions in Military Affairs’, JFQ, 
Summer 1997, pp. 69-76. 
 
Paige, “The Great Landing 1917” in the International Journal of 
Naval History, Vol. 1, No. 1, April, 2002, at www.ijnhonline.org 
 
Saratakes, N. E., ‘The Short but Brilliant Life of The British Pacific 
Fleet’ JFQ, issue: 40, 1st Quarter, 2006, p. 85-91. 
 
Sibley, R. J., “East Africa Fiasco at Tanga“ in History Of The First 
World War Vol. 1, Bristol, 1969, pp. 354-360. 
 
Stephan, J.J., “The Crimean War in the Far East”, Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1969, p. 257-277. 
 
 171 
Stewart, R. A.,, ‘The Japanese Assault on Timor 1942’, Assault 
From The Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare, 
Annapolis, 1993, pp. 202-209. 
 
Sweetman, J., “British Invasion of the Crimea, 1854”, in Assault 
From The Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare, 
Annapolis, 1993, p. 79-87. 
 
Williams, R. C., “Amphibious Scouts and Raiders”, in Military 
Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 3, Autumn, 1949, pp. 150-157. 
 
Wise, T., “ Tsingtao”, in History Of The First World War Vol. 1, 
Bristol, 1969, pp. 320-329. 
 
Yoshikichi, K., “Korean Guard”, p.115, in Japan At War An Oral 
History, London, 2000, pp. 113-120. 
 
DVDs 
 
Granada Television, Warship: The history of War at Sea, 2001. 
